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11 
Setting the Scene
A Guide to This Volume
A disaster occurs when natural phenomena cause physical damage, 
injury or loss of life and assets, environmental degradation, disruption 
in the livelihoods and services of individuals and communities, and 
interruptions in social and economic activity. The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security administers the primary system for recording disasters in the 
United States.1 Major disaster declarations are listed with “DR” fol-
lowed by a sequence number, emergency declarations with “EM,” and 
fire	management	assistance	declarations	with	“FM.”	 In	2015,	FEMA	
recorded	a	total	of	79	natural	disasters.	The	first	major	disaster	declara-
tion of 2015 was made on January 7 for the Mississippi Severe Storms 
and Tornadoes (DR–4205). By the end of 2015, FEMA had issued 43 
major disaster declarations, with the Oklahoma Severe Storms and Tor-
nadoes (DR–4247), declared	on	December	29,	as	the	final	one	of	the	
year.2 Thirteen major disaster declarations were declared in 1953, the 
first	year	recorded	in	the	FEMA	system.
Are disasters becoming more frequent, as the FEMA declarations 
and everyday media reports suggest? Today, most disasters are broad-
cast around the world in real time, through the Internet, radio, television, 
and social networks. Perhaps the frequency of disasters has not neces-
sarily increased, but our methods of tracking potential disastrous events 
have improved so that experts notice them more frequently than in the 
past. Certainly advanced technology has allowed meteorologists to bet-
ter predict weather-related events. Meteorological organizations around 
the world are better equipped to provide increasingly accurate hazard 
assessments on which to base warnings, and early warning systems can 
effectively activate community-based emergency plans to respond to 
these warnings. Furthermore, our ability to communicate information 
has risen, especially with the widespread use of social media.
The	initial	answer	to	the	question	posed	above	is	in	the	affirmative:	
Yes,	disasters	are	increasing	in	frequency	throughout	the	world.3 This 
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response prompts another important question: Is the frequency of natu-
ral	hazards	increasing?	Natural	hazards	are	defined	as	natural	phenom-
ena with the potential to cause destruction. They	can	be	classified	into	
several broad categories: biological, climatological, geological, hydro-
logical, and meteorological.4 These natural hazards have been operating 
throughout history, but they only become noticeable when they nega-
tively affect human populations. Disasters often follow natural hazards: 
they occur when households and assets are both exposed and vulnerable 
to natural hazards. Exposure refers to the people, assets, and systems 
present in hazard zones that are subject to potential losses, whereas vul-
nerability refers to the characteristics and circumstances of an asset, 
community, or system that make it susceptible to the damaging effects 
of a hazard.5	Exposure	is	largely	fixed	by	the	location	of	prior	invest-
ments in infrastructure, economic development, and urbanization, and 
by cultural and social attachment to place.
When a hazard has a negative effect on humans and overwhelms 
their ability to cope (that is, resilience), then it is termed a disaster.6 
The	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	(2007)	finds	that	cli-
mate change contributes to more frequent, severe, and unpredictable 
weather-related	hazards,	such	as	droughts,	floods,	heat	waves,	and	trop-
ical cyclones.7 Resilience with respect to a hazard is determined by the 
degree to which a community has the necessary resources available and 
is capable of organizing itself both prior to the potential hazard occur-
ring and during the incidence of the phenomenon. A disaster causes 
significant	destruction,	 including	loss	of	life,	damage	to	property	and	
infrastructure, a reduction in economic production, the loss of employ-
ment and income, and hardship and suffering caused by the event. The 
severity of a disaster is commonly measured in the number of deaths 
(mortality) or the total dollar amount of the destruction it causes.8 Given 
that natural hazards have occurred throughout history and will always 
be with us, the increase in the frequency of disasters indicates that some-
thing else has changed. Moreover, while natural hazards are becoming 
better understood, the increasing losses associated with them indicate 
that	contemporary	society	still	finds	it	difficult	to	prevent	hazards	from	
becoming disaster risks.
What can account for the increase in the frequency of disasters? A 
recent	 study	finds	 that	 the	 increase	 in	global	 temperatures	 since	pre-
industrial times	significantly	increased	the	probability	of	heavy precipi-
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tation and high heat extremes throughout the world (Fischer and Knutti 
2015).9 Rising temperatures and more intense precipitation contribute 
to the severity of disasters.	 The	 weight	 of	 scientific	 evidence	 finds	
that the increase in the frequency of disasters is due to both anthro-
pogenic (manmade) and natural phenomena. Evidence also suggests 
that weather-related disasters are becoming more frequent compared to 
disasters such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. One explanation 
is that with an increase in human population, exposure and vulnerability 
to hazards rise because more people will be affected. In addition, devel-
opment and urbanization in regions susceptible to natural hazards can 
increase the likelihood that flash floods	and	coastal	floods	will	cause	
a disaster. Examples	 include	building	on	floodplains	or	on	coastlines	
susceptible to tropical cyclones and tsunamis. And human activity can 
increase the frequency or severity of a disaster. Deforestation or over-
grazing,	 for	 example,	 leads	 to	more	 severe	 erosion	 from	 floods	 and	
landslides.
Every year, the World Economic Forum asks a group of about 1,000 
experts	from	academia,	business,	government,	and	not-for-profit	orga-
nizations about the likelihood of 30–50 perceived risks (both likelihood 
and severity in the next 10 years) of human interaction with the envi-
ronment. The perspectives of these experts are published in the Global 
Risks report	that	highlights	the	most	significant	long-term	risks	world-
wide (World Economic Forum 2015). The second most likely perceived 
risk worldwide is extreme-weather events. Howard Kunreuther, an aca-
demic advisor for Global Risks 2015, notes that: 
Experts and the general public are now much more concerned 
with weather-related events than they were ten years ago because 
of the increasing losses from natural disasters around the world. 
‘Extreme weather events’ is ranked as the second most likely 
global risk, and the failure of climate change adaptations is in the 
top	five	global	risks	in	terms	of	potential	impact.	.	.	.	[T]here	are	
now efforts underway . . . to focus on long-term strategies cur-
rently being undertaken by communities to reduce the likelihood 
of severe catastrophes and to cope with disasters more effectively 
should they occur.
The	United	States	has	developed	official	definitions	of	disasters	in	
order to classify and respond to them. The Robert T. Stafford Disas-
ter Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (hereafter, the Stafford Act) 
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authorizes	five	categories	of	committed	action	either	prior	to	a	potential	
hazard occurring or in response to a disaster.10 Three types of declara-
tions	may	be	made	before	a	disaster	occurs:	fire	management	assistance	
declarations, the provision of defense resources before a major disas-
ter is declared, and the decision to pre-position resources and supplies. 
The president of the United States has the authority to issue two types 
of declarations after a disaster overwhelms the combined resources of 
local, county, and state jurisdictions: major disaster and emergency.
This book focuses on three disaster-related categories: major disas-
ter	 declarations,	 emergency	 declarations,	 and	fire	management	 assis-
tance	declarations.	We	utilize	 these	official	definitions	 to	draw	 infer-
ences	 about	 the	 frequency,	 geographic	 patterns,	 trends,	 and	financial	
costs related to disasters. After receiving a request from the governor of 
an affected state for a major disaster declaration, the president may take 
one of three possible actions for federal relief and recovery assistance: 
issue either a major disaster declaration or an emergency declaration, or 
decline the request. The Disaster	Relief	Act	of	1974	firmly	established	
the process of presidential disaster declarations. A major disaster is con-
sidered	to	be	the	result	of	a	natural	hazard	or	of	an	explosion,	fire,	or	
flood,	regardless	of	the	cause.11 Once a president makes a major disaster 
declaration, federal resources are assembled for emergency relief and 
long-term recovery. An emergency declaration is more limited in scope, 
and certain long-term federal recovery programs are not provided. Fire 
management	assistance	grants	are	provided	when	a	fire	is	determined	to	
pose a “threat of major disaster.”
Since a major disaster declaration involves a request from a gov-
ernor to the president, could the election cycle be linked to these dec-
larations? As statewide elections mostly occur in the same years as 
presidential elections, it is possible that more disasters are declared in 
election years. In an exploratory investigation of the likelihood, we test 
for a possible linkage between major disaster declarations and elections 
using regression analysis. While there is a positive association between 
major disaster declarations and election years, the results are not statis-
tically	significant.	Hence,	the	data	for	FEMA-designated	disaster	decla-
rations do not support the election cycle hypothesis.12
Overall, from 1953 through the end of 2013 the cumulative total 
number of declarations in the 50 states and the District of Columbia is 
as follows: 2,046 major disaster (1953–2013), 355 emergency (1974–
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2013),	 and	 1,050	 fire	 management	 (1970–2013).13 The geographic 
entity used in the reporting system is the state/tribal government, and 
each	declaration	 identifies	 the	affected	counties	within	 that	state.	For	
natural disasters that extend across state boundaries, declarations are 
made for each state.
The increase in the occurrence of disasters requires ever-increasing 
taxpayer	dollars	to	finance	the	agencies	responsible	for	improving	“our	
capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and 
mitigate all hazards.”14 Concern	over	the	size	of	federal	budget	deficits	
and the national debt has made policymakers more cognizant of the 
amount of funding the federal government provides to state and local 
governments for disaster assistance and the processes the federal gov-
ernment uses to provide it. Disaster assistance for large-scale destruc-
tive	events	has	usually	been	financed	by	funds	appropriated	outside	tra-
ditional budget constraints, which implies that taxpayers cover a large 
proportion of disaster-related costs.
In March 2011, President Obama issued Presidential Policy Direc-
tive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8) aiming to strengthen the security 
and resilience of the United States to devastating events. The policy 
directive is a national platform for disaster risk reduction; that is, a 
mechanism for coordination and policy guidance on disaster risk reduc-
tion that is interdisciplinary and multisectoral with public, private, and 
civil society participation. It is the national instrument for implement-
ing the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(UNISDR). The goal of PPD-8 is to be achieved through systematic 
preparation for the events that could pose the greatest risk to the secu-
rity of the nation.15 This book examines a number of major disasters 
that pose some of the greatest risks to the United States and discusses 
some of the complex issues associated with mitigation efforts. While 
the adverse effects of hazards often cannot be completely prevented, 
their scale or severity can be substantially reduced through disaster risk 
management.
Our exploration of disasters, however, is limited in scope. First, 
our investigation is restricted to the United States, despite the fact that 
disaster risk is a global issue. We are aware of the global component 
to the topic. It is most comprehensively represented by the UNISDR 
(n.d.), which states that “[T]here is no such thing as a ‘natural’ disaster, 
only natural hazards.” The focus of this multilateral strategy is disas-
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ter risk reduction: “. . . the concept and practice of reducing disaster 
risks through systematic efforts to analyse and reduce the causal factors 
of disasters. Reducing exposure to hazards, lessening vulnerability of 
people and property, wise management of land and the environment, 
and improving preparedness and early warning for adverse events are 
all examples of disaster risk reduction.”
On March 18, 2015, United Nations member-states adopted the 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Relief Reduction. It is a 15-year, volun-
tary, nonbinding agreement that recognizes the primary role of the gov-
ernment in reducing disaster risk but also recognizes that this responsi-
bility should be shared with other stakeholders. Hence, this book should 
be of interest to U.S. policymakers, researchers, and stakeholders who 
are interested in reducing disaster risk.
Second, our empirical analysis is exploratory. As stated previously, 
the costs of disasters can be measured in terms of mortality or the 
total	dollar	amount	of	destruction.	In	this	book,	we	focus	on	financial	
costs, not mortality. The conceptual and practical issues in measuring 
these costs and the direct and indirect effects from a disaster are not 
addressed.16 Instead, we use publicly available databases: one from the 
FEMA reporting system and two developed by the National Oceanic 
and	Atmospheric	Administration	(NOAA).	The	first	is	the	U.S. Billion–
Dollar Weather and Climate Disaster data of the National Climatic 
Data Center (NCDC) and the second is National Weather Service data.17 
Using annual, state-level data we utilize ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation to draw inferences that can provide useful background infor-
mation for increasing our understanding of disasters. This estimation 
technique is one of the most basic and most commonly used prediction 
methods,	with	applications	in	fields	as	diverse	as	economics,	medicine,	
psychology, and statistics. It is a technique that is relatively easy to 
analyze and understand, and it produces solutions that can be easily 
interpreted.	Practically	 speaking,	OLS	 regression	makes	efficient	use	
of the data, and we can obtain good results with relatively small sample 
sizes. The technique, however, does not imply a causal relationship: 
it only shows an association between the variables of interest. More 
sophisticated statistical methods are appropriate to use with a larger 
and richer data set, particularly if the focus of the investigation is at 
the substate level. This point is important to note as most disasters are 
local events. We refer the interested reader to the extensive literature on 
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specific	disasters,	some	of	which	is	referenced	in	subsequent	chapters	
of this book.
Third, we separate the analysis of disasters according to different 
hazard categories. The	UNISDR	(2009)	classifies	hazards on the basis 
of the originating phenomenon type: biological, geological, hydro-
meteorological, and technological. Biological hazards are of organic 
origin or conveyed by biological vectors, such as bacteria, toxins, and 
viruses, that may cause injury or loss of life to humans and animals, 
crop failure, damage to assets and property, social and economic disrup-
tion, and environmental degradation. Geological hazards include geo-
physical phenomena arising from such internal processes of the earth 
as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, which humans cannot usually 
predict; and geophysical phenomena that are the result of such external 
processes of the earth as	 landslides,	mudslides,	and	sometimes	flood-
ing that could be avoided. Disasters originating from external earth 
processes are often related to anthropogenic alterations to the environ-
ment. Hydrometeorological hazards are associated with changes in air 
and ocean temperature that are responsible for the formation of weather 
phenomena, such as hurricanes and tornadoes, and climate and precipi-
tation	variation	that	sometimes	cause	drought,	flooding,	storm	surges,	
and other hydrological phenomena. The fourth hazard type originates 
from technological or industrial conditions, including accidents, dan-
gerous	procedures,	infrastructure	failures,	or	specific	human	activities	
that lead to detrimental effects. Disasters that originate from techno-
logical hazards can be avoided and prevented.
Classification	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	 systematize	 information	 on	
disasters, identify patterns in their impact, and consider their conse-
quences. We look at a subset of all hazards: natural hazards. According 
to the World Meteorological Organization, hazards related to weather, 
climate, and water account for nearly 90 percent of all disasters.18 Nat-
ural hazard events can be characterized according to their magnitude 
or intensity, speed of onset, duration, and area of extent. For exam-
ple, droughts are slow to develop and dissipate and often affect large 
regions, whereas earthquakes have short durations and usually affect a 
relatively small area. Among the disasters considered in this book are 
droughts,	floods,	 hurricanes,	 tornadoes,	 and	wildfires,	which	 are	 dis-
cussed in separate chapters. This approach would be of interest to state 
or regional policymakers, who may be interested in particular types of 
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disasters	as	they	relate	to	their	own	geographic	regions.	We	also	briefly	
examine earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions in addition to 
anthropogenic hazards, combining this discussion into one chapter. Our 
decision to combine geological with anthropogenic hazards is informed 
by the data we use.
We address six questions:
 1) What do we know about disasters in the United States?
 2) Has there been an increase in their frequency?
	 3)	 What	are	the	financial	costs	associated	with	disasters?
 4) What compensation is available to survivors?
 5) Where is each type of disaster likely to occur?
 6) How can disasters be mitigated?
There are nine remaining chapters in this book. Chapter 2 utilizes 
the reporting systems used in the United States for classifying disasters 
to examine	 the	aggregate	 trends	over	 time.	We	find	 that	even	 though	
annual data are highly variable, extreme-weather events are occurring 
with	increasing	frequency.	And	there	are	definite	geographic	trends	in	
disaster declarations. In our presentation of geographic patterns, we use 
the	classification	of	the	U.S.	Census	Bureau	whereby	the	United	States	
is divided into four regions: Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. Each 
of the four census regions is divided into two or more census divisions. 
The Northeast, the Midwest, and the West have two census divisions 
while the South has three. The two divisions in the Northeast region are 
the New England division and the Middle Atlantic division; the East 
North Central division and the West North Central division form the 
Midwest region; and the two divisions in the West region are the Moun-
tain	division	and	the	Pacific	division.	The	three	divisions	in	the	South	
region are the South Atlantic division, the East South Central division, 
and the West South Central division.
In Chapter 2, we also consider the association between population 
density and disasters and the possible linkages of disasters to climate. 
Our analysis shows that the declaration of disasters has increased at a 
much faster rate than the rate of population growth, and there is a statis-
tically	significant	association	between	disasters	and	the	increase	in	tem-
perature. The association between disasters and precipitation, however, 
is	not	statistically	significant.
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Those affected by disasters receive compensation in many ways.19 
Chapter 3 introduces the costs associated with the destructive effects of 
disasters. The returns to capital and the earnings of individuals attached 
to the labor market both decrease when a disaster interrupts produc-
tion. Since labor compensation exceeds half of the value added in 
most industries, reduced earnings are an important element in disaster-
related economic losses. Our discussion does not cover, however, the 
loss of life. Chapter 3 also discusses programs for survivors in disaster 
-affected areas. Effectively assisting survivors requires government 
action beforehand: establishing a response to a disaster, instituting a 
recovery process, and alleviating the damage and hardship of disaster 
survivors through compensation programs. Those affected by a catas-
trophe may receive compensation in many ways, both from private 
arrangements and public disaster assistance programs. Some of the 
assistance	programs	are	specific	to	a	disaster	situation;	other	programs	
are more general and are provided by organizations either in disaster 
situations or delivered to meet regular service requirements.
Among the major disaster declarations between 1953 and 2013, 
hurricanes stand out for their large-scale destructive effects. While they 
accounted for about 10 percent of the 2,046 FEMA-designated major 
disaster declarations, they comprised nearly half of the adverse cost 
estimates in the NCDC data on billion-dollar disasters. In Chapter 4, we 
provide a more detailed discussion of hurricanes. All states along the 
Atlantic and Gulf coasts were affected by several hurricanes between 
1953 and 2013. The 15 states with extensive coastlines extending from 
Massachusetts to Texas accounted for 82 percent of the hurricane-
related major disasters during these 61 years. As a consequence, the 
losses attributable to hurricanes dominate the various programs that 
provide support to disaster survivors. Hurricanes also have obvious 
labor market effects: higher total unemployment and increased pay-
ments	of	unemployment	insurance	(UI)	benefits.	Similarly,	hurricanes	
figure	prominently	in	the	losses	of	the	Disaster	Unemployment	Assis-
tance (DUA) program.
Between 1953 and 2013, 62 percent of the major disaster declara-
tions	in	the	United	States	involved	flooding.	Chapter	5	examines	floods,	
the most frequent of all disasters. States located along major rivers and 
their	tributaries	have	extensive	experiences	with	river	flooding.	Coastal	
floods,	northeasters	(also	nor’easters), storm surges, and tsunamis also 
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cause	flooding.20	We	examine	 the	extent	of	flood	 insurance	coverage	
and the frequency of compensation paid by the National Flood Insur-
ance	Program.	The	 labor	market	effects	of	floods	are	also	examined.	
Unemployment	 increases	 considerably	with	 disastrous	 flooding.	 Our	
analysis	suggests	that	the	UI	benefits	paid	as	a	result	of	flooding	rep-
resent	a	significant	increment	to	the	benefits	paid	directly	by	the	DUA	
program.
Chapter 6 discusses tornadoes. Tornadoes were present in 441 of the 
2,046 major disaster declarations between 1953 and 2013. While present 
in the majority of geographical areas, the most common and most severe 
tornadoes occur in the Midwest region of the United States. Generally, 
while tornadoes are responsible for much smaller aggregate destruction 
compared	 to	hurricanes,	drought,	and	river	floods,	 there	 is	some	evi-
dence that tornadoes are having larger damaging effects in recent years.
Of the eight largest billion-dollar disasters, four were hurricanes 
and three were droughts. Hurricanes and droughts dominate the cost 
estimates of the billion-dollar disasters, accounting for 72 percent of the 
NCDC’s overall total. Chapter 7 examines drought. The FEMA disaster 
-designated	 classification	 affecting	 agricultural	 producers	 includes	
floods,	hail,	severe	storms,	and	winter	freezes,	but	not	drought.	There	is	
an important contrast between the onset and duration of drought com-
pared to other disasters, which span one or a few days. Drought, in con-
trast, extends over several months or even years, and drought-related 
agricultural and other economic losses also accumulate over longer 
periods.
Drought	often	contributes	to	the	severity	of	wildland	fires,	exam-
ined	in	Chapter	8.	Most	wildfires	occur	in	the	West	region	of	the	United	
States. While	wildland	 fires	 have always been an integral and natu-
ral part of forest and prairie ecosystems, new climatic conditions and 
increasing	human	development	are	changing	the	scale	of	wildfires	and	
the	length	of	the	wildfire	season.	More	people	build	homes	in	and	near	
wildfire-prone	areas,	exposing	individuals	and	families	to	greater	risks	
from	fires	and	causing	 increased	fire	suppression	and	recovery	costs.	
A distinguishing feature of our societal arrangements to combat wild-
fires	is	that	they	occur	with	such	regular	frequency	that	we	maintain	an	
ongoing	capacity	 to	fight	wildfires	with	permanent	staffing	at	 federal	
and	state	agencies.	Hence,	the	fire	management	assistance	declarations	
made by FEMA represent only a small fraction of the annual number 
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of	formally	recognized	wildfires	that	occur.	These	wildfire	activities	are	
separate	from	the	actions	of	local	fire	departments.	
Chapter 9 considers geological and technological hazards that occur 
as a result of human interaction with the environment. Anthropogenic 
disasters discussed in this chapter include the Oklahoma Explosion at 
Federal Courthouse in Oklahoma City (DR–1048) on April 26, 1995, 
and the New York Terrorist Attack (DR–1391) on September 11, 2001. 
The likelihood of a geological hazard such as the 1906 San Francisco 
earthquake occurring is extremely rare and the associated losses would 
be devastating. It is a catastrophic hazard: a low-probability, high- 
consequence event. We recognize that looking at the last six decades of 
disaster experience does not capture such extreme risks.
Chapter 10 examines the role of private insurance and private– 
public partnerships in providing coverage for adverse events and out-
lines some of the problems. We emphasize the critical role of incen-
tives (both private and public), institutional arrangements, and the pos-
sibilities and limits to governmental actions. Catastrophic risk and the 
insurance market is more than just the demand, supply, and the market-
clearing price for risk. Individuals, economic agents and governments 
can limit or mitigate the worst effects of catastrophic risk through an 
intelligent combination of insurance and prevention. The chapter high-
lights	selected	findings	from	this	volume	and	offers	some	suggestions	
for national disaster policies, including proposals for legislation and 
administrative practices to improve planning and responses to disasters. 
There are many steps one can take to prepare for potential disasters 
and to respond to them when they occur. A key part of preparedness is 
the prediction of a potential natural hazard. Forecasts and early warn-
ings of such hazards can help prevent and mitigate disasters, save lives, 
and reduce damage to property and to the environment. Decision mak-
ers can foster the design and installation of warning systems to alert 
people of extreme-weather events that may be about to occur. Steps 
need to be taken to increase resilience. For instance, one can develop 
and enforce building codes requiring that buildings be able to withstand 
earthquakes,	floods,	or	high	winds.	Increasing	resilience	to	natural	haz-
ards requires a greater understanding of them.
Disasters impose a massive toll of human suffering. Generally 
speaking, fewer people are dying in disasters but the resulting destruc-
tion is more costly. The damage and losses do not originate from the 
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forces of nature but, rather, from the interaction of natural forces and 
the misguided choices of humans. The scale of the destruction depends 
on the choices we make about our lives and our environment, and these 
choices make us more susceptible to disasters or more resilient to them. 
While damage and losses from disasters have risen, their increase has 
been slower than the growth in population, which indicates that appro-
priate prevention measures and effective emergency preparedness are 
proving to be successful.
We trust that this book will provide useful information on disasters 
in the United States as well as highlight some of the issues that need to 
be addressed. We believe this volume could serve as a basis and inspira-
tion for continuing work on disasters. 
Notes
  1. Prior to the creation of FEMA, state/tribal and local governments worked with 
many separate disaster-related federal agencies. In 1979, President Carter central-
ized the federal emergency functions into one agency. In 2003, FEMA became 
part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
 2. See	 https://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year/2015?field_disaster_type_term_tid_1 
=All (accessed July 27, 2016). The incident period for DR-4205 was from Decem-
ber 23, 2014, to December 24, 2014, with the major disaster declaration declared 
on January 7, 2015. The incident period for DR-4247 was from November 27, 
2015, to November 29, 2015, with the declaration made on December 29, 2015. 
We use the FEMA-designated system for recording extreme events as the basis of 
our investigation of disasters in the United States. One can obtain further informa-
tion about each event from the agency website.
  3. See http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/trends-in-natural-disasters (accessed July 27, 
2016). GRID-Arendal works in partnership with the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) to support informed decision making and to raise awareness 
of environmental issues. The World Bank and the United Nations (2010) and the 
United Nations (2015) also report an increase in global disasters.
			4.	 This	classification	is	the	one	used	by	the	Emergency	Events	Database	of	the	Cen-
tre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (EM-DAT/CRED), with disas-
ters further divided into 12 types and 30 subtypes. The database has the advantage 
of providing greater differentiation of disasters that have very different conse-
quences. See Guha-Sapir, Below, and Hoyois (n.d.).  
   5. See UNISDR (2009). There are many facets of vulnerability, which are a result of 
various economic, environmental, physical, and social factors. Examples include 
disregard for prudent environmental management, inadequate protection of assets, 
lack	of	public	awareness	and	information,	limited	official	recognition	of	risks	and	
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preparedness measures, and unsuitable design and construction of buildings and 
infrastructure.
   6. For a brief explanation of the distinction between a hazard and a disaster, see 
World	Bank	and	the	United	Nations	(2010,	p.	25,	Box	1.2);	for	formal	definitions	
of disaster-related terminology, see UNISDR (2009).
			7.	 Climate	change	is	defined	by	the	UNISDR	(2009)	as	changes	in	climate	that	may	
be due to natural phenomena or to persistent anthropogenic changes in atmosphere 
or in land use. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(1992,	 p.	 3)	 definition	 focuses	 on	 anthropogenic	 alterations:	 “A	 change	 of	 cli-
mate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the 
composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate 
variability observed over comparable time periods.” The Intergovernmental Panel 
on	Climate	Change	(2007)	finds	that	climate	change	is	gradually	altering	average	
temperature, the timing and amount of precipitation, and sea levels. There is the 
potential for more severe changes if carbon emissions are not successfully limited 
and reduced.
   8. In the assessment of disasters, the literature distinguishes between damages and 
losses. The term damages refers to the destruction of assets, both human and 
physical, caused by a disaster. The term losses	refers	to	the	reduction	in	the	flow	
of	benefits,	such	as	income,	that	results	from	the	disaster.	The	United	Nations	Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has developed 
a methodology for estimating the consequences of a disaster and for determining 
the	finances	needed	to	rebuild	affected	areas.	For	the	accounting	framework	used	
by ECLAC in assessing disasters, detailed information about what is included, and 
how each category is measured, see ECLAC (2014).
  9. Fischer and Knutti (2015) show that the largest proportion of the most rare and 
extreme events is anthropogenic and the increase in these events is nonlinear as 
global temperatures further increase. 
  10. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 
amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. The legislation establishes the statutory 
authority for most federal disaster response and recovery activities especially as 
they relate to FEMA and FEMA programs.
		11.	 Section	102(2)	of	the	Stafford	Act	defines	the	term	major disaster as “any natu-
ral catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven 
water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, 
snow	storm,	or	drought),	or	regardless	of	cause,	any	fire,	flood,	or	explosion	in	
any part of the United States, which in the determination of the president causes 
damage	of	sufficient	severity	and	magnitude	to	warrant	major	disaster	assistance	
under this chapter to supplement the efforts and available resources of state, local 
governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, 
hardship, or suffering caused thereby” 42 U.S. C.5122 (2).
   12. To test for a possible association between major disaster declarations and presi-
dential elections, a categorical (dummy) election variable is added to trend regres-
sion Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) in Chapter 2. The election dummy variable 
equals 1.0 in presidential election years and zero otherwise. The regression results 
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of	both	equations	show	that	the	estimated	coefficients	of	the	election	variables	are	
positive as hypothesized with values of 2.5–2.6; but with t-ratios of only 0.7–0.8, 
these	ratios	are	far	below	the	level	required	for	statistical	significance.	Hence,	the	
results do not support the hypothesis of an association between major disaster 
declarations and presidential elections. Using data from 1960 to 2008, Kunreuther 
and Michel-Kerjan (2009) control for differences in the incidence of damaging 
floods	by	using	precipitation	 and	damages	 as	 covariates.	The	 adjusted	mean	 is	
5.3 in reelection years and 4.4 in other years. Theoretical and empirical investiga-
tions of political considerations in disaster declarations are available in the litera-
ture, particularly the political science literature. For instance, Healy and Malhotra 
(2009). 
 13. These 2,046 events all occurred in the 50 states plus D.C. An additional 109 major 
disaster declarations were announced in seven outlying territories: American 
Samoa, the Federated States of Micronesia, Guam, the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
 14. The quote is part of the mission of FEMA. See https://www.fema.gov/declaration-
process-fact-sheet (accessed July 27, 2016).
 15.	 The	U.S.	Department	 of	Homeland	Security	 defines	 national	 preparedness	 as	
“the actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sus-
tain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects 
of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the 
security	of	the	Nation.”	Security	is	defined	as	“the	protection	of	the	Nation	and	
its people, vital interests, and way of life,” and resilience as “the ability to adapt 
to changing conditions and withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to 
emergencies.” See http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national 
-preparedness (accessed July 27, 2016).
	16.	 The	assessment	of	damage	is	difficult,	prone	to	both	overestimation	(for	example,	
double	counting)	and	underestimation	(for	example,	it	is	difficult	to	value	loss	of	
life or damage to the environment). For information on the conceptual issues in 
the compilation of U.S. data, see Smith and Katz (2013) and Smith and Matthews 
(2015). 
 17. The former National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) is now known as the National 
Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI) and is “responsible for preserv-
ing, monitoring, assessing, and providing public access to the nation’s treasure of 
climate and historical weather and information.”
 18. See http://public.wmo.int/en/our-mandate/what-we-do (accessed July 27, 2016).
 19. Note that the term compensation is actually a misnomer because the amounts 
people receive in recompense are usually less than what has been lost.
 20. A northeaster is a large-scale storm along the upper east coast of the United States 
and Atlantic Canada.
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Reporting, Frequency, and 
Correlates of Disasters
The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (2014) states that disasters derive from a combination of 
two factors: 1) natural phenomena capable of unleashing processes that 
lead to physical damage and the loss of human lives and capital, and 
2) the vulnerability of individuals and human settlements. These events 
disrupt the living conditions of communities and individuals and the 
economic activity of countries.
Disasters impose a massive toll of human suffering. As stated in 
Chapter 1, fewer people are dying in disasters but the resulting destruc-
tion	 is	more	costly.	The	World	Bank	and	United	Nations	 (2010)	find	
that the annual global damage from disasters between 1970 and 2010 
(adjusted	for	inflation)	fluctuated,	but	damage	in	the	recent	two	decades	
was	significantly	greater	than	in	the	earlier	decades.	Has	the	incidence	
of disasters increased in the United States? What are the causal factors 
of disasters? Is there a relationship between extreme-weather events 
and climate? Is there a geographic pattern? These questions are initially 
answered in this chapter and discussed in more detail in subsequent 
ones.
The	first	section	examines	the	aggregate	trends	in	disaster-related	
declarations over time. While annual data are highly variable, extreme-
weather events in the United States are occurring with increasing fre-
quency.	These	results	are	consistent	with	 the	research	findings	of	 the	
American Meteorological Society, which investigates extreme events 
from a climate perspective. A number of their recent studies indicate 
that human-caused climate change greatly increased the likelihood and 
intensity	for	extreme	heat	waves;	a	climate	influence	was	found	in	some	
instances of such extreme events as droughts, heavy rains, and winter 
storms, but not in other instances.1
The second section presents a taxonomy of adverse weather-related 
events and provides a framework for examining them. The chapter then 
briefly	examines	trends	in	four	categories	of	hazards:	floods,	tornadoes,	
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hurricanes, and “all other” hazards. The categories are discussed in 
more detail in individual chapters of the book. It is possible that popu-
lation growth and urbanization are responsible for the increasing fre-
quency of disaster-related declarations. The fourth section considers the 
association between population density and these declarations. From 
our analysis, it is clear that major disaster declarations have increased 
at a much faster rate than the rate of population growth since the early 
1950s.	Two	factors	that	could	influence	the	frequency	of	catastrophic	
events are rising temperatures and heavy precipitation. The following 
two sections examine the possible linkages of disasters to climate and 
weather	and	briefly	discuss	the	geographic	trends	in	major	disaster	dec-
larations.	The	final	section	has	concluding	comments.
AGGREGATE TRENDS IN DISASTER DECLARATIONS
Annual data from the reporting system developed by FEMA show 
that disaster-related declarations are highly variable. As stated in the 
Chapter 1, FEMA-designated declarations fall into three categories: 
major	disaster	declarations,	emergency	declarations,	and	fire	manage-
ment	assistance	declarations.	For	both	major	disaster	and	fire	manage-
ment	 assistance	 declarations	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 upward	 trend.	The	
number of emergency declarations, on the other hand, is highly variable 
from	year	to	year	but	does	not	show	a	significant	trend.
Figure 2.1 displays the number of major disaster declarations from 
1953	 to	 2013.	The	figure	 also	 shows	 the	 linear	 trend	 from	 a	 regres-
sion using ordinary least squares estimation. A linear trend is evident 
when the slope of the regression line is statistically different from zero; 
a positive slope indicates an increasing trend and a negative slope a 
decreasing trend.
The regression equation “explains” 62 percent of the time-series 
variation over the sample period.2	 The	 slope	 coefficient	 (0.885)	 of	
the equation indicates that major disaster declarations increased at an 
annual rate of slightly less than one per year from 1953 to 2013, the 
period spanned in Figure 2.1. Thus, the annual number of major disaster 
declarations averaged 15–20 declarations in the mid-1950s but closer to 
60 declarations in recent years.
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Figure 2.1 also vividly illustrates that major disaster declarations 
are highly variable from one year to the next. The standard error of the 
regression equation exceeds 12.3 Large positive errors are observed in 
2008, 2010, and 2011; large negative errors in 1989 and 1990. Finally, 
note the succession of positive errors during 1962–1965, 1972–1975, 
and again during 2007–2011. Conversely, the errors were consistently 
negative between 1980 and 1990. The results of the regression analysis 
suggest that while there is a persistent and large upward trend in major 
disaster declarations between 1953 and 2013, large year-to-year varia-
tion is also observed.
The	second	category	of	declarations	examined	here	is	fire	manage-
ment assistance. Measured since 1970 in the FEMA reporting system, 
fire	management	assistance	declarations	also	exhibit	a	positive	 trend.	
Figure	2.2	shows	the	annual	number	of	fire	management	assistance	dec-
larations and a linear trend regression line for the 44 years from 1970 
to 2013. Similar to major disaster declarations, a strong upward trend 
is	apparent	in	Figure	2.2	for	fire	management	assistance	declarations.	
Figure 2.1  Major Disaster Declarations, 1953–2013
SOURCE: Major disaster declarations data from FEMA. The linear trend is regression 
Equation (2.1) in Table 2.1.
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Similarly, there is a wide year-to-year variation since the mid-1990s. 
Figure	2.2	also	shows	a	sharp	increase	in	the	number	of	fire	manage-
ment assistance declarations in the mid-1990s. Prior to 1995 there were 
fewer than 10 declarations in any year. Between 1998 and 2013, how-
ever,	 there	were	 at	 least	 39	 fire	management	 assistance	 declarations	
in 14 of 16 years, all except 2010 (18) and 2013 (28). This break in 
the data is discussed below and examined in more detail in Chapter 8, 
which	addresses	wildfires.
Emergency declarations have been recorded in the FEMA reporting 
system since 1974. Recall from Chapter 1 that the process of presi-
dential	 disaster	 declarations	was	firmly	 established	 in	 1974.	As	 seen	
in Table 2.1, a linear trend between 1974 and 2013 is positive but 
small.	While	 there	 is	 no	 significant	 trend	 in	 emergency	declarations,	
the annual number is highly variable. The average number of annual 
emergency declarations was about 9 between 1974 and 2013. Over the 
same period, these declarations exceeded 15 in 8 different years but fell 
below 5 in 17 years. Nearly all variation in annual emergency declara-
tions is independent of a linear trend.
Emergency declarations in individual years also show a strong 
bunching pattern by the type of emergency. These declarations helped 
local areas address a broad range of disaster situations with highly 
varied annual rates of occurrence. Drought assistance was unusually 
prevalent in 1977, while winter storm declarations were numerous in 
1993, 2003, and 2005. All 50 states and D.C. received emergency dec-
larations linked to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The declaration for Hur-
ricane Katrina authorized various types of assistance to be provided to 
local survivors, as well as aid to individuals and families who moved 
away from Katrina-impacted areas.4 Hurricanes and tornadoes caused 
numerous emergency declarations in 1999, 2011, and 2012.
Table 2.1 shows the results of a regression analysis that characterize 
the historical experience for the three categories of declarations. The 
analysis emphasizes trends and breaks in the data series. Because the 
three series are available for differing time periods, the starting point 
for each trend is different. The starting year for major disaster declara-
tions	is	1953;	for	fire	management	assistance	declarations,	1970;	and	
for emergency declarations, 1974.
To increase comparability in long-term trends, each regression equa-
tion is centered at zero in 1970, decreased by one in successive earlier 
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years and increased by one in subsequent later years. The purpose of 
the analysis is to test for trends and shifts in the rate of disaster-related 
occurrences for the three declaration series. The regression equations 
also test for a possible acceleration in the rate of disaster occurrences. 
The year selected for the start of the accelerated trend is 1995, chosen 
after	some	experiments	with	specifications.
Equation (2.1.1) in Figure 2.1 is a simple regression of the number 
of major declarations on a linear trend. Equation (2.1.2) adds a second 
trend to major disaster declarations, one that commences in 1995. A 
positive	 coefficient	 on	 the	 1995	 trend	 implies	 an	 acceleration	 in	 the	
annual occurrence of major disaster declarations. The regression results 
indicate that major disaster declarations were increasing at a rate of 
0.55 for each year between 1953 and 1994, but the rate of change then 
increased to 1.92 for each year between 1995 and 2013.5 These results 
suggest more than a doubling of the trend rate of increase starting in 
1995. The acceleration in the rate of change has important implications 
for the annual occurrence of major disaster declarations. The projected 
Figure 2.2  Fire Management Assistance Declarations, 1970–2013
SOURCE: Fire management declarations from FEMA. The linear trend is regression 
Equation (2.3) in Table 2.1.
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20  Table 2.1  Regression Results of Disasters Declarations
Dependent variable: 
Declarations Constant
Long-term 
trend
New trend 
in 1995
Dummy 
variable 
1995 = 1
Adjusted 
R2
Standard 
error
Durbin- 
Watson Mean
(2.1.1) Major disaster 22.06
(11.4)
0.885
(10.0)
0.623 12.17 1.32 33.56
(2.1.2) Major disaster 22.08
(12.4)
0.555
(4.4)
1.367
(3.4)
0.680 11.20 1.60 33.56
(2.1.3) Fire management −11.23
(1.9)
1.632
(7.0)
0.529 19.59 2.10 23.86
(2.1.4) Fire management −1.43
(0.2)
0.493
(1.2)
34.05
(3.2)
0.616 17.68 2.81 23.86
(2.1.5) Fire management 1.86 
(0.3)
0.218 
(0.4)
0.899 
(1.0)
31.094 
(2.9)
0.616 17.67 2.87 23.86
(2.1.6) Emergency 2.14
(0.5)
0.287
(1.7)
0.047 12.21 2.02 8.88
(2.1.7) Emergency 9.64
(1.6)
−0.263
(0.7)
1.143
(1.8)
0.097 11.88 2.18 8.88
NOTE: To be precise, the required t-ratio	at	the	0.05	level	of	significance	under	a	two-sided	t-test is 1.97 and 1.67 under a one-sided t-test.
SOURCE:	The	regression	equations	explain	the	number	of	major	disaster	declarations,	fire	management	declarations,	and	emergency	dec-
larations	from	the	first	available	year	until	2013.	The	starting	year	for	major	disaster	declarations	is	1953;	for	fire	management	assistance	
declarations,	1970;	and	for	emergency	declarations,	1974.	Beneath	each	coefficient	is	the	absolute	value	of	its	t-ratio; a result is statisti-
cally	significant	if	the	t-ratio is 2.0 or larger.
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annual number of occurrences implied by regression Equation (2.1.2) 
is as follows: 12.6 in 1953, 35.4 in 1994, and 71.9 in 2013. During 
the earliest 41 years of the time series, the projected increase of occur-
rences	was	22.8,	but	during	 the	final	20	years	 the	projected	 increase	
was 36.5. As predicted by Equation (2.1.2), the annual occurrences of 
major disaster declarations in 2013 were 5.7 times more numerous than 
declarations in 1953.
Equations	(2.1.3)–(2.1.5),	inclusive,	in	Table	2.1	focus	on	fire	man-
agement assistance declarations between 1970 and 2013. The linear 
trend	coefficient	in	Equation	(2.1.3)	is	highly	significant.	Recall	from	
Figure	2.2,	however,	that	the	annual	pattern	of	fire	management	assis-
tance declarations shows a sharp discontinuity in the mid-1990s. Equa-
tion (2.1.4) adds a categorical (dummy) variable (equal to 1 in 1995 and 
later years; and equal to 0 before 1995) to the linear trend. The dummy 
variable	 adds	 significantly	 to	 the	 explained	 variation,	 resulting	 in	 an	
increase of the adjusted R2 from 0.529 to 0.616. In Equation (2.1.4), 
the	dummy	variable	implies	that	the	annual	number	of	fire	management	
assistance declarations was 34.1 higher during 1995–2013 when com-
pared to earlier years. Equation (2.1.5) adds a 1995 trend acceleration 
variable.	While	it	enters	with	a	positive	coefficient,	it	is	not	statistically	
significant.
As	 stated	 above,	 the	 trend	 coefficients	 in	 Equations	 (2.1.4)	 and	
(2.1.5)	 are	 all	 positive	 but	 not	 statistically	 significant.	 Nevertheless,	
because	the	coefficient	of	the	1995	shift	dummy	is	large	and	positive,	
the	 estimated	 number	 of	 fire	 management	 assistance	 declarations	 is	
much higher in 1995 and later years compared to earlier years. Projec-
tions from Equation (2.1.5) for selected years are as follows: 1.9 in 
1970, 7.2 in 1994, 39.3 in 1995, and 60.2 in 2013. As with major disas-
ters,	fire	management	assistance	declarations	have	occurred	with	much	
greater frequency from 1995 to 2013 than during earlier years.
In	Chapter	8	we	highlight	wildfires	as	one	of	the	disasters	selected	
for further discussion. A distinguishing feature of our societal arrange-
ments	to	combat	wildfires	is	that	they	occur	with	such	regular	frequency	
that	we	maintain	an	ongoing	capacity	to	fight	fires	with	permanent	staff-
ing	 at	 federal	 and	 state	 agencies.	Hence,	 the	 fire	management	 assis-
tance declarations made by FEMA represent only a small fraction of 
the	annual	number	of	 formally	 recognized	fires	 that	occur,	mainly	 in	
western states.
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As noted earlier in this section, emergency declarations are highly 
variable. Equations (2.1.6) and (2.1.7) reinforce this observation. Equa-
tion	(2.1.6)	shows	the	results	of	a	regression	that	fits	the	annual	number	
of	emergency	declarations	to	a	linear	trend.	While	the	trend	coefficient	
is	positive,	it	is	only	marginally	significant,	and	less	than	5	percent	of	the	
variation between 1974 and 2013 in the time series is explained. Adding 
a trend acceleration term that starts in 1995 (Equation 2.1.7) implies a 
small downward trend in emergency declarations before 1995.6 From 
that equation, the estimated number of emergency declarations for three 
selected years is as follows: 8.8 in 1974, 3.3 in 1994, and 20.0 in 2013.
Overall, the results of the regression analysis in Table 2.1 predict 
60–70	major	disaster	 and	fire	management	 assistance	declarations	 in	
2013. The projected number of emergency declarations, however, is 
only about one-third of those averages. If we are to reduce the incidence 
of disasters, then we need to identify the causal factors. The following 
section introduces a taxonomy for examining adverse weather-related 
hazards.
TAXONOMY OF ADVERSE WEATHER-RELATED EVENTS
Extreme-weather events are occurring with increasing frequency 
not only in the United States but throughout the world. The World Bank 
and	 the	United	Nations	 (2010)	 examine	five	 extreme-weather	 events	
(drought,	 earthquake,	 extreme	 temperatures,	 floods,	 and	 storms)	 and	
find	 a	 worldwide	 increase	 in	 their	 frequency.	 The	 taxonomy	 in	 this	
section introduces and discusses a framework for examining adverse 
weather-related events. A more comprehensive taxonomy would incor-
porate additional categories of societal disasters. These include geolog-
ical	events	such	as	volcanic	eruptions	and	lava	flows.	A	complete	tax-
onomy would also include such anthropological disasters as breaches 
in canal walls, dam failures, and terrorist attacks. Our framework in this 
section, however, is limited to extreme-weather events.
Table 2.2 presents a taxonomy of extreme-weather events that 
shows their correlates in terms of three underlying weather conditions: 
precipitation, temperature, and wind. The table also includes a fourth 
dimension: their average duration. The duration averages are derived 
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from the U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disaster data devel-
oped by the NCDC that includes the duration (in days) of each event.7 
This comprehensive data set estimates the cost of the most destruc-
tive weather and climate events in the United States from 1980 to pres-
ent.8 The taxonomy in Table 2.2 shows the usual correlates of extreme 
weather and climate events, but not the conditions that must always 
be	present	for	their	occurrence.	Drought	and	wildfires	can	occur	in	the	
absence of high temperatures, winter freezes do not require high pre-
cipitation, and tornadoes are not always accompanied by heavy pre-
cipitation. Conversely, a severe storm will be more damaging if it is 
accompanied by high wind.
Table 2.2 displays the typical combination of conditions accompa-
nying extreme-weather events. Generally, the destruction caused by an 
extreme-weather event occurs over a relatively short period, typically 
within	a	week	or	 less.	The	devastating	effects	of	droughts,	wildfires,	
and	floods,	however,	can	extend	over	a	much	longer	period.	The	final	
column of Table 2.2 shows the average duration of the event based on 
information from the NCDC data on billion-dollar disasters. Droughts 
and	wildfires	extend	for	months,	as	can	river	flooding.	The	destruction	
caused by hurricanes and tornadoes, in contrast, occurs in just a few 
days.
The	classification	used	in	Table	2.2	closely	resembles	the	catego-
ries used by NCDC in its description of billion-dollar disasters. The 
NCDC categories, however, usually show tornadoes as one element of 
a combination of extreme-weather events. For instance, in May 2008, 
Table 2.2  Correlates of Seven Extreme-Weather Events
Extreme-weather event Precipitation Temperature Wind
Average 
duration (days)
Winter storm, freeze High Low 15
Severe storm High High 12
Drought Low High 191
Wildland	fires Low High 127
Flooding High 33
Tornadoes High High 4
Hurricanes, tropical storms High High 5
SOURCE: The taxonomy is developed by the authors. The estimates of the duration of 
extreme-weather events are averages from the NCDC database of 170 billion-dollar 
disasters that occurred between 1980 and 2013.
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NCDC records a billion-dollar disaster in the Midwest caused by “tor-
nadoes	and	severe	weather.”	By	definition,	tornadoes	are	characterized	
by	wind	speeds	that	exceed	a	specific	minimum	threshold	(73	miles	per	
hour) that can add to the destructive potential of a severe storm. Our 
taxonomy shows tornadoes and severe storms as separate categories.
Unlike precipitation and temperature where high and low ranges 
can both cause severe damage, wind damage occurs only with high 
winds. Numeric scales describe the severity (speed) of the damaging 
high winds that circulate around a low-pressure center for hurricanes, 
tropical storms, and tornadoes. Wind damage can also be caused by 
wind events called straight-line winds, which are often present during 
severe storms and thunderstorms and frequently are downdrafts associ-
ated with storms. Straight-line winds have speeds that exceed 50 or 60 
miles	per	hour	and	often	occur	in	conjunction	with	flooding	and	torna-
does. For example, between 2000 and 2013 there were 57 major disas-
ter declarations where part of the damage was caused by straight-line 
winds. For every one of these 57 events, the FEMA incident descrip-
tion usually associated them with “severe storms.” The FEMA inci-
dent	description	also	uses	“flood”	in	45	and	“tornado”	in	41	of	these	57	
major disasters. During a severe storm, straight-line winds can be part 
of	the	weather	mix	that	may	include	floods	and	tornadoes.
The 2,046 major disaster declarations declared by FEMA between 
1953 and 2013 cover a wide range of events. Certain disasters, such as 
hurricanes	and	earthquakes,	fit	easily	into	distinct	categories.	The	inci-
dent descriptions of FEMA for other disasters, however, include two 
or	more	descriptors	that	make	it	difficult	to	categorize.	For	example,	a	
major disaster could be described as having “severe storms, straight-
line	winds,	and	tornadoes,”	or	as	“severe	storms,	flooding,	landslides,	
and mudslides.”9 During these 61 years 1,273 major disasters involved 
flooding	and	1,215	involved	severe	storms.	FEMA’s	incident	descrip-
tions	indicate	that	severe	storms	and	flooding	were	both	present	in	969	
of these major disasters. Both elements were present in 79.7 percent 
of the severe storms events (969 of 1,215) and in 76.1 percent of the 
flood	events	 (969	of	1,273).	The	high	frequency	of	 joint	occurrences	
of	these	phenomena	means	the	severe	storms	and	floods	are	difficult,	
if not impossible, to separate. We make a judgment call and attribute 
the	destruction	from	flooding	as	the	more	important	contributor	to	the	
disaster.	As	a	consequence,	the	book	includes	a	discussion	of	flooding	
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in Chapter 5 but excludes a discussion of severe storms in a separate 
chapter.
Over the full period of reporting major disasters since 1953, the 
FEMA incident descriptions have evolved. In the years before 1970, 
the majority of major disaster declarations were described with just a 
single descriptor. For instance, Louisiana Floods (DR-84), declared on 
May 20, 1958, has a single descriptor. Since 1970 most major disaster 
declarations use two, three, or more descriptors. For instance, Vermont 
Excessive Rainfall, High Winds, Flooding (DR-1184), declared on July 
25, 1997, has three descriptors. The following section uses these inci-
dent descriptors to assign individual disasters into one of four catego-
ries in order to explain the variation in major disasters between 1953 
and 2013.
TRENDS IN SELECT DISASTERS
The analysis of major disaster declarations in this section looks at 
four	categories	of	hazards:	floods,	tornadoes,	hurricanes,	and	“all	other”	
hazards. The latter is a catch-all category that includes such diverse 
geological	 hazards	 as	 earthquakes,	 wildfires,	 and	 winter	 freezes,	 as	
well as technological hazards such as anthropogenic disasters. Anthro-
pogenic disasters include events such as the Oklahoma Explosion at 
Federal Courthouse in Oklahoma City (DR-1048), declared on April 
26, 1995, and the New York Terrorist Attack (DR-1391), declared on 
September 11, 2001.
Admittedly, the decision rules for assigning individual disasters 
into	these	four	categories	are	arbitrary.	The	classification	of	hurricanes	
is the most straightforward, as the incident description is a single word: 
hurricane. Between 1953 and 2013 there were 208 hurricane-related 
major disasters caused by 70 separate hurricanes, with an average of 
2.7 states affected by each hurricane. We classify a major disaster as a 
flood	if	the	word	appears	in	the	incident	description;	a	similar	classifica-
tion rule is used to identify tornadoes. Where an incident description is 
labeled	with	both	“flood”	and	“tornado,”	we	place	the	disaster	in	each	
category. During 1953–2013, 1,273 major	 disasters	 involved	 floods,	
441	involved	tornadoes,	and	275	were	associated	with	both	floods	and	
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tornadoes.	The	regression	analysis	of	floods	and	tornadoes	uses	dupli-
cate counts of these events. The fourth category, “all other,” represents 
499 major disasters, almost one-quarter of the 1953–2013 total.
Table 2.3 displays the results of a regression analysis to explain the 
variation in the four categories of major disasters between 1953 and 
2013.	For	each	category	there	are	three	specifications:	first,	a	fit	of	the	
dependent variable to a linear trend for the full period; second, a trend 
for the full period and a trend acceleration that starts in 1971; and third, 
a trend for the full period and a trend acceleration that starts in 1995. 
All	four	categories	of	major	disasters	exhibit	a	significant	upward	trend	
between	1953	and	2013.	For	floods,	tornadoes,	and	the	“all	other”	cat-
egory,	the	trend	is	statistically	significant,	and	more	than	40	percent	of	
the variation is associated with the trend. The results of the equations 
for hurricanes have the least explanatory power, where each adjusted R2 
is below 0.20. Hurricanes are the least frequent of the four categories of 
major disasters examined.10
The results of tests for an acceleration in the trends yield positive 
coefficients	in	all	eight	equations	that	included	a	second	(later)	trend.	
Six	of	the	eight	trend-acceleration	coefficients	are	statistically	signifi-
cant.	The	1995	trend-acceleration	coefficient	is	significant	for	all	four	
categories	 of	major	 disasters.	 For	 floods	 in	 particular,	 the	 regression	
results show that the acceleration was stronger after 1995 than after 
1971. The two trend-acceleration variables are of similar importance 
for hurricanes and the “all other” category. While the results provide 
significant	 evidence	 of	 an	 acceleration	 in	 the	 annual	 occurrence	 of	
major disasters, the exact timing of the acceleration between 1971 and 
1995 is not obvious.
The results in Table 2.3 reinforce an earlier point made about the 
remaining unexplained variation in all four categories of major disas-
ters. Of the 12 regression equations, not one has an adjusted R2 that 
exceeds 0.55, which implies that much of the association remains unex-
plained.	Despite	statistically	significant	upward	trends	in	the	four	cate-
gories of major disasters, a large share of year-to-year variation requires 
further explanation. Perhaps a richer data set and more sophisticated 
statistical methods would have more explanatory power and yield better 
results. Overall, the results of the regression analysis displayed in Table 
2.3 provide strong evidence that the frequency of major disasters has 
been increasing since 1953.
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Table 2.3  Regression Results of Four Types of Major Disasters, 1953–2013
Dependent variable Constant
Long-term 
trend 
New trend 
in 1971 
New trend 
in 1995 Adjusted R2
Standard 
error
Durbin- 
Watson Mean
(2.3.1) Floods 14.85
(10.3)
0.463
(7.1)
0.448 9.02 1.29 20.87
(2.3.2) Floods 15.62
(6.7)
0.584
(2.0)
−0.151
(0.4)
0.441 9.09 1.29 20.87
(2.3.3) Floods 14.88
(10.7)
0.296
(3.0)
0.694
(2.2)
0.483 8.74 1.39 20.87
(2.3.4) Tornadoes 4.04
(5.5)
0.246
(7.3)
0.465 4.63 1.52 7.23
(2.3.5) Tornadoes 2.76
(2.3)
0.045
(0.3)
0.251
(1.4)
0.473 4.59 1.57 7.23
(2.3.6) Tornadoes 4.04
(5.7)
0.159
(3.1)
0.358
(2.2)
0.499 4.48 1.65 7.23
(2.3.7) Hurricanes 2.08
(2.9)
0.102
(3.1)
0.129 4.47 1.75 3.41
(2.3.8) Hurricanes 0.177
(0.2)
−0.197
(1.4)
0.373
(2.2)
0.182 4.33 1.89 3.41
(2.3.9) Hurricanes 2.09
(3.0)
0.024
(0.5)
0.324
(2.1)
0.175 4.35 1.88 3.41
(2.3.10) All other 4.18
(5.0)
0.307
(8.0)
0.514 5.27 1.81 8.18
(2.3.11) All other 1.75
(1.3)
−0.075
(0.5)
0.478
(2.4)
0.550 5.07 1.98 8.18
(2.3.12) All other 4.19
(5.1)
0.216
(3.7)
0.380
(2.1)
0.540 5.13 1.94 8.18
SOURCE: Major disaster declarations data from FEMA. The long-term trend equals 1 in 1971 and increments by 1 for all years before and 
after 1971. New trend 1971 and New trend 1995 start in the indicated year, increase by one in later years and equal zero in earlier years. 
Beneath	each	coefficient	is	the	absolute	value	of	its	t-ratio;	a	result	is	statistically	significant	if	the	t-ratio is 2.0 or larger.
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POPULATION DENSITY: A CORRELATE OF  
MAJOR DISASTERS
Major disasters do not occur randomly across the geographic area 
of the United States. To emphasize this point, the number of disaster 
declarations for the 51 jurisdictions (the 50 states plus the District of 
Columbia [D.C.; hereafter, states]) between 1991 and 2011 is summed 
for each state and normalized by its size (thousands of square miles). 
The national average state disaster rate per 1,000 square miles is 0.29. 
Between 1991 and 2011, the range is from 147.10 in D.C. to 0.03 in 
Alaska. When the state averages are grouped into the nine Census 
Bureau divisions, disasters per square mile were most frequent in New 
England (1.47 per 1,000 square miles) and about half as frequent in 
three other census divisions (Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, and East 
South Central). Of the nine states with major disaster frequencies 
greater	 than	1.0	per	1,000	square	miles,	five	are	 in	 the	New	England	
division.	In	contrast,	the	Mountain	and	Pacific	divisions	experience	the	
lowest rates of major disaster occurrences, with both divisions having 
averages below 0.10 per 1,000 square miles. Of the nine states with 
disaster frequency of 0.10 or less per 1,000 square miles, six are from 
the Mountain division.
Since major disasters are becoming more frequent and the popula-
tion of the United States has also been growing, is there an association 
between the occurrence of disasters and population density? Population 
density changes the disaster risk equation. A higher concentration of 
people	reflects	a	greater	concentration	and	value	of	productive	assets,	
public infrastructure, and such private assets as homes. The exposure of 
assets to natural hazards in densely populated areas could, but need not, 
increase vulnerability.
Between 1991 and 2011 there were 1,105 major disaster declara-
tions in the 51 states. Per capita, D.C. experienced the highest occur-
rence rate. The 10 major disaster declarations in D.C. represent a disas-
ter rate of 147.10 per 1,000 square miles. The next highest state disaster 
rate was 4.8. The highest population density among all states is also in 
D.C. with a density of 8,162 per square mile. This density is more than 
7,000 higher than that of the next highest state, New Jersey at 931. To 
prevent D.C. from dominating the cross section regression analysis, it is 
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removed from the sample. For the 50 states, the disaster rate average is 
unchanged at 0.29 per 1,000 square miles, while the average population 
density is 151.3 per 1,000 square miles.
Population density and the frequency of disasters are highly asso-
ciated. Table 2.4 shows the results of a regression analysis of disaster 
frequency on population density using data from 1991 to 2011. As a 
point of reference, the mean population density (simple average) across 
the 50 states in 2010 is 74.6 persons per square mile.
Note	that	the	coefficient	for	population	density	is	positive	and	statis-
tically	significant.	Equation	(2.4.2)	adds	categorical	(dummy)	variables	
for the census divisions as a test for geographic variability in disas-
ter	occurrence	 rates.	The	only	division	with	 a	 statistically	 significant	
dummy	variable	 is	New	England,	with	a	positive	coefficient.11 When 
the residuals from Equation (2.4.1) in Table 2.4 are examined, large 
projection errors are found in four small East Coast states: Delaware, 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Hence, Equations (2.4.1) 
and (2.4.2) substantially underpredict the disaster occurrence rate for 
all four states. The combined errors from these four states account for 
80 percent of the error variance in these two equations. Since these four 
states account for 1.5 percent of the population in the United States, it 
is	 appropriate	 to	 exclude	 their	 influence	 on	 the	 estimated	 population	
density	coefficient.
Equations (2.4.3) and (2.4.4) in Table 2.4 remove the four small 
states of Delaware, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Note 
that	 their	 removal	 improves	 the	 goodness-of-fit	 of	 the	 equations	 but	
does not critically affect the estimated slope for population density. The 
coefficients	in	Equations	(2.4.1)	and	(2.4.3)	are	similar,	as	are	the	coef-
ficients	in	Equations	(2.4.2)	and	(2.4.4).	Removing	the	four	small	states	
reduces the standard errors by more than half but does not change the 
estimated effect of population density.12 The states with high population 
density	 experience	 significantly	 higher	 rates	 of	major	 disaster	 occur-
rences per square mile vis-à-vis states with low population density.
Finally, note the effect of removing the four small states on the 
mean disaster occurrence rate per 1,000 square miles of state area. The 
simple average of the occurrence rate decreased from 0.736 for the 50 
states to 0.521 for the 46 states. For most of the country, the disaster 
occurrence rate from 1991 to 2011 averaged about 0.5 per 1,000 square 
miles of state area.
30  Table 2.4  Results of an Analysis Linking Disaster Occurrence Rate with State Population Density
Constant
Population 
density
Division 
dummies Adjusted R2 Standard error
Average 
occurrence rate
(2.4.1) 50 states 0.288
(2.2)
0.00296
(5.4)
No 0.363 0.729 0.736
(2.4.2) 50 states 0.115
(0.4)
0.00212
(2.9)
Yes 0.438 0.685 0.736
(2.4.3) 46 states 0.206
(4.3)
0.00227
(10.8)
No 0.721 0.254 0.521
(2.4.4) 46 states 0.120
(1.2)
0.00207
(7.5)
Yes 0.799 0.216 0.521
SOURCE: The disaster occurrence rate is the number of major disaster declarations from 1991 to 2011 per 1,000 square miles of state area. 
Beneath	each	coefficient	is	the	absolute	value	of	its	t-ratio;	a	result	is	statistically	significant	if	the	t-ratio is 2.0 or larger.
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For the 46 states included in Equations (2.4.3) and (2.4.4), what is 
the effect of higher density on the disaster occurrence rate? Population 
density averaged 139.3 per 1,000 square miles for the 46 states from 
1991 to 2011. Equation (2.4.4) projects an occurrence rate of 0.408 
disasters per 1,000 square miles in a state with average population den-
sity and a rate of 0.609 for a state with twice the average population 
density. The estimated elasticity of the occurrence rate evaluated at the 
means of the occurrence rate and population density is 0.56. 
What are the implications of this analysis? First, more densely pop-
ulated	 states	have	a	 significantly	higher	 risk	of	major	disaster	occur-
rences vis-à-vis other states. Second, as population density rises, the 
increase in the rate of disaster occurrences is about half the rate of 
increase in population density. 
Between 1953 and 2011 the population of the United States nearly 
doubled, growing from 159.0 to 311.8 million and population density 
per 1,000 square miles increased from 41.9 to 82.1.13 Using Equation 
(2.4.4), the projected increase in the disaster occurrence rate due to pop-
ulation growth was from 0.207 per 1,000 square miles in 1953 to 0.290 
in 2011, an increase of 40.3 percent. Over the same period, the simple 
regression underlying in Figure 2.1 had a projected increase in major 
disasters for each year from 7.0 to 60.7, or 756 percent. While popula-
tion growth has been large since 1953, the increase in major disasters 
has been about 19 times what would be expected based on population 
growth alone (756 percent compared to 40.3 percent). The increase 
in the frequency of major disasters since 1953 may be attributed to a 
highly nonlinear effect of increased population density, or to factors 
other than population growth, or both increased population density and 
other factors. Whatever the explanation, major disasters increased at a 
much faster rate than population growth between 1953 and 2013.
The preceding analysis examined the cross-section association 
between population density and the occurrence of major disaster decla-
rations. From the analysis, it is clear that the rate of major disasters has 
increased much faster than the rate of population growth since the early 
1950s.	One	factor	that	might	influence	the	frequency	of	major	disaster	
declarations is climate change. The U.S. Global Change Research Pro-
gram	(2014)	finds	that	the	average	temperature	in	the	nation	has	risen	
and is expected to rise; and average precipitation has increased since 
1900 (see Walsh et al. [2014]). Average temperature and annual rain-
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fall, two aspects of weather and climate, are discussed in the following 
section. 
A LINKAGE TO WEATHER AND CLIMATE? 
Various aspects of weather and climate, such as average tempera-
ture and annual rainfall, have been recorded not only for states, but also 
substate areas for more than 100 years.14 Linking the increase in major 
disaster declarations to the weather, however, presents major concep-
tual and measurement challenges. Limited observational record and 
the inability of models to accurately reproduce some extreme events 
are some of the challenges that face attribution assessment. For readers 
interested in an explanation of extreme events from a climate perspec-
tive, we suggest the extensive literature from the American Meteoro-
logical Society, particularly the results of studies presented in their spe-
cial supplements, or the continuing research of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change.
The NCDC indicators of weather and climate all demonstrate wide 
year-to-year variability, especially for precipitation. Figure 2.3 traces 
the evolution of annual average temperature and annual precipitation 
for the 48 contiguous states of the United States from 1950 to 2013. 
During these 64 years, the average annual temperature was 52.4 degrees 
Fahrenheit and average annual precipitation was 29.6 inches. The most 
obvious feature of Figure 2.3 is the greater year-to-year variability of 
precipitation. The standard deviations for the period are 0.93 for tem-
perature and 2.23 for precipitation. These statistics imply that the annual 
variation in precipitation is more than twice that for the annual variation 
in temperature. While the two series in Figure 2.3 appear to be trend-
less,	there	are	significant	trends	in	both	temperature	and	precipitation.
Table 2.5 displays the results of a regression analysis that tests for 
two linear trends, one starting in 1950 and one starting in 1970. For 
both weather variables two equations are estimated: one ends in 2012, 
the	other	in	2013.	The	coefficients	of	six	of	the	eight	trend	variables	are	
statistically	significant.	There	is	a	significant	downward	trend	in	annual	
temperature starting in 1950, which indicates a per-decade decrease in 
temperature of about 0.4 degrees Fahrenheit. Annual precipitation start-
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ing in 1950 is predicted to increase by about 1.19–1.21 inches each 
decade during the 1950s and 1960s.
In 1970, the trends in both temperature and precipitation start to 
change. Readers should note the interpretation of the T-1970 slope 
coefficients:	 they	 identify	 the	 per-year	 trend	 after	 1970	measured	 as	
a deviation from the earlier 1950–1969 trend. Thus, the net annual 
trend in temperature commencing in 1970 is 0.0510 degrees (= 0.0945 
−	0.0435)	 for	Equation	 (2.5.1)	 that	 ends	 in	 2012;	 0.0475	degrees	 (=	
0.0879	−	0.0404)	 for	Equation	(2.5.2)	 that	ends	 in	2013.	After	1970,	
the trend in annual temperature changes from negative to positive, and 
the national per-decade increase is about half a degree Fahrenheit in 
both equations. For annual precipitation the upward trend from 1950 
almost disappears after 1970. From Equations (2.5.3) and (2.5.4), the 
net post-1970 annual trends are 0.0117 and 0.0140, respectively, or a 
per-decade increase of 0.117 and 0.140 inches, respectively. Average 
annual precipitation nationwide was essentially unchanged between 
1970 and 2013.
Figure 2.3  Annual Temperature and Precipitation, 1950–2013
SOURCE: Annual average temperature (Fahrenheit) and annual precipitation (inches) 
for the United States. Data are from NCDC.
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34  Table 2.5  National Trends in Temperature and Precipitation, 1950–2013
Variable and time period Constant
Trend from 
1950
Trend from 
1970 Adjusted R2
Standard 
error
Durbin- 
Watson Mean
(2.5.1) Temperature 
1950–2012
53.39
(176.5)
−0.0435
(2.2)
0.0945
(3.9)
0.445 0.699 1.58 52.42
(2.5.2) Temperature 
1950–2013
52.27
(173.0)
−0.0404
(2.0)
0.0879
(3.6)
0.413 0.713 1.77 52.42
(2.5.3) Precipitation 
1950–2012
27.30
(30.1)
0.1208
(2.0)
−0.1091
(1.5)
0.092 2.135 1.63 29.52
(2.5.4) Precipitation 
1950–2013
27.31
(30.4)
0.1186
(2.0)
−0.1046
(1.4)
0.097 2.120 1.70 29.55
SOURCE:	Annual	average	temperature	(Fahrenheit)	and	annual	precipitation	(inches)	from	NCDC.	Beneath	each	coefficient	is	the	abso-
lute value of its t-ratio;	a	result	is	statistically	significant	if	the	t-ratio is 2.0 or larger.
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Finally,	note	the	superior	goodness-of-fit	of	the	temperature	equa-
tions in Table 2.5. The adjusted R2s are more than four times higher 
(Equations [2.5.1] and [2.5.2]) compared to their precipitation counter-
parts (Equations [2.5.3] and [2.5.4]), while the standard errors for tem-
perature are about one-third of those for precipitation. The linear trends 
are more successful in summarizing the evolution of average tempera-
ture than the evolution of annual precipitation during the 64 years.
To develop a more nuanced picture of developments in climate since 
1950, a similar regression analysis was undertaken for the 48 states.15 
The results closely mirror those in Table 2.5, the national trends. The 
trend in annual temperature was downward between 1950 and 1969, 
then	upward	after	1970.	Nearly	all	of	the	state-level	trend	coefficients	
during 1950–1969 were negative (42 of 48) while all 48 net trends were 
positive during the 1970–2012 period. In other words, the sum of the 
coefficients	for	T-1950	and	T-1970	variables	is	positive	for	all	48	states.
	The	patterns	 in	 the	state-level	 trend	coefficients	for	precipitation	
reproduce the patterns observed in the national data. The 1950 trend 
coefficient	is	positive	for	34	of	48	states;	27	of	48	post-1970	trends	are	
negative. Considering the effects of both trends in the post-1970 period, 
32 net precipitation trends are positive after 1970 while 16 are negative. 
On average, precipitation increased in most states between 1950 and 
1969, but the upward trend decelerated after 1970. For individual states, 
however, there are many exceptions in trends in annual precipitation.
Further Analysis of Temperature Patterns
Discussions on climate change emphasize that increases in aver-
age temperature are not uniform across geographic areas. State-level 
temperature data highlight this point. For instance, northern states have 
experienced more rapid increases in temperature than southern states. 
Table 2.6 summarizes the results of a regression that focuses on changes 
in temperature since 1950 in 48 states; that is, Alaska, Hawaii, and D.C. 
are omitted from the sample. The analysis emphasizes the association 
between average temperature and the latitude of each state.16 Besides 
latitude, the analysis controls for mean state elevation since higher ele-
vations are associated with lower temperatures. Some equations also 
include geographic controls for state location measured with categori-
cal (dummy) variables for the nine census divisions.
36  Table 2.6  State and Regional Temperature Patterns since 1950
Constant
State
latitude
State
elevation
Division 
dummy
Adjusted 
R2
Standard
error Mean
(2.6.1) Average temp. 
1950–2012
115.00
(35.0)
−1.564
(18.6)
−0.679
(3.4)
No 0.892 2.513 52.183
(2.6.2) Average temp. 
1950–2012
115.54
(34.5)
−1.594
(20.8)
−1.911
(5.7)
Yes 0.964 1.451 52.183
(2.6.3) Projected change 
1950–2012
−3.589
(4.4)
0.1055
(5.1)
0.125
(2.5)
No 0.436 0.616 0.786
(2.6.4) Projected change 
1950–2012
−4.269
(3.7)
0.1161
(4.3)
−0.344
(2.9)
Yes 0.620 0.506 0.786
(2.6.5) Actual change 
1950–2012
−7.276
(3.6)
0.3008
(5.8)
−0.284
(2.3)
No 0.415 1.551 4.077
(2.6.6) Actual change 
1950–2012
−9.710
(5.8)
0.3249
(8.5)
−0.154
(0.9)
Yes 0.874 0.720 4.077
(2.6.7) Actual change 
1950–2013
−7.673
(9.0)
0.2302
(10.6)
−0.153
(3.0) 
No 0.703 0.650 1.127
(2.6.8) Actual change 
1950–2013
−7.334
(5.1)
0.2176
(5.9)
−0.453
(3.1)
Yes 0.722 0.628 1.127
SOURCE: Statewide annual temperature (Fahrenheit) from NCDC. State latitude is measured as the latitude of the capital city. Mean state 
elevation from netstate.com. The regression analysis refers to 48 states excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and D.C. Some regression equations 
include dummy variables for the nine Census Bureau divisions. Absolute values of t-ratios	are	shown	beneath	the	coefficients;	a	result	is	
statistically	significant	if	the	t-ratio is 2.0 or larger.
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Equations (2.6.1) and (2.6.2) show the strong negative association 
between state latitude and average statewide temperature from 1950 
to 2012. Note that state elevation also enters both equations with a 
significantly	 negative	 coefficient,	 but	 the	 point	 estimate	 (coefficient)	
is sensitive to the inclusion, or exclusion, of the dummy variables for 
the census divisions. From 1950 to 2012, for each degree of higher 
latitude, average statewide temperature was lower by approximately 
1.56–1.59 degrees Fahrenheit. The increase in latitude from Tallahas-
see, Florida (latitude 30.46), to Olympia, Washington (latitude 47.04), 
is 16.58 degrees. Equations (2.6.1) and (2.6.2).suggest that the change 
in latitude is associated with about a 26-degree difference in average 
temperature, but the actual difference between these two statewide 
averages during 1950–2012 was 22.4 degrees.
The principal interest for our present purpose centers on Equations 
(2.6.3)–(2.6.8), which examine changes in annual temperature since 
1950. Equations (2.6.3) and (2.6.4) focus on projected changes in aver-
age annual temperature based on the regression results for the 48 states. 
These state-level regression results with two trends (post-1950 and post-
1970) were used to project annual statewide temperature in each state in 
1950 and 2012. The dependent variable in Equations (2.6.3) and (2.6.4) 
is the difference between the 2012 projection and the 1950 projection. 
In 40 of 48 states, the predicted change in temperature is positive, with 
seven of the eight projected decreases occurring in southern states.17 
In	Equation	(2.6.3),	the	coefficient	of	the	latitude	variable	(0.1055)	
is	 both	positive	 and	 statistically	 significant.	Geographically,	 states	 in	
higher latitudes experienced above-average increases in temperature 
between 1950 and 2012. The inclusion of a divisional dummy variable 
(Equation 2.6.4) does not change the sign or the size of the latitude 
coefficient,	which	remains	statistically	significant.	Adding	the	division	
dummy variable does change the sign of the state elevation variable 
from positive to negative.18 Inclusion of the division dummy variables 
also	increases	the	goodness-of-fit,	with	the	adjusted	R2 increasing from 
0.436 to 0.620.
Equations (2.6.5) and (2.6.6) examine the changes in actual tem-
perature between 1950 and 2012. For both equations the latitude vari-
able	remains	statistically	significant	and	its	slope	coefficient	is	close	to	
0.3. Recall in Figure 2.3 that average national temperature increased 
in	 2012.	 This	 temperature	 increase	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 mean	 change	
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displayed	in	the	final	column	of	Table	2.6;	that	is,	4.077	in	Equations	
(2.6.5) and (2.6.6) compared to 0.786 for the projected temperature 
changes of Equations (2.6.3) and (2.6.4). The state latitude variable 
retains	its	statistical	significance	in	the	final	two	equations	of	Table	2.6,	
which use temperature change data that extend through 2013. The year 
2013 had lower temperatures in nearly all states compared to 2012, and 
the mean statewide increase from 1950 dropped from an average of 
4.077 degrees Fahrenheit in 2012 to 1.127 degrees in 2013. Note in 
the	final	two	equations	how	the	state	latitude	variable	retains	its	high	
statistical	significance.	The	point	estimates	suggest	that	each	degree	of	
higher latitude is associated with a 1950–2013 increase in temperature 
of about 0.22–0.23 degrees Fahrenheit. Finally, note that the state eleva-
tion	variable	enters	with	negative	coefficients	in	the	final	four	equations	
in Table 2.6. Low-elevation states have experienced larger temperature 
increases than high-elevation states, which are mainly located in the 
Mountain	and	Pacific	divisions.19 
To summarize, the results of the regression analysis in Table 2.6 
indicate that the increase in annual temperature was larger in the more 
northern states. While the point estimates of the annual temperature 
increases vary in size across these equations, from 0.1055 to 0.3249 per 
degree	of	latitude,	all	six	are	consistent	with	the	finding	that	since	1950	
northern states experienced larger increases in average temperature 
than other states. The U.S. Global Change Research Program (2014) 
finds	that	not	only	has	the	average	temperature	in	the	nation	risen,	it	is	
expected to rise; how much the increase will be depends primarily on 
the amount of heat-trapping gasses emitted globally. Our results indi-
cate that the effects of global warming in the United States since 1950 
have been occurring at a noticeably faster pace in the more northern 
states than elsewhere.
Further Analysis of Precipitation Patterns
Similar analysis was undertaken for the geographic patterns in 
precipitation since 1950.20 The principal conclusion one can draw is 
that state-level precipitation patterns have been quite stable. There is a 
substantial degree of variation, however, across census divisions in the 
projected change in precipitation between 1950 and 2012. The most 
important contrasts were above-average increases in New England and 
above-average	reductions	in	the	Pacific	division.
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From the analysis, two comments about precipitation are war-
ranted. First, state precipitation is far more varied (both average levels 
and annual changes) than state temperature. Second, the results of our 
analysis provide weak evidence that northern states experienced larger 
reductions in annual rainfall than southern states since 1950. Research 
by the U.S. Global Change Research Program (2014) provides stronger 
evidence that average precipitation in the nation has increased since 
1900, and that there are regional differences; some areas have experi-
enced larger increases and other areas have seen decreases. The authors 
responsible	for	investigating	the	effects	of	climate	find	that	more	winter	
and spring precipitation is projected for the northern United States and 
less for the Southwest.
CONCLUSIONS
The disasters outlined in this chapter all present physical danger 
and	impose	financial	costs	among	affected	individuals,	agricultural	pro-
ducers, businesses, and governments. The evidence presented in this 
chapter shows that disasters are occurring with increasing frequency. 
Other	researchers	confirm	this	finding.	For	instance,	using	more	sophis-
ticated techniques than OLS estimation, Smith and Katz (2013) show 
that an increasing trend in annual aggregate losses is primarily attribut-
able	to	a	statistically	significant	increasing	trend	of	about	5	percent	per	
year in the frequency of billion-dollar disasters.
Major disaster declarations have increased at a much faster rate than 
the rate of population growth since the early 1950s. Research by the 
World Bank and the United Nations (2010) on climate-induced catas-
trophes	finds	 that	even	without	climate	change,	population	growth	 is	
expected to increase the baseline damages from extreme events over the 
next	century.	These	findings	have	implications	for	the	agencies	respon-
sible for providing disaster-related assistance in the United States. In 
recent	years,	 concern	over	 the	 size	of	 federal	budget	deficits	and	 the	
national debt has made policymakers more cognizant of the amount 
of funding the government provides to state and local governments 
for disaster assistance, and the processes the federal government uses 
to provide that assistance. Disaster assistance for large-scale adverse 
40   Brusentsev and Vroman
events	has	usually	been	financed	by	funds	appropriated	outside	tradi-
tional budget constraints, which implies that taxpayers cover a large 
proportion of disaster-related losses compared to private insurance cov-
erage or other means.
The primary responsibility for providing disaster-related assistance 
to affected parties rests with FEMA. Various other federal agencies 
provide assistance to disaster survivors as well as state and local gov-
ernment agencies, private insurance companies, and nongovernmental 
organizations. As well as supporting individuals and communities dur-
ing and after a disaster, social protection is increasingly recognized as 
a means for increasing predisaster resilience (see UNISDR [2015]). 
If a disaster causes unemployment, for example, the affected worker 
may	be	eligible	to	collect	unemployment	insurance	benefits	or	disaster	
unemployment	 assistance.	Details	 of	 the	 cash	benefits	 and	other	 ser-
vices to disaster survivors are provided in Chapter 3.
Precipitation (rain, hail, or snow), or its absence, usually accompa-
nies	the	classification	of	each	extreme-weather	event.	Such	information	
is useful to insurance providers. The National Flood Insurance Program 
is widely utilized by homeowners, businesses, and governments. This 
program	includes	flood	hazard	mapping,	flood	insurance,	and	floodplain	
management. More detailed information about the program is provided 
in Chapters 3 and 5.
Floods, hail, severe storms, and winter freezes affect agricultural 
producers. These disastrous events span one or a few days. Drought, 
in contrast, extends over several months or even years, and drought-
related agricultural and other economic losses also accumulate over 
longer periods. The federal crop insurance program provides a safety 
net for agricultural producers as they face the uncertainties of markets 
and adverse weather. Farm commodity programs, programs to con-
serve the nation’s natural resources, disaster relief programs, and emer-
gency assistance programs for agricultural producers are discussed in 
Chapter 3.
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Notes
  1. See Herring et al. (2015). For instance, climate change also decreased the Antarc-
tic sea ice extent and increased the likelihood of high sea surface temperatures in 
both	the	Atlantic	and	Pacific	Oceans.
  2. See Equation (2.1.1) in Table 2.1.
 3. The standard error of the regression equation is the average distance between the 
regression line and the actual number of major disaster declarations.
 4. Much has been written about the disaster-related responses to and the conse-
quences of Hurricane Katrina. One consequence was the massive out-migration 
from Katrina-impacted areas. 
	 5.	 The	annual	rates	of	increase	are	calculated	from	the	trend	coefficients:	0.555	for	
the 1953–1994 period and 1.922 for the 1995–2012 period.
  6.  Note that the adjusted R2 remains less than 0.10 and the standard error is large.
 7. The former National Climatic Data Center (NCDC), now known as the National 
Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI), records a start date and an end 
date for each billion-dollar event.
  8. For information on the compilation of the data, see Smith and Katz (2013) and 
Smith and Matthews (2015). 
  9. The incidents are, respectively, Illinois Severe Storms, Straight-line Winds, and 
Tornadoes (DR–4157) declared on November 26, 2013, and North Carolina 
Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides (DR–4153) declared on 
October 29, 2013.
  10. In the FEMA incident descriptions of major disasters between 1953 and 2013, 208 
were attributed to hurricanes and 441 to tornadoes, the next lowest total.
	11.	 A	test	of	significance	for	adding	the	full	set	of	census	division	dummies	was	per-
formed,	but	the	results	are	not	statistically	significant.
	12.	 The	better	goodness-of-fit	is	indicated	by	the	higher	values	for	the	adjusted	R2s 
and lower standard errors.
	13.	 The	data	refer	to	the	population	aged	five	years	and	older.
 14. Our usage of the terms weather and climate	follows	standard	definitions.	Weather	
refers to short-term phenomena, such as today’s temperature and rainfall. Climate 
is weather averaged over a long period, such as a decade. 
 15. The results of the regression analysis are available from the authors.
 16. For the analysis, the latitude of the capital city is used to approximate the latitude 
of each state.
 17. The eight are Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Okla-
homa, Texas, and Maine. 
	18.	 The	explanation	for	the	negative	coefficient	is	not	obvious,	but	it	is	likely	related	
to	the	fixed	effects	of	the	census	division	dummy	variables.	Note	that	state	eleva-
tion	enters	with	a	negative	coefficient	in	regression	Equations	(2.6.4)	to	(2.6.8)	in	
Table 2.6.
 19. Ten of the 11 states with mean elevation above 2,500 feet are in the Mountain and 
Pacific	divisions.
  20. The results of the regression analysis are available from the authors.
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Providing Compensation 
to Survivors of Disasters
Prevention requires procedures that reduce the risk of death, injury, 
and damage from disasters. Early warning systems, preparedness, rapid 
response, and recovery measures all play key roles in disaster preven-
tion. Disaster risk management in the United States focuses on disas-
ter management, preparedness, and response. A national disaster risk 
reduction	 framework	defines	an	overall	 strategic	vision	and	 specifies	
policies to increase disaster risk management efforts. The National 
Disaster Recovery Framework of the Presidential Policy Directive 8, 
National Preparedness (PPD-8), enables disaster-recovery managers to 
operate in a collaborative manner as they provide support in disaster-
affected areas. It also addresses the roles of individuals, communities, 
private entities and organizations, and government in the preparedness 
mission. As noted in Chapter 1, the United Nations’s Sendai Frame-
work for Disaster Relief Reduction not only recognizes the primary role 
of the government in reducing disaster risk, but also the responsibility 
of other stakeholders.
What are the respective roles and responsibilities of the private and 
public sectors in creating long-term strategies to strengthen resilience to 
extreme	events?	How	are	disasters	currently	administered	and	financed?	
What kinds of assistance programs are available to compensate disas-
ter survivors? In recent years, concern over the size of federal budget 
deficits	and	the	national	debt	has	made	policymakers	more	cognizant	
of the amount of funding the federal government provides to state and 
local governments for disaster assistance and the processes the federal 
government uses to provide that assistance. In addition, disaster assis-
tance	for	 large-scale	catastrophes	has	usually	been	financed	by	funds	
appropriated outside traditional budget constraints, which implies that 
taxpayers cover a large proportion of disaster-related losses compared 
to private insurance coverage or other means.
The	 first	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 discusses	 the	 costs	 of	 disastrous	
events. The second section outlines the primary disaster-assistance pro-
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grams administered by the federal government. Not all the programs 
that various federal agencies provide in disaster or emergency situa-
tions are outlined. While assistance programs are provided by various 
agencies, they are generally aimed at four broad categories of disaster 
survivors: 1) individuals and families; 2) state, territorial, and local gov-
ernments;	3)	small	businesses	and	nonprofit	organizations,	with	sepa-
rate	programs	specifically	for	agricultural	producers;	and	4)	a	general	
category. The third section outlines two unemployment compensation 
programs available to individuals whose employment or self-employ-
ment is lost or interrupted as a direct result of a disaster.
The	financial	consequences	resulting	from	adverse	events	may	be	
ameliorated by the advance purchase of insurance to cover the haz-
ard in question. The fourth section of the chapter discusses the role 
of insurance in compensating disaster survivors. The widespread use 
of homeowners insurance provides coverage against many natural haz-
ards,	 including	fire,	hail,	 lightning,	 sleet,	 snow,	 storm,	weight	of	 ice,	
and wind. Catastrophic losses have affected the willingness of private 
insurers to provide coverage against certain hazards. When the private 
insurance market fails to provide coverage for disaster-related prop-
erty losses, the government could intervene. The fourth section also 
discusses	 private–public	 partnerships.	 Nonprofit	 entities,	 nongovern-
mental organizations, and governments provide other disaster-related 
initiatives	to	support	disaster	survivors.	The	fifth	section	briefly	exam-
ines	 these	 general	 assistance	 programs,	 and	 the	 final	 section	 draws	
conclusions.
THE COSTS OF DISASTERS
As noted in Chapter 1, the severity of a disaster is commonly mea-
sured in the number of deaths or in terms of the total dollar amount 
of the destruction the event causes.1	 The	 financial	 costs	 of	 disasters	
include physical damage to private property (residences, commercial 
structures, and equipment), infrastructure (public buildings, transporta-
tion and communication networks, and public utilities), and agricultural 
assets.	 In	addition,	 there	 is	 the	financial	 strain	associated	with	health	
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care and the loss of life. The returns to capital and the earnings of indi-
viduals attached to the labor market both decrease when a disaster inter-
rupts production. Since labor compensation exceeds half of the value 
added in most industries, reduced earnings comprise an important ele-
ment in disaster-related costs.
Annual estimates of the costs associated with extreme-weather 
events in the United States are published by three entities: the Insur-
ance Information Institute, which is supported by private insurance 
companies; Munich Re, an international reinsurance entity headquar-
tered in Munich, Germany; and NOAA of the U.S. Department of Com-
merce. The Insurance Information Institute and Munich Re estimate the 
total costs associated with extreme-weather events in the United States 
during 2012 to be $100 billion with insured costs totaling $58 billion. 
Between 1980 and 2012, these extreme-weather costs exceeded $50 
billion (measured in 2013 prices) in 8 of the 33 years. The greatest 
single costs were incurred in 2005, the year of the catastrophic destruc-
tion from Hurricane Katrina, as $196 billion in 2013 dollars.
The NCDC compiles and publishes cost estimates on weather and 
climate disasters that reach or exceed $1.0 billion. While the threshold 
is arbitrary, these billion-dollar events account for about 80 percent of 
the total costs for all combined severe weather and climate events.2 The 
information	from	the	NCDC	reflects	the	direct	effects	of	weather	and	
climate events and it constitutes total loss estimates, both insured and 
uninsured,	but	 it	does	not	 take	 into	account	 the	financial	 strain	asso-
ciated with health care or the loss of life.3 Between 1980 and 2013, 
the NCDC noted that there were 170 billion-dollar disasters, about 7 
each year.4 Because of the delays in reporting and delays in servicing 
insurance claims, detailed cost estimates of the published billion-dollar 
disaster series from the NCDC are available only for the 170 disasters 
to the end of 2013. Estimated cumulative losses from 1980 to 2013 
are almost $1.0 trillion. The NCDC measures the costs associated with 
each disaster in the current dollars of the disaster year and also in bil-
lions of 2013 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to convert 
the original estimates into a constant price series.
Table 3.1 reorganizes the information from the NCDC into seven 
natural hazard categories using a similar taxonomy developed in Chap-
ter	 2.	Again,	 the	 sorting	 into	 these	 categories	 reflects	 some	 arbitrary	
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decisions. In particular, the distinction between severe storms and tor-
nadoes	is	subjective.	The	decision	rule	is	based	on	the	first	word	used	
by the NCDC to describe the incident.
One obvious characteristic of the NCDC estimates is the multistate 
nature of most the disasters. Of the 170 disasters, 148 involved two 
or more states. Ten or more states were affected for at least 30 of the 
multistate disasters. The multistate dimension is important to recog-
nize because FEMA bases its major disaster declarations on individual 
states. Thus, Hurricane Sandy generated 13 major disaster declarations 
in the FEMA reporting system and an estimated $65.7 billion disas-
ter	in	the	NCDC	reporting	system.	The	financial	costs	associated	with	
major disasters can be estimated accurately only with the passage of 
time following their occurrence. Hurricane Sandy, for example, gen-
erated initial estimates of $75 billion; the estimate in early 2015 was 
$65.7 billion. Using the 2012 and 2013 disasters as currently priced, the 
1980–2013 total is $1.07 trillion.
Droughts and hurricanes dominate the cost estimates. The combined 
cost of droughts and hurricanes ($768.6 billion) accounts for 72 percent 
of the overall total across all billion-dollar disasters. These two types of 
weather-related disasters incur much larger costs per event compared to 
the	remaining	five	categories.	The	bottom	two	rows	of	Table	3.1	show	
two broad groupings of weather and climate disasters. The respective 
Table 3.1  Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, 1980–2013
Number Total loss
Average 
loss
Multistate 
events Deaths
Winter weather, freeze 17 54.0 3.2 11 959
Drought, heat wave 21 278.2 13.2 21 18,779
Hurricane, tropical storm 33 490.4 14.9 29 3,148
Severe storm 45 82.1 1.8 41 610
Flood 17 85.7 5.0 13 373
Tornado 25 60.7 2.4 24 941
Wildfire 12 23.6 2.0 9 151
Total 170 1074.7 6.3 148 24,961
Drought-Hurricane 55 768.6 14.0 50 21,927
Rest 115 306.1 2.7 98 3,034
SOURCE: NCDC data on billion-dollar disasters measured in 2013 dollars.
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averages for the two broad groupings of costly disasters are $14.0 and 
$2.7	billion.	A	typical	drought	or	hurricane	leads	to	approximately	five	
times	 the	financial	costs	of	 the	other	 types	of	billion-dollar	disasters.	
Across the 170 costly weather-related disasters as measured by the 
NCDC, the 55 droughts, hurricanes, and tropical storms accounted for 
32 percent of all billion-dollar events but 72 percent of total costs.
In recent years the NCDC summaries of tornado-related events fre-
quently record the number of tornadoes, which often exceed 100 so 
that average cost per individual tornado is only a small fraction of the 
$2.4 billion average shown in Table 3.1. Of the 25 tornado events in the 
NCDC data, just two incurred total costs that exceeded $5.0 billion, and 
both occurred in 2011.
While it is not obvious from Table 3.1, certain categories of 
weather-related	disasters	have	a	definite	geographic	locus.	Hurricanes	
and tropical storms disproportionately affect states along the East and 
Gulf Coasts. Floods are concentrated in states near the largest rivers, 
such	 as	 the	Mississippi	 and	Missouri.	All	 12	 billion-dollar	 wildfires	
occurred in states west of the Mississippi River.
The NCDC billion-dollar disasters have been occurring with 
increased frequency since 1980. Between 1980 and 1989 there were 27 
billion-dollar disasters; between 2000 and 2009 there were 54. For the 
34 years from 1980 to 2013, a regression analysis of the count of annual 
billion-dollar disasters on a linear trend explains over 40 percent of the 
variation in the occurrence of these disasters annually.5	The	coefficient	
on the trend variable shows an increase in billion-dollar disasters of 2.1 
per decade. A regression-based prediction for the current decade sug-
gests there will be 81 billion-dollar disasters between 2010 and 2019. 
The projected count from the regression analysis for 2010–2013 was 
33; somewhat below the actual four-year count of 41 billion-dollar 
disasters.
The total cost in 2013 dollars (CPI-adjusted) of the 170 billion-
dollar disasters that occurred between 1980 and 2013 was $1.075 tril-
lion. Of the 170, however, the eight largest disasters accounted for $488 
billion (45.4 percent of the total) for an average of $61.0 billion for 
each large disaster. Within this octet of large disasters, the costs associ-
ated with Hurricane Katrina were the largest by far, estimated at $148.8 
billion while the second-highest was Hurricane Sandy ($65.7 billion). 
The smaller 162 disasters accounted for $586.9 billion, or an average of 
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$3.6 billion for each disaster. On average, the eight large disasters were 
more than 15 times costlier than the other billion-dollar disasters.
Table 3.2 shows a breakdown of the 170 billion-dollar disasters with 
attention to the type of hazard and size of the associated costs. Of the 
eight largest disasters, four were hurricanes, three were droughts, and 
one	was	a	flood.6 As estimated by NCDC, all eight disasters incurred 
costs of at least $25 billion (2013 dollars). Table 3.2 again highlights 
the predominance of hurricanes and drought in these cost estimates. 
Not only did they account for 72 percent of the total costs of all billion-
dollar events, they were also responsible for seven of the eight large 
disasters	identified	in	the	table.	Hurricanes	alone	were	responsible	for	
46 percent of the aggregate estimated costs.
For	each	of	 the	 three	categories	of	events	 identified	 in	Table	3.2,	
note the comparative size of the average costs from the large disasters 
relative to all other events in the same category. For all three types of 
events, the large events had average costs that were about 10 times the 
average costs of the other (smaller) billion-dollar disasters.
Since these NCDC data identify both the number and estimated 
costs for the different categories, an analysis of their average size is 
also	possible.	Two	 regression	equations	are	fitted	 to	 test	 for	possible	
trends in the average cost per disaster. One equation tests for a trend in 
the average cost for all 170 events, while the second tests for a trend in 
the	average	financial	cost	after	removing	the	eight	large	disasters	from	
the sample. The results of both regression equations indicate there is no 
trend in the average size of the billion-dollar disasters between 1980 
and 2013. Thus, the growth in the aggregate costs of these events arises 
from their increased annual frequency, not from the average cost of 
each disaster.
While aggregate costs of billion-dollar disasters since 1980 now 
exceed $1.0 trillion, it is important to keep in mind the relative scale 
of	 the	financial	 costs.	The	gross	domestic	product	 (GDP)	of	 the	U.S	
economy in 2014 was $17.4 trillion. Cumulative real GDP from 1980 
to 2013 was $342.7 trillion (in dollars of 2009 purchasing power) and 
$365.8 trillion (in dollars of 2013 purchasing power). Relative to cumu-
lative real GDP in 2013 dollars, the $1.0 trillion cost of billion-dollar 
disasters represent 0.29 percent of real GDP, or slightly more than one-
quarter of 1 percent.7 One observation conveyed by this calculation 
is the enormous size of the U.S. economy. The total costs of the 170 
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billion-dollar disasters are relatively small when placed into a macro-
economic context.
The Insurance Information Institute-Munich Re (III–Munich Re) 
data on the costs associated with disasters cover a broader set of major 
weather events than the FEMA disaster declarations. For example, III–
Munich Re estimated that the $100 billion catastrophic cost in 2012 was 
caused by 184 weather events, including 115 severe thunderstorms, 38 
wildfires,	19	floods,	and	8	other	events.	For	that	same	year,	the	FEMA	
disaster declarations were as follows: 47 major disaster, 16 emergency, 
and	49	fire	management.
FEDERAL DISASTER RELIEF PROGRAMS
Chapter 2 outlines the declaration process of the Stafford Act for 
catastrophic	events.	The	legislation	instituted	a	first	response	to	a	disas-
Table 3.2  Billion-Dollar Disasters by Type of Event and Size, 1980–2013
Number
Total cost  
($ billions)
Average costs 
 ($ billions)
Total 170 disasters
Total 170 1,074.7 7.0
Large 8 487.8 61.0
Rest 162 586.9 3.6
Hurricanes and tropical storms
Total 33 490.4 14.9
Large 4 288.5 72.1
Rest 29 201.9 7.0
Drought and heat wave
Total 21 278.2 13.2
Large 3 165.5 55.2
Rest 18 112.7 6.2
River	flood
Total 17 88.7 5.0
Large 1 33.8 33.8
Rest 16 51.9 3.2
SOURCE: NCDC data on billion-dollar disasters measured in 2013 dollars.
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ter that introduced long-term recovery strategies and established disas-
ter assistance programs. Grants are provided for the care of disaster 
survivors, clearance of debris, restoration of damaged or destroyed 
facilities,	 mitigation	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 future	 disasters,	 and	 financial	
aid for those with uninsured critical needs. In addition, the legislation 
authorizes	 loans	 to	communities	 that	 incur	 significant	 revenue	 losses	
as a result of a catastrophe, disaster-related unemployment assistance, 
and the use of federal agency resources to assist with local and state 
response and recovery efforts.
This section summarizes the primary disaster assistance programs 
provided by the federal government.8 As stated in Chapter 1, not all 
programs provided by federal agencies in disaster or emergency situ-
ations are outlined. Disaster assistance programs are administered by 
two federal agencies: FEMA and the U.S. Small Business Administra-
tion (SBA). Other federal agencies administer assistance programs that 
may be provided in a disaster situation or as part of regular service 
delivery. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) administers a 
number of programs that provide assistance to individuals and fami-
lies, landowners, farmers, ranchers, and other agricultural producers 
affected by a major disaster or emergency.9 The two USDA agencies 
discussed in this section are the Food and Nutrition Service and the 
Farm Service Agency. Among the many other federal agencies respon-
sible for administering disaster-related assistance are the U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Employment and 
Training Administration of the U.S. Labor Department, and the U.S. 
Department of Transportation. The assistance provided by these agen-
cies may be funded through their own budgets, but in most cases it is 
requested and paid for by FEMA.
Congress appropriates funds to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) to 
ensure that federal assistance is available to help individuals and com-
munities overwhelmed by severe disasters.10 Annual appropriations to 
fund the DRF commence with the formulation of a budget request for 
the DRF account by the administration. The DRF, which is managed by 
FEMA,	is	a	no-year	account	used	 to	finance	disaster	response	activi-
ties and to fund ongoing recovery programs.11 Supplemental appropria-
tions	are	generally	required	each	fiscal	year	to	meet	the	crucial	needs	of	
catastrophic disasters. Additional funds to the DRF are made through 
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supplemental appropriations legislation. The use of this procedure con-
cerns some legislators because these additional funds are designated 
as emergency appropriations, providing amounts in excess of discre-
tionary spending limits (see Lindsay, Painter, and McCarthy [2013]). 
In addition, the legislation often moves through Congress on an expe-
dited basis that sometimes limits debate and leaves little opportunity for 
amendments.
The Stafford Act establishes the eligibility requirements for differ-
ent disaster-related programs. Disaster assistance may be in the form 
of grants, low-interest loans, or loan guarantees. The funds are limited 
either	to	a	fixed	dollar	amount	or	to	a	percentage	of	the	eligible	costs. 
The provisions of the Stafford Act stipulate the cost-share requirements 
of the federal and state governments. In most cases, federal taxpay-
ers	finance	75	percent	of	 the	approved	costs	and	states	contribute	25	
percent.
The initial response to a catastrophic event is the activation of local 
government emergency services. Depending on the extent of the disas-
ter, local government may not be able to respond to the relief effort by 
itself, and other governments are called to assist. Local and state gov-
ernments typically have reciprocal aid pacts in place whereby they help 
each other in emergency situations. Disaster relief is provided from 
nearby counties, state agencies, and volunteer organizations. Once a 
presidential declaration of a major disaster is made, emergency fed-
eral resources expressly for activities authorized by the Stafford Act are 
assembled. Essential assistance authorizes federal agencies to distribute 
aid to disaster survivors through state and local governments and volun-
tary organizations to perform life- and property-saving assistance, clear 
debris, and conduct search and rescue missions, among other immediate 
response services. The disaster relief effort is coordinated and funded 
by FEMA for search and rescue, restoration of electrical power, and the 
provision of basic human needs. 
The long-term recovery process and the alleviation of the damage 
and hardship of disaster survivors follow the initial response to a cata-
strophic event. The long-term recovery phase of a major disaster places 
severe	financial	strain	on	individuals,	families,	and	local	and	state	gov-
ernments.	Some	of	the	financial	strain	can	be	eased	through	the	provi-
sion of compensation programs.
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Assistance for Individuals and Families
Both FEMA and the SBA provide disaster assistance programs for 
individuals and families. Three main disaster assistance programs are 
provided by FEMA: the Individual and Household Program (IHP), 
crisis counseling, and legal services. The IHP grants are the primary 
source of direct federal aid for households who sustain damage from 
a	disaster.	The	other	programs	are	 less	 significant	 in	 terms	of	 cover-
age. The SBA provides one primary program for households: the Home 
Disaster Loan Program (HDLP). The IHP and HDLP are the primary 
sources of disaster-related funding for individuals and families.
The IHP provides direct compensation to households for uninsured 
losses	related	specifically	to	the	disaster.	Direct	assistance	is	delivered	
through the provision of temporary housing units (mobile homes) to 
households who were displaced because their homes were seriously 
damaged or destroyed. Disaster housing grants may be used to rent 
alternative housing and may be available for up to 18 months to indi-
viduals and families who were displaced from their homes. The federal 
share of temporary housing assistance is 100 percent. Financial grants 
are also available to alleviate disaster-related needs and necessary 
expenses not covered by private insurance and other assistance pro-
grams.	Limited	financial	assistance	is	available	for	housing	repairs	and	
replacement, transportation costs, the replacement of personal property, 
and uninsured personal needs (medical, dental, funeral, or other per-
sonal expenses). Statutory matching requirements mandate that states 
contribute 25 percent for uninsured personal needs. Grants may not 
exceed	a	fixed	dollar	amount	(currently	$29,900)	for	each	household.
The crisis counseling program provides grants for immediate crisis 
counseling services, when required, to disaster survivors for relieving 
mental health problems caused or aggravated by a major disaster or its 
aftermath. Cost-share requirements are not imposed on crisis counsel-
ing assistance. This assistance is short term and community oriented. 
While the regulations specify that program funding generally ends after 
nine months, an extension may be approved if requested by the state 
and	approved	by	FEMA	officials.
Disaster legal services offer free legal assistance to individu-
als affected by a major federal disaster. The legal assistance typically 
includes help with insurance claims, preparing powers of attorney, help 
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with guardianship, and the preparation of new wills and other legal doc-
uments lost in the disaster. There are no cost-share requirements or time 
limitations for legal services assistance.
The HDLP of the SBA is the second major source of disaster-related 
assistance for individuals and families. As the disaster assistance in the 
form of a loan, it needs to be repaid to the federal government. Low-
interest loans are available to homeowners, renters, and personal prop-
erty owners located in a declared disaster area to cover uninsured or 
underinsured property losses from the disaster. The HDLP falls into two 
categories: personal property loans and real property loans. A personal 
property	loan	provides	up	to	a	fixed	dollar	amount	(currently	$40,000)	
to an eligible homeowner or renter to repair or replace personal prop-
erty items damaged or lost in a disaster. These loans can cover personal 
items such as automobiles, clothing, and furniture. A real property loan 
provides	up	to	a	fixed	dollar	amount	(currently	$200,000)	to	an	eligible	
homeowner to repair or restore the primary residence to its predisaster 
condition. These loans may not be used to upgrade homes or build addi-
tions, unless upgrades or changes are required by local building codes. 
A real property loan may be increased by 20 percent if hazard mitiga-
tion is undertaken to the damaged property.
Assistance for State, Territorial, and Local Governments
When a disaster occurs, public property is damaged or destroyed and 
public functions are disrupted. Roads, utilities, and recreational facili-
ties may need to be restored. Public buildings may need to be repaired 
or rebuilt. Administrative units, the criminal and civil justice systems, 
and regulatory bodies may need assistance to resume their functions. 
The	federal	government	provides	assistance	to	finance	part	of	the	costs	
of the rebuilding, long-term recovery, and hazard mitigation efforts.
Four disaster-related programs are provided by FEMA to assist 
state, territorial, and local governments in their long-term recovery 
efforts. Public assistance grants are the primary assistance programs 
for state and local governments. They may be used to repair, replace, or 
restore disaster-damaged, publicly owned facilities and undertake other 
activities such as the removal of debris, repair of roads and bridges, and 
repair of public buildings and water control facilities.
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Hazard mitigation grants are provided to state and local govern-
ments to reduce the risks and impact of future disasters. The Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program provides grants to each state in which a major 
disaster has been declared. The funds may be used to implement any 
eligible hazard mitigation activity in the state, not necessarily related to 
the catastrophe that led to the declaration. There is a statutory matching 
requirement of 25 percent for the program. By comparison, predisaster 
mitigation grants are not related to major disaster declarations. This 
program	provides	financial	and	technical	assistance	to	states,	territories,	
and local communities to undertake hazard mitigation measures that 
complement a comprehensive hazard mitigation program.12 The objec-
tive is to reduce injuries, loss of life, and the damage and destruction of 
property	of	future	disasters.	Federal	funds	generally	finance	75	percent	
of the cost of approved mitigation projects.
The Community Disaster Loan (CDL) program provides loans to 
local governments that have incurred a substantial loss of revenue from 
taxes and other sources in jurisdictions included in a major disaster dec-
laration.	The	state	governor	must	specifically	request	the	program,	and	
Congress needs to appropriate funds into the CDL account. There is no 
statutory matching requirement for a CDL loan. The local government 
must	demonstrate,	however,	that	there	is	a	need	for	financial	assistance,	
and the funds can only be used to maintain existing county functions. 
Typically, the loan may not exceed 25 percent of the annual operating 
budget	of	the	local	government	for	the	fiscal	year	of	the	disaster	and	a	
loan	may	not	exceed	a	fixed	dollar	amount	(currently	$5	million).	While	
the statute does not impose a time limitation on the loan, the usual term 
is	five	years.
Assistance	for	Small	Businesses	and	Nonprofit	Organizations
The SBA administers three types of disaster-related loans for small 
businesses	 and	 nonprofit	 organizations.	 Physical	 disaster	 loans	 are	
available	 to	 both	 nonprofit	 organizations	 and	 businesses.	 The	 other	
business disaster loans are limited to small businesses.
Any	 business	 or	 nonprofit	 organization,	 regardless	 of	 size,	 in	 a	
declared disaster area can apply for physical disaster loans to compen-
sate uninsured physical damage and losses. The loans are intended to 
compensate for the repair and replacement of real property, equipment, 
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fixtures,	 inventory,	 leasehold	 improvements,	 and	machinery	not	 cov-
ered	by	insurance.	The	maximum	loan	amount	is	up	to	a	fixed	dollar	
amount (currently $2.0 million). The potential duration of the loan may 
be 30 years. Businesses that receive physical disaster loans may use up 
to 20 percent of the loan amount for mitigation measures to help pre-
vent	loss	from	a	similar	disaster	in	the	future.	Nonprofit	organizations	
whose physical disaster loan applications are rejected or are approved 
for less than the requested amount may be eligible for grants from 
FEMA. There is no statutory matching requirement for this program.
The Economic Injury Disaster Loans Program (EIDLP) offers loans 
and loan guarantees to help small businesses recover from economic 
injury sustained as a result of a disaster. The program is limited to small 
businesses, the size of which varies by industry.13 If the secretary of 
agriculture designates an agriculture production disaster, small farms 
and small cooperatives are eligible for EIDLP loans and loan guaran-
tees. The businesses must be located in a declared disaster area and 
contiguous counties.14 These low-interest loans are designed to provide 
small businesses with operating funds until the business recovers. The 
maximum	loan	amount	is	up	to	a	fixed	dollar	amount	(currently	$2.0	
million). The potential duration of EIDLP loans may be 30 years. There 
is no statutory matching requirement for this program.
The	SBA	may	make	low-interest,	fixed-rate,	predisaster	mitigation	
loans	to	small	businesses.	These	loans	are	used	to	finance	hazard	miti-
gation measures to protect commercial property, leasehold improve-
ments, or contents from disaster-related damages that may occur in the 
future (see McCarthy and Keegan [2009]). The business applying for 
the loan must be located in a Special Flood Hazard Area. A small busi-
ness that participates in the program may be eligible to receive up to a 
fixed	dollar	amount	(currently	$50,000)	each	fiscal	year.
Assistance for Agricultural Producers
The USDA provides several programs to help agricultural produc-
ers	recover	from	the	financial	losses	associated	with	natural	disasters.15 
All the programs have permanent authorizations and only one requires a 
federal disaster designation (the emergency loan program). The funding 
for most of the programs is not subject to annual discretionary appro-
priations; instead, the programs receive “such sums as are necessary.”
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The mission of the Farm Service Agency (FSA) of the USDA pro-
vides a safety net for agricultural producers as they face the uncertain-
ties of markets and adverse weather. The agency administers farm com-
modity programs, programs to conserve the nation’s natural resources, 
disaster relief programs, and emergency assistance programs that help 
improve the stability of the agricultural economy.16 The Agricultural Act 
of 2014 made major changes to commodity programs, added new crop 
insurance options, streamlined conservation programs, and expanded 
programs for beginning farmers and ranchers, bioenergy, organic farm-
ers, rural development, and specialty crops.17
The federal crop insurance program, administered by the Risk Man-
agement Agency of the USDA, is discussed in the following section. 
The programs discussed in this subsection are all administered by FSA 
and fall into four broad categories: the Noninsured Crop Disaster Assis-
tance Program (NAP); livestock and fruit tree disaster programs; emer-
gency agricultural land assistance programs; and emergency disaster 
loans.
Agricultural producers who grow a crop that is currently ineligible 
for federal crop insurance may apply for NAP.18 The program provides 
financial	assistance	to	producers	of	commercially	produced	agricultural	
commodities not only for crop losses but also planting prevented by a 
natural disaster.19 The program covers eligible producers for eligible 
crop losses and planting prevented by an eligible cause of loss. The 
NAP	defines	an	eligible	producer	as	a	landowner,	tenant,	or	sharecrop-
per who undertakes the risk of producing a crop and who is entitled to 
an ownership share of that crop. Agricultural commodities for which 
the catastrophic level of federal crop insurance is unavailable are clas-
sified	as	eligible	crops	in	the	program.	An	eligible	cause	of	loss	is	any	of	
the following: damaging weather, such as drought, excessive moisture, 
excessive winds, freeze, hail, or hurricanes; an adverse natural occur-
rence,	 such	 as	 earthquake	 or	 flood;	 a	 condition	 related	 to	 damaging	
weather or an adverse natural occurrence, such as excessive heat, insect 
infestations, plant disease, volcanic smog; or any combination of these 
conditions. While a catastrophic level of coverage is provided under 
the program, producers can apply for additional coverage. Agricultural 
producers who elect for additional coverage pay a premium in addition 
to the service fee. Crops intended for grazing, however, are not eligible 
for additional coverage.
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A number of emergency programs provide disaster assistance for 
agricultural	losses	resulting	from	drought,	fire,	flood,	freeze,	pest	infes-
tation, tornadoes, and other hazards.20 The Agricultural Act of 2014 
indefinitely	 extended	 three	disaster	 assistance	programs	 for	 livestock	
and one for fruit trees. In addition, the legislation provides retroactive 
authority for compensating agricultural losses back to October 1, 2011. 
Eligibility for these disaster assistance programs under the current leg-
islation does not require producers to purchase crop insurance or NAP 
coverage, which was mandated under the previous legislation.
The Livestock Forage Disaster Program provides compensation to 
eligible livestock producers who incurred grazing losses due to drought 
or	fire.	Producers	are	compensated	for	the	grazing	losses	on	land	that	is	
native, on improved pastureland with permanent vegetative cover, or on 
land	that	is	planted	specifically	for	grazing.	The	grazing	losses	must	be	
the result of drought conditions during the normal grazing period for the 
county. The program also provides compensation to eligible livestock 
producers who incurred grazing losses on rangeland managed by a fed-
eral agency if they are prohibited by the federal agency from grazing 
their	livestock	on	rangeland	because	of	a	wildfire.
The Livestock Indemnity Program provides compensation to eli-
gible livestock producers for livestock deaths in excess of normal mor-
tality caused by adverse weather conditions.21 The livestock must have 
been maintained for commercial use and excludes wild free-roaming 
animals, pets, and animals used for recreational purposes. The program 
payment rate is equal to 75 percent of the market value of the livestock 
on the day before the date of their death. The USDA publishes a pay-
ment rate or each type of livestock for each year.
The Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honeybees, and Farm-
Raised Fish Program (ELAP) provides assistance for losses due to 
disease, adverse weather, or other conditions not adequately covered 
by	 any	 other	 disaster	 program,	 such	 as	 blizzards	 and	wildfires.	 Four	
categories are covered by ELAP for livestock losses: livestock death 
losses caused by an eligible loss condition, livestock feed and grazing 
losses	 that	 are	 not	 due	 to	 drought	 or	wildfires	 on	 federally	managed	
lands, losses resulting from the additional cost of transporting water 
to livestock due to an eligible drought, and losses resulting from the 
additional cost associated with gathering livestock for treatment related 
to	cattle	tick	fever.	ELAP	provides	assistance	specifically	for	the	loss	of	
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honeybee colonies in excess of normal mortality. In order to meet the 
eligibility requirements for honeybee colony losses, they must be the 
direct result of an eligible adverse weather or loss condition such as col-
ony	collapse	disorder,	eligible	winter	storm,	excessive	wind,	and	flood.
The	Tree	Assistance	Program	provides	financial	assistance	to	quali-
fying orchardists and nursery tree growers to replant or rehabilitate eli-
gible stock damaged by a natural disaster.22 Eligible trees, bushes, and 
vines are those from which an annual crop is produced for commercial 
purposes. Nursery trees include ornamental, fruit, and nut produced for 
commercial sale. Trees used for pulp or to harvest timber are ineligible. 
Several permanent disaster assistance programs help agricultural 
producers repair damaged land following disasters.23 Three programs 
offer	 financial	 and	 technical	 assistance	 to	 agricultural	 producers	 to	
repair, restore, and mitigate the damage on private land that was caused 
by a disaster. The Emergency Conservation Program provides funding 
and technical assistance for farmers and ranchers to rehabilitate land 
damaged by a disaster, and to undertake emergency water conservation 
measures during periods of severe drought. The Emergency Forest Res-
toration Program provides funding and technical assistance for farmers 
and ranchers to rehabilitate land damaged by a disaster, and to under-
take emergency water conservation measures during periods of severe 
drought.	The	program	provides	financial	assistance	to	eligible	owners	
of nonindustrial private forestland to restore forests damaged by natural 
disasters. For both programs, participants are paid a percentage of the 
cost to restore the land to a productive state.
The Natural Resources Conservation Service of the USDA and the 
U.S. Forest Service administer the Emergency Watershed Protection 
(EWP)	program	and	its	floodplain	easement	program.	The	EWP	assists	
landowners and operators in implementing emergency recovery mea-
sures for runoff retardation and erosion prevention to relieve the immi-
nent hazards to life and property created by natural disasters. The EWP 
floodplain	easement	program	is	a	mitigation	program	that	finances	per-
manent easements on private land with the aim of safeguarding lives 
and	ameliorating	property	damage	from	future	floods,	drought,	and	the	
effects of erosion. 
When either the president or the secretary of agriculture declares 
a county as a disaster area, agricultural producers in that county may 
become eligible for low-interest emergency disaster loans.24 Agricultural 
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producers in contiguous counties also become eligible for an emergency 
disaster loan. Loan funds may be used to help eligible farmers, ranch-
ers, and aquaculture producers recover from production losses or from 
physical	losses.	Production	losses	are	associated	with	a	significant	loss	
of an annual crop in the disaster year. Physical losses cover expenses 
such as repairing or replacing damaged or destroyed structures or equip-
ment, reorganizing farming operations, replanting permanent crops, 
paying	essential	family	living	expenses,	and	refinancing	certain	debts.	A	
qualified	applicant	may	borrow	up	to	100	percent	of	actual	production	
or	physical	losses	up	to	a	maximum	fixed	amount	(currently	$500,000).
General Assistance Programs
General federal assistance supports state and local governments in 
facilitating the distribution of consumable supplies; authorizes federal 
agencies to provide resources to support evacuations, response, and 
recovery efforts; and provides a range of technical and advisory help.
The Food and Nutrition Service of the USDA has the primary 
responsibility of coordinating state, local, and voluntary organizations 
that provide emergency nutrition assistance.25 In a major disaster, the 
first	 response	 is	 to	 send	 food	 commodities	 needed	 for	mass	 feeding	
operations to organizations such as the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, 
faith-based organizations, and other voluntary relief organizations.26 
In limited situations, food is provided to these relief organizations for 
household distribution.
Short-term food assistance may be provided to individuals and fam-
ilies through the Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(D-SNAP).27	Eligible	disaster	survivors	receive	one	month	of	benefits	to	
purchase food at authorized grocery stores. To be eligible for D-SNAP, 
a household must live in the disaster designated area, have been affected 
by the disaster, and meet the criteria for D-SNAP eligibility.28 House-
holds cannot receive both disaster distribution food commodities and 
D-SNAP	 benefits	 at	 the	 same	 time.	The	 Food	 and	Nutrition	 Service	
authorizes	states	to	issue	D-SNAP	benefits,	which	are	provided	through	
an	electronic	benefit	transfer	card	that	can	be	used	at	authorized	food	
retailers. Those individuals who are already participating in the regular 
SNAP	program	may	be	eligible	to	receive	additional	benefits	under	the	
D-SNAP program. 
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A	disaster	causes	significant	destruction,	 including	a	 reduction	 in	
economic production and the loss of employment and income. The fol-
lowing section outlines two unemployment compensation programs 
available to individuals whose employment or self-employment is lost 
or interrupted as a direct result of a disaster.
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND  
DISASTER UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE
Individuals whose employment is lost or interrupted as a direct 
result	of	a	disaster	may	receive	financial	assistance	through	the	regu-
lar UI program or the DUA program.29 The Employment and Training 
Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor oversees the federal–
state unemployment compensation system and provides support to the 
state workforce agencies that administer these programs. For the DUA 
program,	FEMA	finances	benefit	payments	and	state-level	administra-
tive costs.
The federal–state UI program provides unemployment payments 
(benefits)	to	eligible	persons	who	are	unemployed	through	no	fault	of	
their own and who meet other state-based eligibility requirements.30 
Unemployment	 insurance	benefits	 are	 intended	 to	provide	 temporary	
financial	assistance	to	unemployed	individuals	who	meet	the	require-
ments of state law. Each state administers a separate UI program within 
the guidelines established by federal legislation. State legislation deter-
mines	 the	 eligibility	 requirements	 for	 UI,	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 benefit	
and	 the	 length	of	 time	 these	benefits	are	available.	To	be	eligible	 for	
UI	benefits,	individuals	need	to	meet	the	state	requirements	for	wages	
earned or time employed in market work during an established period 
of time referred to as a “base period.” In addition, administrators need 
to determine that individuals became unemployed through no fault of 
their own and verify that these unemployed individuals meet other eli-
gibility requirements of state law.
Individuals whose employment or self-employment is lost or inter-
rupted as a direct result of a major disaster, and who are not eligible to 
receive	regular	UI	benefits,	can	obtain	DUA.31 Assistance is generally 
available to those who lived, worked, or were scheduled to work in 
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the disaster area and because of the catastrophic event no longer have 
“a job or a place to work; or cannot reach the place of work; or cannot 
work due to damage to the place of work; or cannot work because of an 
injury caused by the disaster.”32	Individuals	can	receive	DUA	benefits	
for the weeks of unemployment in the disaster assistance period. The 
period	begins	with	the	first	day	of	the	week	following	the	declaration	of	
the major disaster and continues for up to 26 weeks after the declaration 
date.	The	amount	of	the	maximum	weekly	benefit	depends	on	the	UI	
provisions of the state in which the disaster occurred. The amount of the 
minimum	weekly	benefit,	however,	is	50	percent	of	the	average	benefit	
amount in the state.
While	many	survivors	of	disasters	receive	UI	benefits,	there	is	no	
systematic ongoing measurement of the number of recipients or the 
amount	of	UI	benefits	associated	with	disasters.	Chapters	4	and	5	show	
estimates	of	UI	benefit	payments	caused	by	hurricanes	and	floods.	The	
methodology we use is described in these chapters.
Data	on	the	receipt	DUA	cash	benefits	for	individual	major	disas-
ters are available starting in 1983. Between 1983 and 2013 DUA ben-
efits	were	paid	to	survivors	of	600	major	disasters,	or	42.7	percent	of	
the 1,405 major disasters from 1983 to 2013. During these 31 years the 
share	of	disasters	that	resulted	in	DUA	benefits	varied	systematically.	
Table 3.3 displays the results of four regressions that summarize devel-
opments in the DUA recipiency proportion; that is, the proportion of 
major	disasters	for	which	DUA	cash	benefits	were	paid.
The equations test for trends and for differential recipiency rates 
for	three	categories	of	disasters:	hurricanes,	floods,	and	tornadoes.	Both	
linear	trends	are	highly	significant.	In	Equation	3.3.1	in	Table	3.3,	the	
post-1983 trend indicates that the recipiency proportion increased by 
0.0196 per year or by 0.196 per decade in the years immediately after 
1983. The post-1995 trend, however, is negative and larger in absolute 
value than the post-1983 trend. Thus, Equation (3.3.1) indicates that the 
recipiency	rate	decreased	by	0.0148	(=	0.0196	−	0.0344)	each	year	after	
1995 or by 0.148 per decade. While both trends are statistically sig-
nificant,	Equation	(3.3.1)	explains	only	about	40	percent	of	the	annual	
time-series variation in the DUA recipiency rate. The standard error of 
0.094 indicates that the average annual projection error over the sample 
period reaches almost 10 percentage points.
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Regression Equation (3.3.1) reveals large trend-related changes 
in the DUA recipiency rate over the sample period. The projected 
recipiency rate increased from 0.361 in 1983 to 0.562 in 1995 but then 
decreased	to	0.296	in	2013.	The	likelihood	of	receiving	DUA	benefits	
following a major disaster has decreased substantially since 1995. As 
noted below, there is no obvious explanation for the decrease.
Figure 3.1 displays the actual recipiency rates and the rates pro-
jected by regression Equation 3.3.1 from 1983 to 2013. The reversal 
of the recipiency rate after 1995 has been dramatic. The upward trend 
through the mid-1990s saw the recipiency rate increase substantially, 
but then decrease by even more during the most recent two decades. 
Tracking changes in the projected proportion, the increase through the 
mid-1990s was more than 0.20 but the subsequent decrease was at least 
0.30.33 The projected recipiency rate in 2013 was only about half of the 
rate in 1995.
Chapter 2 explores trends in major disasters with an emphasis on 
hurricanes,	floods,	and	tornadoes.	Equations	(3.3.2),	(3.3.3),	and	(3.3.4)	
test for the effects of these three hazard categories on the DUA recipi-
ency rate. The three categories span almost the full range of average 
losses per disaster with hurricanes having the highest average and tor-
nadoes one of the lowest averages.34 Each category is measured as a 
proportion of all major disasters, and this proportion is added to the 
Table 3.3  Disaster Unemployment Assistance Receipt in Major Disasters, 
1983–2013
Regression Constant
Trend
1983
Trend
1995
Disaster
type
Adjusted
R2
Standard
error
Durbin- 
Watson
(3.3.1) Two trends 0.341
(6.3)
0.0196
(3.2)
−0.0344
(4.1)
0.393 0.094 1.83
(3.3.2) Two trends 
+ hurricanes
0.330
(5.9)
0.0199
(3.3)
−0.0350
(4.2)
0.109
(0.1)
0.389 0.094 1.83
(3.3.3) Two trends 
+	floods
0.362
(3.7)
0.0192
(3.1)
−0.0340
(4.0)
−0.028
(0.2)
0.377 0.095 1.83
(3.3.4) Two trends 
+ tornadoes
0.247
(3.9)
0.0201
(3.6)
−0.0350
(4.6)
0.338
(2.5)
0.491 0.088 1.49
SOURCE: Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) recipiency rates are measured as 
the	proportion	of	major	disasters	with	some	weeks	of	DUA	cash	benefits	paid.	Trend	
1983	and	Trend	1995	are	measured	as	linear	trends.	Beneath	each	coefficient	is	the	
absolute value of its t-ratio;	a	result	is	statistically	significant	if	the	t-ratio is 2.0 or 
larger. The mean annual DUA recipiency rate for the 1983–2013 period was 0.445.
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regression equations that also include the trends from 1983 and 1995. 
The results from the three regressions are surprising. The one category 
that	contributes	significantly	to	explained	variation	is	the	tornado	pro-
portion of major disasters (Equation 3.3.4) and not hurricanes (the most 
costly)	or	floods	(the	most	common).
The decline in the DUA recipiency proportion since 1995 has no 
obvious explanation. Program eligibility rules have not changed over 
the past 20 years, but the downtrend is apparent as early as 2007. Also, 
the	tornado	proportion	retains	significance	when	the	estimation	period	
is	shortened	to	2007,	while	the	hurricane	and	flood	proportions	remain	
insignificant	with	shorter	estimation	periods.
The	decline	 in	DUA	recipiency	could	 reflect	 a	decline	 in	knowl-
edge about the program among potential participants (mainly the self-
employed). The most recent data indicate that the decline may have 
accelerated. The recipiency proportion in 2013 was 0.145 and 0.140 
in 2014. These are the two lowest proportions of the entire 1983–
Figure 3.1  Disaster Unemployment Assistance Recipiency Rates, 
1983–2013
SOURCE:	Disaster	Unemployment	Assistance	(DUA)	beneficiary	proportion,	the	pro-
portion	of	major	disasters	where	DUA	cash	benefits	were	paid	 to	 survivors	of	 the	
disaster.
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2014 period. Explaining why recipiency has declined is an important 
endeavor in order to ensure that DUA will continue to support disaster 
survivors in future years.
PRIVATE INSURANCE AND PRIVATE–PUBLIC 
PARTNERSHIPS
The	financial	consequences	of	many	casualty	losses	may	be	ame-
liorated by the advance purchase of private insurance. For instance, 
disability insurance, health insurance, and life insurance are privately 
sold	policies	that	provide	compensation	to	individuals	for	the	specified	
casualty loss. Property insurance is a private mechanism that provides 
compensation to those who suffer covered losses to physical property 
(both real and personal property). Homeowners insurance may pay not 
only for the rebuilding or repair of a damaged home, but also for tem-
porary living costs. Business interruption insurance can partially substi-
tute for temporarily lost income or pay for temporarily higher expenses. 
While private insurance policies are primarily used to cover the risk 
loss in nondisaster settings, they can also operate in the event of a major 
disaster.
The most common private insurance policy for homeowners in the 
United States is Homeowner-3 (HO-3). A standard HO-3 policy pro-
vides broad coverage for losses due to “perils,” as they are called in 
the	insurance	industry,	such	as	explosions,	fire,	hail,	lightning,	smoke,	
storms, theft, tornadoes, vandalism, and wind.35 In some areas prone to 
hailstorms,	there	is	a	deductible	specifically	for	hail	damage.	There	are	
some restrictions in coverage for windstorm damage if one lives near 
the Atlantic or Gulf Coasts because of the high risk of hurricanes. Simi-
larly, if one lives in certain parts of the Midwest, where tornadoes are 
common, windstorm damage is not usually covered.
Some disasters, such as damage from hail, lightning, volcanic erup-
tions, and windstorms, are covered under homeowners insurance; dam-
age from perils that lead to widespread disastrous consequences are 
specifically	 excluded.	Earthquake	 insurance	 can	 be	 purchased	 for	 an	
additional premium under a standard HO-3 policy in all states except 
California.36	The	cost	of	this	coverage	varies	significantly	from	one	area	
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to another, depending on the likelihood of a major earthquake. Flood 
coverage, however, is not available as additional coverage. Hurricanes 
and	 other	 windstorms	 are	 often	 accompanied	 by	 flooding.	 In	 many	
cases,	flooding	can	cause	far	more	damage	to	a	home	and	other	property	
than high winds. Neither homeowners insurance nor a separate wind-
storm	 policy	 covers	 flood	 damage.	 Neither	 does	 property	 insurance	
cover the destruction of one’s home or other buildings if the destruction 
was	the	result	of	a	flood.
Catastrophic	 losses	 from	 earthquakes,	 floods,	 hurricanes,	 nuclear	
radiation, and terrorism have affected the willingness of private insurers 
to	provide	coverage	against	these	perils.	In	the	case	of	floods,	private	
insurance	companies	provided	flood	insurance	until	the	late	1920s.	Fol-
lowing the heavy losses the insurance industry experienced as a result 
of	the	Mississippi	floods	in	1927,	private	flood	insurance	coverage	was	
discontinued.37 Floods were perceived to be uninsurable for three rea-
sons.	First,	adverse	selection	meant	that	only	households	and	firms	in	
flood-prone	areas	would	purchase	coverage.	Second,	risk-based	premi-
ums were too costly for the average household. Third, private insurers 
could	not	generate	sufficient	premiums	to	insure	against	a	catastrophic	
flood	event.	
Two federal government insurance programs were created to pro-
vide coverage for a peril that the private insurance market was unwill-
ing to underwrite: the federal crop insurance program and the National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Before the federal crop insurance pro-
gram	was	established,	private	insurers	had	difficulty	providing	afford-
able insurance policies because of the inherent risks and potential for 
widespread catastrophic losses associated with agricultural production. 
The	NFIP	was	created	 in	 the	wake	of	 the	widespread	flooding	 in	 the	
mid-1960s	and	calls	for	a	reduction	in	the	financial	burden	on	taxpayers	
for	providing	assistance	to	flood	survivors.	Because	private	insurance	
was not available, the federal government decided to provide coverage 
in order to safeguard the economic interests of households, agricultural 
producers, businesses, communities, and taxpayers.
To help the agricultural sector recover from the combined effects 
of the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl, Congress passed the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act of 1938 and the Federal Crop Insurance Act. 
The legislation established the federal crop insurance program and cre-
ated the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation to administer the program. 
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The program’s aim is threefold: to protect the income of agricultural 
producers against crop failure or price collapse, to protect individuals 
and	families	against	food	shortages	and	price	fluctuations,	and	to	assist	
business	and	employment	by	providing	a	consistent	flow	of	agricultural	
commodities.
The federal crop insurance program is designed to help protect agri-
cultural producers against either the loss of their crops from a natu-
ral disaster (crop-yield insurance), or the loss of revenue from lower 
agricultural commodity prices (crop-revenue insurance). According 
to the National Crop Insurance Services, farmers spent approximately 
$4.5 billion in 2013 to purchase more than 1.2 million crop insurance 
policies that protected 128 different kinds of crops.38 Crop insurance is 
divided into two categories: the federally subsidized multiple-peril crop 
insurance and the state-regulated private crop insurance.
The multiple-peril crop insurance program provides coverage for 
the losses associated with the unavoidable risks of adverse weather, and 
weather-related plant diseases and insect infestations. It provides insur-
ance	for	crops	and	livestock	against	damage	caused	by	droughts,	floods,	
hail, and winter freezes.39 Crop insurance is available for most major 
crops and many specialty crops (including fruit, tree nut, vegetable, and 
nursery crops), as well as forage and pastureland for livestock produc-
ers. An agricultural producer who chooses to purchase an insurance pol-
icy must do so by an administratively determined deadline date, which 
varies by crop and usually coincides with the planting season.
The Risk Management Agency of the USDA operates and man-
ages the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, which provides crop 
insurance to farmers and ranchers. Private-sector insurance companies 
sell and service these policies. The federal government subsidizes the 
administrative and operating expenses of the private insurance com-
panies, develops and/or approves the premium rate, approves and sup-
ports products, and reinsures the companies. The largest category of the 
insurance payments is associated with droughts, but compensation from 
floods	is	also	common.
A	 number	 of	 legislative	 changes	 have	modified	 the	 federal	 crop	
insurance program.40	The	most	recent	modification	was	with	the	Agri-
cultural Act of 2014. The legislation expands the scope of the federal 
crop insurance program by covering a greater share of agricultural 
losses,	 and	 makes	 other	 modifications	 that	 broaden	 policy	 cover-
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age. It makes major changes in commodity programs, adds new crop 
insurance options, and expands programs for specialty crops, organic 
farmers, bioenergy, and rural development. In addition, the legislation 
introduces new products to help agricultural producers expand their 
protection against losses due to natural disasters or price declines.41
Under the current crop-yield insurance, part of the federal crop 
insurance program, an agricultural producer who grows an insurable 
crop selects a level of crop yield and price coverage and pays a pre-
mium. Premiums increase as the level of yield and price coverage rise. 
All eligible agricultural producers can receive catastrophic coverage, 
however, without paying a premium. Although eligible agricultural 
producers do not pay a premium for catastrophic coverage, they are 
required to pay an administrative fee (currently $300) per covered crop 
for each county where the crop is grown.
For many insurable commodities, an eligible producer can purchase 
crop-revenue insurance. Under such a policy, a farmer can potentially 
receive an indemnity payment when actual farm revenue for a com-
modity	falls	below	the	target	level,	regardless	of	whether	the	deficit	in	
revenue was caused by a shortfall in production or low farm commodity 
prices. Insured agricultural producers can also be eligible for reduced 
coverage if they are late in planting or prevented from planting because 
of	flooding.
The second government insurance program discussed in this section 
is the NFIP. In 1968, Congress passed the initial legislation that created 
the program to address the increasing costs of taxpayer-funded disaster 
relief	for	flood	survivors	and	the	increasing	damage	caused	by	floods.	
While	the	program	has	been	expanded	and	modified	several	times,	it	has	
consistently	pursued	a	comprehensive	flood	risk	management	strategy:	
flood	hazard	mapping,	flood	insurance,	and	floodplain	management.42 
Flood	 hazard	 mapping	 is	 designed	 to	 identify	 and	 map	 flood-prone	
communities	across	the	nation.	Purchasing	flood	insurance	encourages	
property owners in NFIP-participating communities to protect their 
property	against	flood	losses.	Flood	plain	management	requires	com-
munities	in	flood-prone	zones	to	adopt	and	enforce	approved	floodplain	
management	ordinances	to	mitigate	the	risk	of	future	flood	damage.
The Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, part of 
FEMA, administers NFIP in close coordination with private companies 
that provide property insurance to households and businesses.43 Partici-
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pation in NFIP is based on an agreement between the federal govern-
ment and local communities to provide insurance if a community will 
implement and enforce mitigation measures to reduce future risks in 
flood-prone	areas.
The NFIP has grown extensively since its inception; as of January 
2015 the program has more than 5.1 million policies in 22,000 com-
munities and provided $1.25 trillion in coverage. Insurance coverage 
tends to be concentrated in coastal states, with nearly 40 percent of 
the entire program (in the number of policies, premiums and coverage) 
concentrated in Florida and Texas. In the aftermath of the hurricane sea-
sons in the last decade, the NFIP borrowed approximately $27 billion 
from the U.S. Treasury to meet its claims obligations. In response to 
these increasing obligations, Congress passed the Biggert-Waters Flood 
Insurance Reform Act (BW-12) in July 2012. The legislation applied 
the	tools	of	risk	management	to	the	peril	of	flooding.	Among	its	provi-
sions,	BW-12	required	that	floodplain	maps	be	updated,	local	building	
code enforcement be strengthened, insurance subsidies for certain prop-
erties be removed, and risk-related premiums be charged.
Some residents, particularly those who received insurance pre-
mium subsidies, were confronted with large price increases. Originally, 
BW-12 was to gradually phase out the subsidized rates for about 20 per-
cent of property owners, half were to pay 25 percent more per year and 
the	rest	were	to	move	to	the	full	cost	for	flood	insurance	upon	purchase	
of an older property. Because FEMA did not issue the new rates for 15 
months, many households bought property before they could be warned 
of the retroactive rate increase. Other households saw rate quotes that 
were inaccurate and well above the intended 25 percent increase. In the 
face	of	significant	challenges	 to	BW-12,	Congress	passed	 the	Home-
owner Flood Insurance Affordability Act in March 2014. This legisla-
tion should resolve most of the unintended consequences of BW-12. 
In an effort to encourage mitigation measures, reduced premiums will 
be	available	for	households	who	flood-proof	or	undertake	other	meth-
ods to elevate property. If there are affordability issues with low-value 
homes,	nonprofit	organizations,	churches,	or	small	businesses,	FEMA	
is obliged to propose solutions to Congress. In addition, FEMA is 
required to monitor the implementation of the legislation and complete 
a comprehensive affordability study to help guide future congressional 
action.
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If a private–public insurance program were to be provided, then it 
would need to be linked with other initiatives. Given the reluctance of 
individuals to voluntarily purchase insurance against damages, regula-
tions could be passed that require catastrophic insurance coverage for 
all individuals who face risk. Insurance premiums would be risk-based 
to provide appropriate signals about the hazards individuals face and 
enable insurance providers to lower premiums for properties where 
mitigation is undertaken.
OTHER SUPPORT
In the aftermath of a major disaster, the government is not the only 
actor that provides compensation to disaster survivors. Private actors, 
individuals, or local groups of people spontaneously extend assistance. 
Nonprofit	 entities	 and	nongovernmental	 organizations	 also	 step	 in	 to	
provide disaster relief assistance. The Red Cross was set up in advance 
with the mission of responding to disasters and emergencies.44 In order 
to encourage the participation of the private sector, the government 
needs	to	define	its	role	as	supplementing	and	not	supplanting	the	assis-
tance of others.
Even though social insurance and social assistance programs are not 
restricted to disaster settings, they come into play after a major disaster. 
Social insurance is aimed at personal loss, not property loss. For exam-
ple, the social security program in the United States effectively requires 
workers to partially insure against the loss of income from retirement or 
death, and the unemployment compensation program requires workers 
to partially insure against the loss of wages arising from involuntary 
unemployment.
Social insurance can be viewed as a scheme that mandates individu-
als to contribute in advance their own “fair share” to a program that will 
help them in times of personal need, rather than rely on taxpayers when 
the need arises. When people suffer personally from a major disaster, 
social insurance is already in place, and so certain survivors of disasters 
(and their families) can call on these programs to help compensate for 
income loss, medical costs, and other expenses.
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Income-conditioned social assistance programs are also available 
to survivors of a catastrophic event. For instance, individuals who lose 
income, employment, or health insurance may become eligible for pro-
grams	that	are	not	specifically	intended	for	disaster	relief.	Social	assis-
tance is intended to help individuals (and their families) who experi-
ence personal disasters. It includes income support provided by welfare 
programs such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 
housing support programs such as public housing units and housing 
vouchers provided by HUD, job training under the Workforce Invest-
ment Act, Medicaid, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(S-CHIP), food assistance for disaster relief, and so on.
Under programs such as the Social Services Block Grant or Com-
munity	 Development	 Block	 Grant,	 state	 or	 local	 officials	 have	 the	
discretion to use funds to meet disaster-related needs. Other federal 
agencies may offer assistance to state and local governments, the U.S. 
Economic Development Administration (EDA), and the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers. The role of EDA in disaster recovery is “to facili-
tate delivery of federal economic development assistance to local 
governments for long-term community economic recovery planning, 
reconstruction, redevelopment and resiliency.”45 Within the context of 
the National Disaster Recovery Framework, EDA coordinates the activ-
ities of a diverse group of partner agencies in support of community 
economic recovery.
CONCLUSIONS
Given the occurrence of disasters in the United States, there is a 
need to encourage those at risk to invest in mitigation measures to 
reduce future risks prior to a catastrophic event. Together with risk 
management programs, insurance can play an important role in disaster 
risk reduction. Insurance is a well-known form of risk transfer: cover-
age of a risk is obtained from an insurance provider in exchange for 
ongoing premiums paid to the provider. Insurance is designed to spread 
risk by using an insurance pooling mechanism for those who choose to 
live in high-risk areas. Each policyholder would pay a relatively small 
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premium to an insurance provider who would then be able to cover the 
large losses suffered by a few. In an ideal situation, those who undertake 
loss-prevention measures would be rewarded by a reduction in the price 
of	their	coverage	to	reflect	their	lower	expected	claims.
When the private insurance market fails to provide insurance cov-
erage for property losses from certain disasters, the government could 
intervene. For instance, state and federal governments could work with 
private insurers facing a similar peril to provide coverage for that risk 
and make each insurer cover its “fair share.” Or the government could 
create a fund paid for by private insurers that covers the target peril. 
Alternatively, the government could become the insurer of the risk and 
offer the coverage. It could enlist private insurers to sell the policies, 
collect the premiums, and even process the claims if the covered risk 
were to occur.
Disaster survivors and public entities need to be encouraged to 
avoid the potential risks of future disasters to life and property. Local, 
state, and federal governments could take steps to encourage potential 
disaster survivors to engage in loss prevention (or reduction) measures. 
It is possible that current zoning regulations are encouraging unwise 
construction in high-risk areas. Land-use planning can help mitigate 
disasters and reduce risks by discouraging settlement and construction 
in hazard-prone areas, particularly such key installations as power, sew-
age and water, and service routes for transportation.
Building codes necessary to ensure human safety and welfare could 
be encouraged, including resistance to collapse and damage. Building 
regulations	could	 require	specific	enhancements	 to	structures	 to	 limit	
the damage caused by earthquakes of certain magnitudes or the force 
of strong winds. Governments could provide information to building 
owners	about	these	measures,	provide	financial	incentives	to	owners	to	
utilize them, and penalize owners who failed to take such measures and 
suffered harm in a subsequent extreme event. Similar actions could be 
taken by governments to encourage precautionary measures for other 
potentially	catastrophic	risks,	such	as	floods	or	tornadoes.	For	example,	
chronically	flood-damaged	homes	could	be	relocated	from	flood-prone	
areas or houses could be elevated. It is not only the adoption of ade-
quate codes and standards by local, state, and federal governments that 
is required for mitigation, but also the enforcement of building codes 
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and standards. As the UNISDR (2009) notes, a systematic regime of 
enforcement is a critical supporting requirement for effective imple-
mentation of building codes.
Current insurance is not effectively meeting two important objectives 
to those at risk: delivering information to those residing in hazard-prone 
areas about the nature of the risks they face, and providing incentives for 
undertaking loss-reduction measures prior to a disaster. Public–private 
partnerships can encourage investment in protective measures prior to a 
disaster, manage the issue of affordability, and provide insurance cover-
age for catastrophic risks. In order to reduce risk, the rate structure of 
premiums	would	 reflect	 risk	 based	on	 accurate	 information	 about	 the	
perils faced by those residing in hazard-prone areas. Accurate informa-
tion is needed to determine the price of risk-based premiums.
To address the issue of affordability, means-tested vouchers could 
be provided to individuals who undertake cost-effective mitigation 
measures. Long-term loans for mitigation would encourage expendi-
ture on cost-effective mitigation measures. An additional motivation for 
undertaking loss-reduction measures is well-enforced building codes. 
Given economic development in hazard-prone areas, the need for mak-
ing communities more resilient to natural disasters by investing in loss 
reduction measures is critical. 
Notes
 1. For an accounting framework in assessing disasters, see Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (2014).
   2. See http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions (accessed September 16, 2016). Recall 
that the former National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) is now the National Cen-
ters for Environmental Information (NCEI).
   3. The insured and uninsured direct loss components include physical damage to res-
idential, commercial, and government/municipal buildings; material assets within 
a building; losses due to businesses interruption; vehicles, boats, offshore energy 
platforms; public infrastructure; and agricultural assets.
   4. In 2014 and 2015, the NCDC added 18 more incidents to its list.
   5. The regression is as follows with t-ratios appearing in parentheses beneath the 
coefficients;	a	result	is	statistically	significant	if	the	t-ratio is 2.0 or larger. 
   NOAA number = 1.251 + 0.2142 × Trend 1980    
  Adjusted R2 = 0.414. Standard error = 2.49  (1.4)  (4.9)   
  Durbin-Watson = 1.83   Mean = 5.00  
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  6. The four hurricanes and the cost estimates of the destruction (in billions of 2013 
dollars) were Katrina ($148.8), Sandy ($65.7), Andrew ($44.8), and Ike ($29.2). 
The three drought-heat waves occurred in 1988 ($78.8), 1980 ($56.4), and 2012 
($30.3),	while	the	large	flood	event	was	the	Great	Flood	of	1993	($33.8).
   7. A scaling procedure is generally used in comparisons across economies even 
though	GDP	is	a	flow	concept,	while	damage	is	a	stock	concept.	The	reason	is	that	
absolute	damage	in	affluent	economies	is	considerably	greater	because	they	have	
more assets. In a sample of 175 economies, the World Bank and United Nations 
(2010, p. 32) found that damage is less than 1 percent of GDP for 86 percent of the 
sample.
   8. For a more comprehensive list, see Torsell (2012). 
   9. The authority of the USDA to provide emergency assistance for its various disas-
ter relief programs exists under the Stafford Act, secretary of agriculture disaster 
designations, Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, as well as other authorizing leg-
islation. For an overview of the emergency disaster designation and declaration 
process,	 see	 https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/ed_desig_process2012.
pdf (accessed July 28, 2016).
 10. The Budget Control Act of 2011 amended the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit	 Control	Act	 of	 1985.	 The	 2011	 legislation	 reinstated	 the	 discretionary	
spending limits that had expired after 2002 and made adjustments to those limits.
 11. No-year funding appropriations are available until expended which is helpful in 
disaster recovery since infrastructure repair and mitigation projects can extend 
over several years.
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Hurricanes
Among the seven types of major disasters introduced in Chapter 2, 
the large-scale destructive effects of hurricanes stand out for the mag-
nitude	of	their	financial	costs.	While	hurricanes	accounted	for	just	195	
of the 2,046 FEMA-designated major disasters declared between 1953 
and 2013, they comprised nearly half the billion-dollar disasters (NCEI, 
n.d.).
The	large	financial	costs	associated	with	hurricane-related	disasters	
reflect	several	hurricanes,	not	just	a	few	wildly	destructive	ones	such	
as Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy. It was noted in Chapter 3 that the 
financial	costs	of	four	of	the	eight	billion-dollar	disasters	that	exceeded	
$25 billion (2013 dollars) were hurricanes. Seven of the 13 disasters 
with	financial	costs	between	$10	and	$25	billion	and	eight	of	 the	22	
with costs between $5 and $10 billion were also hurricanes. Thus, of 
the	43	billion-dollar	disasters	with	financial	costs	of	$5	billion	or	more	
that occurred between 1980 and 2013, 19—nearly half—were caused 
by hurricanes.
Hurricanes	 also	 figure	 prominently	 in	 the	 large	 financial	 losses	
recorded in other disaster-related statistical series. The NFIP publishes 
information	 of	 each	 flood	 event	 with	 paid	 losses	 of	 1,500	 or	 more.	
Between January 1978 and December 2013, the NFIP records indicate 
that	there	were	22	separate	flood	events	with	10,000	or	more	paid	losses,	
and	14	were	due	to	hurricanes.	Similarly,	hurricanes	figure	prominently	
in the losses of the DUA program. Hurricanes were responsible for 8 
of the 20 disasters between 1983 and 2013, during which DUA made 
payments	of	more	than	40,000	weekly	benefits.	In	short,	the	financial	
losses attributable to hurricanes dominate the various programs that are 
responsible for providing support to disaster survivors.
The	first	section	introduces	terminology	that	differentiates	between	
tropical depressions, tropical storms, hurricanes, and major hurricanes. 
It	also	outlines	the	Saffir-Simpson	Hurricane	Wind	Scale	used	to	clas-
sify hurricanes. Like all major disasters, hurricanes generate several 
types of adverse effects on individuals, families, and the economy. Since 
labor compensation exceeds half of the value added in most industries, 
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reduced earnings comprise an important element in disaster-related 
economic losses. The second section analyzes the labor market effects 
of	 the	 four	 hurricanes	 that	 caused	 the	 largest	 financial	 losses.	These	
hurricanes were (in descending order) Katrina, Sandy, Andrew, and Ike. 
Four destructive hurricanes also impacted Florida between mid-August 
and late September in 2004. The regression analysis also examines the 
labor market effects of these combined “Florida Four” hurricanes. The 
third section examines property damage and compensation from hur-
ricanes using data from the NCDC, the NFIP program, and the DUA 
program. The last section provides concluding comments.
TERMINOLOGY
Hurricanes	 are	 tropical	 cyclones	 (defined	below)	or	 severe	 tropi-
cal storms that form over oceans and other large bodies of warm 
water. Atlantic hurricanes form in the Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean 
Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico. Occasionally hurricanes that affect the 
United States form off the west coast of Mexico. In the United States, 
most states affected by hurricanes border the Atlantic Coast and the 
Gulf of Mexico, but occasionally hurricanes affect Hawaii and states 
along	 the	 Pacific	Coast.	The	Atlantic	 hurricane	 season	 extends	 from	
June to November, with peak activity from mid-August to late October. 
The	Eastern	Pacific	hurricane	season	extends	 from	mid-May	 through	
November.
A tropical cyclone is a warm-core circular wind pattern that origi-
nates in warm or tropical waters. It is characterized by closed sur-
face	wind	circulation	about	a	well-defined	center	or	eye,	high	circular	
wind speeds, and thunderstorms. Over water a hurricane is sustained 
by extracting heat energy from warm water while exporting energy at 
a low temperature in the upper atmosphere. Destruction from hurri-
canes is caused by heavy rainfall, strong winds, and storm surges along 
coastal	areas	but	can	also	entail	flash	flooding	and	mudslides.	Typically,	
the destructive effects of hurricanes are most serious along the coast but 
can extend inland for hundreds of miles.
The severity and potential damage from a tropical cyclone is evalu-
ated	by	its	maximum	sustained	surface	wind	speed	as	classified	by	the	
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Saffir-Simpson	Hurricane	Wind	Scale	(SSHWS).	A	tropical	depression	
has a maximum sustained surface wind speed of 38 miles per hour (mph) 
or less. Tropical cyclones with wind speeds between 38 and 73 mph are 
termed tropical storms, while those with wind speeds of 74 mph or 
higher	are	termed	hurricanes.	Hurricanes,	in	turn,	are	classified	into	five	
categories depending on maximum sustained wind speeds: Category 1 
(74–95 mph), Category 2 (96–110 mph), Category 3 (111–129 mph), 
Category 4 (130–156 mph), and Category 5 (157 mph or higher). Hur-
ricanes	in	Saffir-Simpson	Categories	3,	4,	and	5	are	commonly	termed	
major hurricanes.
The National Weather Service of the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NWS-NOAA) has documented cyclone and 
hurricane activity for more than 100 years. Since 1962, NWS-NOAA 
has published annual summary information of the Atlantic hurricane 
season	using	the	SSHWS	classification	system,	an	arrangement	extend-
ing from tropical depressions through Category 5 hurricanes.1 Between 
1962 and 2013 there were 847 tropical depressions, 593 tropical storms, 
316 hurricanes, and 119 major hurricanes. Across these 52 years about 
70 percent of tropical depressions became tropical storms; about half of 
tropical storms became hurricanes, and about one-third of hurricanes 
were major hurricanes. On average, only about 14 of each 100 tropical 
depressions became major hurricanes.
The	 SSHWS	 classification	 system	 has	 been	 used	 consistently	 to	
classify hurricanes in all years since the FEMA major disaster reporting 
system was initiated in 1953. Between 1953 and 2013, 70 separate hur-
ricanes resulted in major disaster declarations. As noted in the introduc-
tory chapter, the geographic entity used in the FEMA reporting system 
is the state/tribal government. Given that major disaster declarations 
are recorded by state, the number of hurricane-related major disasters 
was much larger at 195. Hurricane Sandy, for example, caused major 
disasters in 13 states in the FEMA reporting system.
Between 1953 and 2013 there were 372 Atlantic hurricanes and 
four	Eastern	Pacific	hurricanes	that	affected	the	United	States.	Of	the	
376, only 70 resulted in major disaster declarations. Major hurricanes 
(SSHWS categories 3, 4, and 5), however, were more likely to result 
in major disaster declarations than lesser hurricanes. Of the 223 lesser 
hurricanes, only 16 (= 0.072) resulted in major disaster declarations, 
whereas 54 of the 153 (= 0.353) major hurricanes resulted in major 
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disaster	 declarations.	 Major	 hurricanes	 were	 about	 five	 times	 more	
likely to cause catastrophic destruction compared to lesser hurricanes.
All states along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts were affected by sev-
eral hurricanes between 1953 and 2013. The 15 states with extensive 
coastlines extending from Texas to Massachusetts accounted for 159 of 
the 195 (or 82 percent) hurricane-related major disasters during these 
61 years. Florida, Louisiana, and North Carolina experienced the larg-
est absolute numbers with 26, 17, and 17, respectively. Each of these 
15 coastal states, however, was affected by at least six hurricane-related 
major disaster declarations during the period.
Table 2.2 in Chapter 2 reported the results of a regression analysis 
on the frequency of major disaster declarations caused by hurricanes. 
Between 13 and 18 percent of the time series variation in the annual 
number of hurricanes between 1953 and 2013 was explained in regres-
sion Equations (2.2.7), (2.2.8), and (2.2.9). These most destructive 
of natural disasters vary widely in frequency from year to year. The 
regression results also indicated that the frequency of hurricane-related 
disaster declarations increased after 1995.
Since the NWS-NOAA has been tracking tropical depressions and 
hurricanes for more than 100 years, it may be instructive to provide a 
brief review of the trends in recent decades. Table 4.1 displays decade 
averages	since	the	1950s	for	five	hurricane-related	series.	Columns	(1)–
(4) show annual averages from the NWS-NOAA reporting system for 
Atlantic hurricanes. Note that the occurrence of tropical depressions has 
not changed, whereas most other series in Table 4.1 have been occur-
ring more frequently in recent decades compared to earlier decades 
(consistent with the earlier the regression results from Table 2.2).
Three results are apparent in Table 4.1. First, tropical depressions 
have progressed to tropical storms with more frequency in recent 
decades compared to the 1960s, increasing from about 60 percent to 
about 90 percent. Other things equal, this tendency is likely to increase 
the potential adverse effects of a given annual number of tropical depres-
sions. Second, the progression of tropical storms to hurricanes and of 
hurricanes to major hurricanes both display downward trends between 
the 1950s and recent years. Third, the progression from hurricanes and 
major hurricanes to major disasters has become increasingly likely. 
Major disasters in the FEMA reporting system were about 40 percent 
of Atlantic hurricanes in the 1950s. Since 2000, however, the compa-
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rable statistic has been about 80 percent. Hurricanes have become more 
likely to lead to major disaster declarations in recent years.
Major disasters generate several types of adverse effects on indi-
viduals, families, and the economy. Since labor compensation exceeds 
half of the value added in most industries, reduced earnings comprise 
an important element in disaster-related economic losses. The follow-
ing section looks at the effects of hurricanes in the labor market.
HURRICANES AND THE LABOR MARKET
Hurricanes affect the labor market in several ways. A recent analy-
sis by Groen, Kutzbach, and Polivka (2015) examines the effects of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on individual labor market participants in 
Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. The focus of their analysis 
is the changes in employment and earnings of individuals affected by 
hurricane damage. The authors pay attention to personal characteris-
tics (age, race, gender, and schooling) and provide detailed geographic 
data on the extent of hurricane damage by residential area and place 
Table 4.1  Annual Averages of Hurricane-Related Events, 1950–2013
Tropical
depressions
(1)
Tropical 
storms
(2)
Hurricanes
(3)
Major
hurricanes
(4)
Major
disasters
(5)
1950–1959 n/a 10.8 6.9 3.7 2.7a
1960–1969 14.1b 9.5 6.1 2.8 1.6
1970–1979 21.1 9.5 4.9 1.6 1.4
1980–1989 14.7 9.3 5.2 1.7 1.8
1990–1999 12.8 10.6 6.1 2.0 4.6
2000–2009 17.3 15.1 7.4 3.6 5.1
2010–2013 18.8 17.8 7.8 2.8 8.0
NOTE: n/a = not available. 
a1953–1959 average. 
b1962–1969 average.
SOURCE: Columns (1)–(4) from the NWS-NOAA reports on Atlantic tropical depres-
sions and related weather series. Column (5) from FEMA data on major disaster dec-
larations. 
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of employment. They track information on employment and earnings 
from	 two	 years	 prior	 to	 the	 hurricanes	 to	 five	 posthurricane	 years.	
Their analysis utilizes different control group methodologies based on 
samples of “comparable” individuals from other geographic areas in 
Southeastern states that were not impacted by hurricanes. Using a large, 
rich	sample	of	micro	data,	they	document	quarterly	time	profiles	of	the	
effects on the employment and earning of individuals from local areas 
who experienced differing degrees of hurricane damage.
The literature about the adverse effects of hurricanes is expand-
ing. For instance, Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2011); Kunreuther, 
Pauly, and McMorrow (2013); and Smith and Katz (2013) consider 
total property losses and reimbursement from hurricanes. Brown, 
Mason, and Tiller (2006) and Belasen and Polachek (2009) examine 
the employment and unemployment effects of hurricanes. Strobl (2011) 
investigates the effects of hurricanes on economic growth, Jarmin and 
Miranda (2006) examine the association between hurricanes and busi-
ness establishments, and Paxson et al. (2012) look at the traumatic and 
psychological stress associated with hurricanes. This literature is large 
and growing and also includes important analyses of the consequences 
of hurricanes in other economies.
The following discussion focuses on labor markets. Statewide 
monthly data for three series are examined: the total unemployment 
rate (TUR) as measured in the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data from 
its Local Area Unemployment Statistics program, weeks compensated 
in the UI program, and weeks compensated in the DUA program. Using 
“weeks compensated” as the variable of interest in these programs 
avoids the comparability problem of a nominal series such as weekly UI 
and	DUA	compensation	that	incorporates	the	effects	of	inflation.	Our	
series are measured as weekly averages; that is, we divide the monthly 
UI and DUA series by 4.333 to convert them into weekly averages. 
The strategy is to examine those hurricanes that are associated 
with	the	largest	financial	costs,	as	reported	in	the	NCDC	billion-dollar	
disaster series. The four costliest hurricanes were (in descending order) 
Katrina, Sandy, Andrew, and Ike, with estimated costs of $148.8, $65.7, 
$44.8, and $29.2 billion (in 2013 dollars), respectively. Four destruc-
tive hurricanes that impacted Florida between mid-August and late 
September occurred in 2004.2 The analysis also tests for the combined 
effects of these Florida Four hurricanes. While these four hurricanes 
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collectively caused 152,000 DUA weeks compensated across all states, 
138,000 weeks (89 percent) were paid to Floridians. Almost all the pay-
ments to disaster-survivors were made between September 2004 and 
April 2005 (99 percent).
Recall that the unit of observation used by FEMA is the state/tribal 
government and counties within the state. For each hurricane-impacted 
state, an adjacent state is selected as a control to provide a counterfac-
tual for the time path of the labor market variable. The following com-
binations of hurricanes, hurricane-impacted states, and control states 
are used in our analysis: Katrina-Louisiana-Texas, Katrina-Mississippi-
Alabama,	 Katrina-Alabama-Georgia,	 Sandy-New	York-Pennsylvania,	
Sandy-New Jersey-Pennsylvania, Andrew-Florida-Georgia, Ike-Texas-
Oklahoma, and the 2004 Florida Four hurricanes-Florida-Georgia.
Hurricane Katrina
Of all the disasters experienced since 1980, Hurricane Katrina was 
the most destructive.3 The NCDC estimated the total cost at $148.8 
billion, about twice as large as the second-largest major disaster, the 
drought of 1988 ($78.8 billion). As noted, Katrina also caused the larg-
est DUA weeks compensated and associated DUA payouts, as well as 
the largest number of NFIP paid losses and associated compensation for 
flood	damage	(see	Table	4.4).
The devastating impact of Katrina was concentrated primarily in 
Louisiana.	 Significant	 destruction	 was	 sustained	 in	 Mississippi	 and	
some	 in	Alabama.	 Indicative	of	 the	 scale	 of	financial	 losses	 in	 these	
three states, in the fall of 2005 Congress made appropriations for the 
UI program in Louisiana, $400 million; Mississippi, $80 million; and 
Alabama, $20 million.
Table 4.2 reports the results of a regression analysis that help 
describe the extent of the labor market effects caused by Hurricane 
Katrina. In both Louisiana and Mississippi, Katrina had obvious effects 
on	statewide	unemployment	and	UI	benefit	payments.	In	contrast,	the	
analysis	did	not	find	statistically	significant	effects	in	the	statewide	data	
from Alabama.
The top panel in Table 4.2 displays the results of the regression 
analysis	to	explain	the	statewide	unemployment	rates.	The	specification	
in each regression uses two control variables: the TUR in an adjacent 
84  Table 4.2  Katrina, State Unemployment, and State Unemployment Insurance Weeks Compensated
State Constant
Control 
state 
variablea 
Katrina1 
dummy 
variableb 
Katrina2 
dummy 
variablec
Adjusted 
R2
Standard 
error
Durbin-
Watson
Mean 
dependent 
variable
State unemployment  
rate (TUR)
Louisiana 0.679
(1.2)
0.766
(8.3)
6.494
(58.8)
0.991 0.132 2.26 5.372
Mississippi 5.009
(5.4)
0.498
(5.6)
2.593
(17.1)
0.976 0.186 1.33 6.934
Alabama −0.834
(0.7)
1.003
(12.2)
−0.108
(1.1)
0.996 0.121 1.16 5.086
State UI average weekly  
beneficiaries
Louisiana 5,148
(1.0)
0.154
(4.6)
121,048
(15.3)
0.730 16,840 1.98 32,661
Mississippi 3,793
(5.4)
0.500
(25.3)
19,038
(17.8)
0.890 2,432 1.95 21,265
Alabama 2,255
(1.8)
0.497
(30.1)
−730
(0.5)
0.971 2,146 2.55 32.840
aControl states: Texas is the control state for Louisiana; Alabama for Mississippi; and Georgia for Alabama.
bKatrina1 dummy variable = 1.0 September to November 2005, 0.333 December 2005, and 0.0 in other periods.
cKatrina2 dummy variable = 1.0 September 2005 to February 2006, and 0.0 in other periods.
SOURCE:	The	regression	equations	are	fitted	with	monthly	state-level	data.	Beneath	each	coefficient	is	the	absolute	value	of	its	t-ratio; a 
result	is	statistically	significant	if	the	t-ratio is 2.0 or larger. Unemployment rates in percentages of the state labor force. All regressions 
fitted	for	the	108	months	from	January	2001	to	December	2009.	All	regressions	adjust	for	first	order	autocorrelation.
Hurricanes   85
state and a categorical (dummy) variable for the months immediately 
after Katrina hit in late August 2005. The dummy variable in the TUR 
equation equals 1.0 from September to November 2005 and 0.333 in 
December 2005. For Louisiana, the TUR in Texas that is used as the 
control	variable	is	statistically	significant,	as	is	the	post-Katrina	dummy	
variable.	The	coefficient	on	the	dummy	variable	indicates	that	Katrina	
increased the statewide TUR by about 6.5 percentage points between 
September and December 2005. The effects on the statewide TUR, 
however, did not extend into 2006. In fact, by January 2006 the season-
ally adjusted TUR of 4.5 percent was lower than it was in August 2005 
(4.9 percent).
The unemployment rate equation for Mississippi uses the TUR 
from Alabama as the adjacent state cyclical control variable.4 It is statis-
tically	significant.	The	post-Katrina	dummy	variable	is	also	statistically	
significant,	suggesting	 that	Katrina	 increased	 the	TUR	of	Mississippi	
by 2.6 percentage points during September–December 2005. The TUR 
in Alabama also closely mirrored that of an adjacent state (Georgia), but 
the results of the regression do not suggest an independent effect from 
Katrina	(it	is	not	significantly	different	from	zero).	Hence,	there	is	no	
evidence of any effect from the hurricane on the TUR in Alabama.
Three other results from the unemployment rate equations in 
Table 4.2 are noteworthy. First, for both Louisiana and Mississippi 
the statewide TURs in the early months of 2006 were lower than that 
projected by the regression equations. This pattern was consistently 
observed between February and June 2006. Second, the residuals from 
all	three	states	displayed	high	autocorrelation.	The	patterns	of	signifi-
cant increases in the TURs of Louisiana and Mississippi during Sep-
tember–November 2005 were unchanged whether or not the equations 
included corrections for autocorrelation. Third, the point estimates for 
the Katrina dummy variables did not change when a different estima-
tion period was used (that is, the months of 2001–2007 as opposed to 
2001–2009). In short, the results displayed in Table 4.2 regarding state-
wide unemployment rates are robust to alternative estimates. For Loui-
siana and Mississippi, Katrina caused large but temporary increases in 
statewide unemployment during the fall of 2005.
The bottom panel of Table 4.2 displays the results of tests for an 
impact	of	Katrina	on	weekly	beneficiaries	 in	 the	UI	programs	of	 the	
three states. These regression equations also use developments in adja-
86   Brusentsev and Vroman
cent	states	to	control	for	general	developments	in	UI	benefit	recipiency.	
For all three states, the variable for adjacent state average weekly ben-
eficiaries	enters	with	a	positive	and	statistically	significant	coefficient.	
The equations also test for the effect of Katrina using a dummy variable 
for post-Katrina months. In these equations, however, the “on” period 
lasted from September 2005 to February 2006. For the six months of 
the	 “on”	 period	 the	 dummy	 variable	 coefficients	 suggest	 UI	weekly	
beneficiaries	 increased	by	 about	 121,000	 in	Louisiana	 and	19,000	 in	
Mississippi, but they were unchanged in Alabama.
During the six months from September 2005 to February 2006, 
weekly	DUA	beneficiaries	in	Louisiana	averaged	59,164,	or	42	percent	
of	weekly	UI	beneficiaries,	which	averaged	141,391	for	the	same	period.	
In Mississippi the corresponding DUA and UI weekly averages were 
8,762 and 34,223, or DUA weeks averaging 26 percent of UI weeks. 
Again, to reinforce the earlier point about low participation in Alabama, 
weekly DUA recipients averaged 271 during these six months, or only 
1.2	percent	of	UI	weekly	beneficiaries,	which	were	22,677.
Recall from Chapter 3 that DUA is reserved for individuals who are 
not	eligible	to	receive	regular	UI	benefits.	One	problem	with	the	statisti-
cal reports of the UI program is that the data do not distinguish persons 
who	receive	disaster-related	UI	benefits	 from	other	UI	recipients.	An	
indirect way to estimate the effect of Katrina on UI weeks compensated 
is to use a dummy variable approach. The results are displayed in the 
bottom panel of Table 4.2 and suggest that DUA weeks compensated 
caused by Katrina were strongly associated with regular UI weeks com-
pensated in both Louisiana and Mississippi, but not in Alabama.
The regular UI and DUA data from Hurricane Katrina may also 
suggest	 a	 different	 timing	 in	 the	 payment	 of	 increased	 UI	 benefits	
compared	 to	DUA	benefits.	 In	Louisiana,	 for	example,	1.538	million	
weeks of DUA were paid between September 2005 and February 2006, 
and 1.053 million weeks were paid between March and June 2006. 
The	coefficient	on	the	Katrina	dummy	variable	for	Louisiana	in	Table	
4.2 (121,048) refers to the six months between September 2005 and 
February 2006. When the Katrina dummy variable for Louisiana was 
extended	 to	June	2006,	 the	goodness-of-fit	of	 the	equation	decreased	
(the adjusted R2 decreased from 0.730 to 0.632). A similar decrease 
also occurred in Mississippi. At least following Katrina, the payment 
of	increased	DUA	benefits	persisted	considerably	longer	than	the	pay-
Hurricanes   87
ment	 of	 increased	 regular	 UI	 benefits.	 Since	 total	 unemployment	 in	
both states had already decreased below pre-Katrina levels by February 
2006,	one	can	ask	if	the	DUA	benefits	after	February	2006	were	paid	to	
individuals actively seeking work.
Hurricane Sandy
Following Hurricane Sandy, FEMA made major disaster decla-
rations in 13 states extending from Virginia to New Hampshire and 
included Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.5 The destruction, how-
ever,	was	 concentrated	mainly	 in	 the	 coastal	 areas	of	New	York	 and	
New Jersey, and these two states accounted for 99 percent of DUA cash 
benefits	paid	through	the	end	of	2013.	The	total	financial	costs	of	Sandy	
were estimated at $65.7 billion (in 2013 dollars) in the NCDC billion-
dollar disaster series.
In contrast to Katrina, where there were immediate and large effects 
on	statewide	unemployment	and	weekly	UI	beneficiaries	in	two	states,	
the	effects	of	Sandy	in	New	York	and	New	Jersey	were	much	smaller.	
Table 4.3 displays summary results of the regression analysis for New 
York	and	New	Jersey,	applying	the	same	specifications	used	above	to	
examine the effects of Katrina. The adjacent state that serves as the 
control	state	for	both	New	York	and	New	Jersey	is	Pennsylvania.	The	
table examines monthly state unemployment rates and average weekly 
UI	beneficiaries.
The	 unemployment	 rates	 in	 both	New	York	 and	New	 Jersey	 are	
strongly associated with the unemployment rate in Pennsylvania (both 
adjusted R2s exceed 0.99). In neither state, however, does the dummy 
variable	coefficient	for	Hurricane	Sandy	suggest	that	it	raised	the	unem-
ployment rate. The most likely inference to make is that the adverse 
effects from Sandy did not raise the unemployment rate in either state. 
The bottom panel in Table 4.3 indicates that there was a positive effect 
of the hurricane on UI weeks compensated in both states. The posi-
tive	coefficients	on	the	dummy	variable	suggest	that	Sandy	increased	
weekly	beneficiaries	by	about	9,200	in	New	Jersey	and	by	about	29,500	
in	New	York	during	the	six	months	from	November	2012	to	April	2013.
When the estimated increments in UI weeks compensated are mul-
tiplied	by	the	respective	weekly	UI	benefits	in	the	two	states	($291.65	
in	New	York	and	$373.23	in	New	Jersey),	the	increases	in	UI	benefit	
88  Table	4.3		Hurricane	Sandy,	State	Unemployment,	and	State	Unemployment	Insurance	Average	Weekly	Beneficiaries
Constant
Pennsylvania 
TUR and UI 
beneficiaries
Sandy 
dummya Adjusted R2
Standard
error
Durbin- 
Watson
Mean 
dependent 
variable
State unemployment  
rate (TUR)
New Jersey 0.405
(0.6)
1.067
(14.2)
−0,053
(0.8)
0.998 0.088 2.29 7.509
New	York 0.878
(1.6)
0.914
(13.9)
−0.095
(1.8)
0.998 0.075 1.81 7.011
State UI average weekly  
beneficiaries
New Jersey 37,768
(12.5)
0.509
(33.1)
9,209
(3.5)
0.869 11,346 2.06 133,471
New	York 63,325
(4.8)
0.814
(12.1)
29,294
(2.0)
0.783 28,140 2.15 216,688
aThe categorical (dummy) variable equals 1.0 from November 2012 to April 2013 and zero in all other months.
SOURCE:	Regression	analysis	fitted	with	monthly	state-level	data.	Beneath	each	coefficient	is	the	absolute	value	of	its	t-ratio; a result 
is	statistically	significant	if	the	t-ratio is 2.0 or larger. The unemployment rate is the percentage of the state labor force. Monthly weeks 
compensated	are	divided	by	4.333	to	yield	a	weekly	average.	All	regression	equations	are	fitted	for	the	96	months	from	January	2006	to	
December	2013.	All	regression	equations	adjust	for	first	order	autocorrelation.
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payments	are	estimated	 to	be	$223.6	million	 in	New	York	and	$89.4	
million	 in	New	Jersey.	Since	 total	DUA	benefit	payments	 in	 the	 two	
states through the end of 2013 totaled just $8.9 and $5.3 million, respec-
tively,	the	estimates	suggest	that	added	UI	benefits	due	to	Sandy	were	
many	times	larger	 than	the	direct	payments	of	DUA	weekly	benefits.	
In	 fact,	 the	estimated	 increases	 in	UI	benefit	payments	due	 to	Sandy	
represented	12.6	percent	of	regular	UI	benefits	paid	in	New	York	during	
these	six	months	and	6.8	percent	of	UI	benefits	paid	in	New	Jersey	over	
the same period.
Other Large Hurricanes
As the NCDC estimates in its billion-dollar disaster series, Hur-
ricane Andrew in August 1992 and Hurricane Ike in September 2008 
were the third and fourth costliest hurricanes with estimated costs of 
$44.8 and $29.2 billion (in 2013 dollars), respectively.6 A quartet of 
hurricanes battered Florida during August and September 2004— three 
crossed the center of the state, while the fourth (Ivan) crossed south 
Florida. The cost of the combined total destruction as estimated by the 
NCDC was $55.4 billion. The combined DUA weeks compensated 
totaled 152,000 for the quartet of hurricanes in Florida. Of total DUA 
weeks compensated across all states, 135,000 weeks (88 percent) was 
paid to Florida residents, and 131,000 of these weeks were paid between 
September 2004 and March 2005. If one considers these four hurricanes 
as a single extended disaster event, then their total damage would rank 
fifth	among	the	billion-dollar	disasters	of	the	NCDC,	third	among	DUA	
weeks compensated, and fourth among the paid losses of NFIP.7
We analyze the effects of Hurricanes Andrew, Ike, and the Florida 
Four	on	state	unemployment	and	weekly	UI	beneficiaries.8 Our results 
provide	no	statistically	significant	effect	of	Hurricane	Andrew	in	raising	
the unemployment rate in Florida in the posthurricane months. Neither 
do the results support the hypothesis that Hurricane Andrew caused 
a	significant	 increase	 in	UI	 recipiency	 in	Florida	between	September	
1992	and	March	1993.	For	Hurricane	 Ike,	our	analysis	does	not	find	
statistically	significant	effects	on	the	state	unemployment	rate	nor	the	
receipt	of	UI	benefits	in	Texas	during	the	months	from	September	2008	
to March 2009. While the months near the time of this event saw major 
increases in both unemployment and UI recipiency due to the Great 
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Recession,	 the	 results	 do	not	 show	a	 separate	 significant	 effect	 from	
Hurricane Ike. The effects of the Florida Four hurricanes on unemploy-
ment	and	UI	weeks	compensated	in	Florida	are	not	statistically	signifi-
cant; they are best described as minuscule—essentially zero.
Summary of Labor Market Effects
The	analysis	of	the	labor	market	effects	of	five	separate	hurricane-
related major disasters yields mixed results. Hurricane Katrina had 
large	effects	on	state	unemployment	rates	and	the	receipt	of	UI	benefits	
in both Louisiana and Mississippi. The results of the regression analysis 
of	Hurricane	Sandy	found	no	statistically	significant	effect	on	the	state	
unemployment	 rates	 in	New	York	and	New	Jersey.	 In	contrast,	 there	
were	measurable	increases	in	the	receipt	of	regular	UI	benefits	in	both	
states during the six months following the devastation of Sandy on their 
coastal areas.
The results of the analysis of Hurricanes Andrew, Ike, and the Flor-
ida	Four	did	not	identify	any	statistically	significant	statewide	effects	
in	Florida	or	Texas,	nor	did	they	find	statistically	significant	increases	
in	state	unemployment	rates	or	the	weekly	number	of	UI	beneficiaries.
There are at least three possible explanations for the lack of statis-
tically	significant	results	in	Florida	and	Texas.	First,	 the	analysis	was	
conducted using statewide data. An analysis based on substate geo-
graphic	areas	would	be	expected	to	yield	findings	of	significant	labor	
market effects in counties directly in the path of the hurricanes. For 
instance, the analysis by Groen, Kutzbach, and Polivka (2013) illus-
trates the advantage of analysis based on detailed local geographic 
areas that experienced differing degrees of destruction.
Second, Florida and Texas are both large states, ranking twenty-
third and twenty-second in land area, respectively. While the hurricanes 
were very destructive in certain local areas, their statewide effects may 
not have been large relative to the economies of these states. In Florida, 
the hurricanes largely missed the Miami area, with effects of Hurri-
cane Ivan arising from wind speeds that did not reach minimum wind 
speeds of a tropical storm.9 Given the large volume of DUA claims in 
Florida that followed the fall 2004 hurricanes, it is surprising that UI 
claims did not show an effect from the Florida Four. Louisiana and 
Mississippi are further down the distribution of state size by land area, 
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ranking	thirty-first	and	thirty-second,	respectively,	among	all	the	states.	
Their smaller size, coupled with the direct impact of Hurricane Katrina 
on New Orleans, undoubtedly provide much of the explanation for the 
large effects on both states.
Third, Florida and Texas consistently have very low rates of UI ben-
efit	recipiency,	among	the	lowest	in	the	state	UI	system.10 The receipt 
of	UI	benefits	(as	a	ratio	to	total	unemployment)	in	both	states	is	about	
two-thirds of the national average. The low recipiency rate in this long-
standing social insurance program could mean that information about 
UI	benefit	availability	is	below-average	in	both	states	and	may	partially	
explain	why	receipt	of	UI	did	not	show	a	significant	increase	following	
Hurricane Andrew in 1992, Hurricane Ike in 2008, or the four hurri-
canes that crossed Florida in the fall of 2004.
COSTS AND COMPENSATION
Chapter 2 notes that hurricanes were responsible for a large share 
of the total costs of major disaster declarations. The following section 
describes the importance of hurricanes in the costs and compensation 
recorded by four data series: billion-dollar disasters as estimated by the 
NCDC	(2013	dollars);	the	number	compensated	for	flood-related	losses	
by the NFIP program; the NFIP compensation amount (2013 dollars); 
and DUA weeks compensated.
Table 4.4 highlights the estimated costs and compensation from all 
hurricanes and from the four most destructive hurricanes in the NCDC 
data: Katrina, Sandy, Andrew, and Ike, plus the four (Charley, Frances, 
Ivan, and Jeanne) that impacted Florida in August–September 2004. 
For the latter hurricanes, Table 4.4 shows their combined statistics in 
the Florida Four row as well as their individual details. While all the 
data series extend through 2013, they have different start dates: the 
NCDC	data	start	 in	1980,	NFIP	recipients	and	benefits	commence	 in	
1978, and DUA weeks compensated start in 1983.
To help highlight the importance of hurricanes, columns (2)–(5) 
show the rank of each hurricane among all disasters from their respec-
tive start dates to 2013 in parentheses. The bottom four lines of Table 
4.4 show the totals for all hurricanes, all major disasters, the hurricane 
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share of the total, and the count of hurricanes in the 20 largest disasters 
for each data series.
A prominent feature of Table 4.4 is the quantitative importance of 
Hurricane	Katrina	 relative	 to	 all	 other	major	 disasters.	 It	 ranks	 first,	
accounting for between 10.5 and 52.5 percent of the program totals over 
the 31-plus years spanned by the data. A second prominent feature of 
the table is the major importance of hurricanes in all four data series. 
Hurricanes accounted for about 45 percent of all billion-dollar costs 
and NFIP recipients (columns [2] and [3]). They accounted for about 
two-thirds of all NFIP real compensation and DUA weeks compensated 
(columns [4] and [5]). Because average NFIP compensation for hur-
ricanes	is	much	larger	than	the	average	compensation	for	other	flood-
related events, the hurricane share of compensation (0.697) is much 
larger than their share of compensated survivors (0.449).
Table 4.4  Effects of the Most Destructive Hurricanes Since 1980
Hurricane 
Year
(1)
NCDC costs
(billions of 
2013 $)
(2)
NFIP 
recipients
(000s)
(3)
NFIP 
payments
(billions of 
2013 $)
(4)
DUA weeks 
compensated
(000s)
(5)
Katrina 2005 148.8 (1) 168.0 (1) 18.922 (1) 3,011.5 (1)
Sandy 2012 65.7 (3) 129.0 (2) 8.030 (2) 66.3 (13)
Andrew 1992 44.8 (5) 5.6 0.255 78.0 (9)
Ike 2008 29.2 (8) 46.6 (3) 2.892 (3) 46.3 (18)
Florida Foura 2004 55.4 (5) 41.2 (5) 2.327 (4) 152.1 (3)
Charley 2004 18.5 (11) 2.6 0.061 42.9 (20)
Frances 2004 11.1 (17) 5.0 0.184 55.1 (15)
Ivan 2004 17.2 (12) 28.3 (7) 1.929 (4) 43.8 (19)
Jeanne 2004 8.6 5.4 0.153 10.2
All hurricanes 480.9 720.2 42.86 3,860.0
Program total 1,074.7 1603.0 61.53 5,740.0
Hurricane share 0.447 0.449 0.697 0.672
Top 20 hurricanes 11 14 16 8
aRank of the Florida Four hurricanes of 2004 if treated as a single event.
SOURCE: Data on billion dollar disasters from NCDC and refer to 1980–2013; NFIP 
recipients from FEMA and refer to 1978–2013; DUA weeks compensated from U.S. 
Department of Labor and refer to 1983–2013. Numbers in parentheses in columns 
(2)–(5) show the rankings of the individual hurricanes.
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Note also that several hurricanes were of major quantitative impor-
tance. The bottom row in Table 4.4 shows the number of hurricanes in 
the top 20 of each data series. The count ranges between 8 and 16. The 
table	also	shows	the	importance	of	the	four	individually	identified	hur-
ricanes plus the Florida Four. Their rankings within the top 20 of each 
series are shown in parentheses in Table 4.4. If we treat the Florida Four 
hurricanes as a single event, then the ranks across the four columns are 
between 3 and 5.
Table 4.4 also illustrates the variability of costs and compensa-
tion across the three reporting systems. Because the destruction from 
Andrew	was	confined	largely	to	inland	areas,	NFIP	compensation	was	
modest, with just 5,600 NFIP recipients. Hurricane Sandy generated 
limited DUA weeks compensated (66,300) and ranked thirteenth in this 
data series, whereas it ranked third among all billion-dollar disasters 
and second among NFIP recipients and the NFIP amount compensated. 
Among the Florida Four note that only Ivan generated large amounts 
of NFIP compensation (column [4]), whereas Charley and Frances also 
resulted in costs that exceeded $10.0 billion (column [2]) and more than 
40,000 DUA weeks compensated (column [5]). Only Jeanne of these 
four did not generate costs or compensation that ranked in the top 20 of 
the four series in Table 4.4. Combined, however, these four hurricanes 
devastated large areas in Florida with destruction spread throughout the 
months of August and September 2004.
CONCLUSIONS
Of all categories of major disasters, hurricanes cause the greatest 
destruction.	Average	 financial	 costs	 per	 hurricane	were	 $14.9	 billion	
(in 2013 dollars) for the 33 hurricanes and tropical storms present in 
the NCDC billion-dollar disaster series from 1980 to 2013. The fre-
quency of hurricanes is highly variable from one year to the next. In 
Chapter 2, the trend regression analysis of Table 2.3 explains less than 
20 percent of the time series variation in annual occurrences between 
1953 and 2013. While our regression results provide some evidence 
of acceleration in annual occurrences after 1971 or 1995, the under-
lying year-to-year variability stands out in the historical record. The 
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U.S.	Global	Change	Research	Program	(2014)	finds	that	the	intensity,	
frequency, and duration of North Atlantic hurricanes, as well as the fre-
quency of the strongest hurricanes, have all increased since the early 
1980s. Moreover, hurricanes are projected to increase as the climate 
continues to warm.
Hurricane Katrina was by far the most destructive of all hurricanes 
since 1953, both in terms of property damage and mortality. The NCDC 
estimate of $148.8 billion represents 13.8 percent of all the cost esti-
mates from major disasters between 1980 and 2013. The number of 
fatalities from Katrina is estimated to be 1,833 lives. We do not discuss 
the loss of lives nor the assistance provided to individuals and families 
who moved away from Katrina-impacted areas. Interested readers can 
refer to the extensive literature on the disaster-related responses and the 
consequences of Katrina-impacted areas, particularly the devastating 
effects in New Orleans (see, for example, Brinkley [2006]).
Hurricanes were responsible for 11 of the 20 most destructive disas-
ters. And the combined 33 hurricane-tropical storm events accounted 
for 44.7 percent of the estimated costs of the billion-dollar disasters 
during the 34 years from 1980 to 2013. Hurricanes were also responsi-
ble	for	a	large	share	of	the	compensation	provided	to	flood	survivors	in	
the NFIP program (69.7 percent) between 1978 and 2013. Because they 
also caused large-scale interruptions of business activity, hurricanes 
accounted for 67.2 percent of total weeks compensated through the 
DUA program between 1983 and 2013. In short, hurricanes on average 
cause the most damage to property and the most disruption to economic 
activity of all the categories of major disasters in the United States.
While hurricanes are the most destructive of the major disasters 
identified	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 place	 their	 destructive	 impact	
into a macroeconomic perspective. This chapter tested for the effects 
on statewide unemployment rates. Our analysis estimated that Katrina 
raised the TUR by 6.5 percentage points in Louisiana and 2.6 percent-
age points in Mississippi during the fall of 2005. There were no sig-
nificant	effects	on	state	unemployment	rates	from	Sandy,	Andrew,	Ike,	
or the Florida Four. Our analysis of the impact of Katrina on weekly 
UI	beneficiaries	found	significant	effects	in	Louisiana	and	Mississippi	
between September 2005 and February 2006. Sandy was estimated to 
have	increased	weekly	UI	beneficiaries	significantly	in	New	Jersey	and	
New	York	between	November	2012	and	April	2013.	For	the	other	three	
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large hurricane events (Andrew, Ike, and the Florida Four of 2004), the 
analysis	did	not	find	statistically	significant	increases.
The effects of the latter three large and destructive hurricane events 
did not register in the statewide data of our investigation. Nearly all 
hurricanes, the most destructive of the major disasters examined in this 
book, have modest effects when the geographic unit of analysis is the 
entire	state.	While	the	extensive	financial	costs	attributable	to	hurricane	
destruction shown in Table 4.4 are very large indeed, they are modest 
when compared to the total size of the economy of an entire state.
This	finding	reinforces	the	one	made	in	the	previous	chapter	(see	
Tables 3.1 and 3.2). The cumulative real GDP of the U.S. economy 
from 1980 to 2013 was $365.8 trillion (in 2013 dollars). Relative to 
cumulative real GDP in 2013 dollars, the large-scale destructive losses 
of major disasters represent slightly more than one-quarter of 1 per-
cent	 of	 real	GDP	 (0.29	 percent).	Overall,	 the	 total	 financial	 costs	 of	
major disasters are relatively small when placed into a macroeconomic 
context.
Notes
	 1.	 The	Saffir-Simpson	Hurricane	Wind	Scale	(SSHWS)	system	has	been	applied	to	
the	five	categories	of	hurricanes	for	over	100	years,	but	estimates	of	annual	tropi-
cal depressions are available only since 1962.
  2. The four hurricanes were Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne.
  3. Four declarations were made by FEMA for Hurricane Katrina: DR-1602 for Flor-
ida on August 28, DR-1603 for Louisiana, DR-1604 for Mississippi, and DR-1605 
for Alabama. The latter three declarations were announced on August 29, 2005.
		4.	 Note	that	Alabama	also	incurred	financial	costs	from	the	adverse	effects	of	Hur-
ricane Katrina. The destruction was limited, however, so that no statistically sig-
nificant	effect	is	found	in	our	analysis.	The	small	scale	of	the	impact	in	Alabama	
is clearly illustrated in Groen, Kutzbach, and Polivka (2015, Figure 3). 
  5. Thirteen declarations were made for Hurricane Sandy. Three were declared 
on	October	 30,	 2012:	DR-4085	 for	New	York;	DR-4086	 for	New	 Jersey;	 and	
DR-4087 for Connecticut. Ten other declarations followed: DR-4089 for Rhode 
Island on November 3; DR-4090 for Delaware on November 16; DR-4091 for 
Maryland on November 20; DR-4092 for Virginia on November 26; DR-4093 for 
West Virginia on November 27; DR-4095 for New Hampshire on November 28; 
DR-4096 for D.C. on December 5; DR-4097 for Massachusetts on December 19; 
DR-4098 for Ohio on January 3, 2013; and DR-4098 for Pennsylvania on January 
10, 2013.
  6. Two declarations were made by FEMA for Hurricane Andrew: DR-954 for Florida 
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on August 24; DR-955 for Louisiana on August 26, 1992. Six declarations were 
made for hurricane-related damage from Ike: DR-1791 for Texas and DR-1792 
for Louisiana on September 13, 2008; DR-1797 for Alabama on September 26; 
DR-1802 for Kentucky on October 9; DR-1804 for Arkansas on October 22; and 
DR-1805 for Ohio on October 24, 2008. By October, Hurricane Ike had been 
downgraded as a tropical storm or a tropical depression.
		7.	 Only	Hurricane	Katrina	and	the	upper	Midwest	floods	of	1993	paid	more	weeks	of	
DUA	benefits,	while	Hurricane	Rita	of	2005	paid	about	the	same	number	of	weeks	
as these four combined. Only Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, Ike, and Irene had more 
NFIP paid losses at 167,000, 128,000, 46,000, and 44,000 compared to the 41,000 
paid losses of these four 2004 hurricanes. 
  8. The results of the regression analysis are available from the authors.
  9. Hurricane Ivan took a most unusual track, initially grazing the extreme of western 
Florida (the panhandle) on September 16–17. After continuing north as far as Vir-
ginia, it reentered the Atlantic Ocean on September 18–19 and moved south and 
crossed south Florida on September 21. By that date, however, its wind speeds 
were	so	low	that	NOAA	classified	it	as	an	extratropical	storm,	that	is,	with	sus-
tained wind speeds below 38 mph. 
  10. Average UI recipiency rates for the years 2000 to 2013 were computed across 51 
UI programs. Florida and Texas ranked 47 and 49, respectively. Their average 
recipiency rates of 0.206 and 0.195 were about two-thirds of the national average 
(0.304) for the same 14 years.
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Floods and Their Consequences
Chapter 1 notes that the cumulative total number of major disaster 
declarations in all the states was 2,046 from 1953 to 2013. In the same 
period,	1,273	(62	percent)	of	these	major	disasters	involved	flooding.	
The geographic entity that FEMA uses in its reporting system is the 
state/tribal	 government,	 and	 each	 declaration	 identifies	 the	 affected	
counties within that state. For catastrophic events that extend across 
state boundaries, multiple declarations are made.
States located along major rivers and their tributaries have extensive 
experiences	with	catastrophic	events	caused	by	river	flooding.	Flooding	
that started in May 1993 and lasted through September affected approx-
imately 150 major rivers and tributaries and led to major disaster dec-
larations in nine Midwest states.1	Fifty	flood-related	deaths	occurred.	
Hundreds of levees failed along the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. 
The magnitude and severity of the disaster was overwhelming, and it 
ranks	as	the	largest	and	most	significant	flood	event	experienced	in	the	
United States since 1950. Described as the Great Flood of 1993, this 
riverine	flood	was	unusual	in	the	scale	of	damage,	geographic	extent,	
the height of river crests, the duration of high waters, and the number of 
levees	that	failed	to	restrain	floodwaters	(see	Larson	[1993]).
Compensation in the form of DUA payments commenced in July 
1993, extended to the fall of 1994, and totaled $74.2 million. Of this 
total,	$39.0	million	was	paid	 to	flood	 survivors	 in	 Iowa.	The	NCDC	
estimated the total damage of the Great Flood of 1993 to be $21.0 bil-
lion ($33.8 billion in 2013 dollars), the sixth highest of the 170 billion-
dollar disasters that occurred between 1980 and 2013.2
The	first	section	of	the	chapter	documents	the	frequency	of	disas-
ters	caused	by	river	flooding	 in	 individual	states	 located	along	major	
rivers, such as the Mississippi and the Missouri, that were affected by 
the Great Flood of 1993. The number of major disasters experienced by 
these	nine	states	is	high,	and	the	flood	events	are	concentrated	during	
spring and early summer, when rain and snow melt combine to increase 
river	flow.	The	second	section	of	the	chapter	examines	the	occurrence	
of	unemployment	due	to	three	major	floods	in	the	Missouri-Mississippi	
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river	 systems:	 the	Great	 Flood	 of	 1993,	 and	 the	 floods	 of	 1997	 and	
2008.	These	 floods	were	 the	most	 destructive	 of	 the	NCDC	 billion- 
dollar	flood-related	disasters.	Our	calculations	suggest	that	the	UI	ben-
efits	paid	for	these	flood	events	represented	a	significant	addition	to	the	
benefits	paid	directly	by	the	DUA	program.
The	chapter	then	examines	the	extent	of	flood	insurance	coverage.	
Because	 FEMA	 identifies	 the	 individual	 counties	 in	 each	 state/tribal	
government when it makes major disaster or emergency declarations, 
one can document the frequency of compensation paid by the NFIP to 
survivors in individual counties. Repeated hurricane-related disasters 
occur in coastal communities and, more than likely, similar patterns 
are present for counties in inland states located along major rivers. We 
apply the methodology used in Chapter 4 for estimating the effects of 
Hurricane	Katrina	 to	 riverine	 floods.	 Our	 analysis	 shows	 that	major	
flood-related	disasters	do	not	exhibit	an	obvious	linkage	to	NFIP	cover-
age.	The	fourth	section	examines	the	financing	of	NFIP	and	the	financial	
solvency of the program in light of the increasing obligations of cata-
strophic	flooding,	and	the	final	section	provides	concluding	comments.
MAJOR DISASTERS DUE TO FLOODS IN THE  
MIDWEST REGION
As	noted	in	the	first	chapter,	1,273	(62	percent)	of	the	2,046	major	
disaster	declarations	involved	flooding,	mostly	riverine	flooding.	While	
the Great Flood of 1993 was the most extensive in the period 1953–
2013,	numerous	riverine	floods	have	occurred,	especially	in	the	Mid-
west region of the United States. Recall that the U.S. Census Bureau 
divides the United States into four census regions and nine census divi-
sions. The Midwest region is divided into two divisions: East North 
Central, and West North Central. The states included in the East North 
Central Division are Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin; 
in the West North Central Division are Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota.
Table 5.1 shows nine states from the Midwest region where major 
disaster	 declarations	 associated	 with	 river	 flooding	 were	 declared	
between 1984 and 2013. All nine states border the Missouri and/or Mis-
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sissippi rivers.3 Seven states are from the West North Central Division 
and two are from the East North Central Division (Illinois and Wiscon-
sin). The year 1984 is selected because the DUA program was intro-
duced in 1983. To be included in Table 5.1, at least two of the nine states 
were required to have experienced a major riverine disaster on the same 
date or proximate dates, the month FEMA made the major disaster dec-
laration.	This	requirement	ensures	that	the	flood	is	of	a	substantial	scale.
Two features of Table 5.1 are obvious: the number of major disaster 
declarations experienced by these nine states, and the concentration of 
flood	events	during	spring	and	early	summer.	Fifteen	of	the	16	earliest	
declaration dates occurred between April and July, months when rain 
and	 snow	melt	 combine	 to	 increase	 river	 flow.	During	 16	 of	 the	 30	
years,	two	or	more	of	the	nine	states	experienced	a	flood-related	major	
disaster.
Table	5.1	 identifies	75	major	disaster	 declarations,	 an	 average	of	
8.3 per state. Eight of the nine states are listed at least six times in the 
table, and the ninth (Nebraska) is listed four times. The largest number 
Table 5.1  Major Disasters from River Flooding in the Midwest Region, 
1984–2013
Year First month States DUA weeks
1984 June MO, KS, IA, NE, SD 0
1986 October WI, IL, MO, KS 0
1989 May MN, ND 0
1990 May MO, IA 175
1993 July MN, WI, IL, IA MO, SD, NE, KS, ND 461,589
1995 May ND, SD, IL, MO 132,604
1997 April IL, ND, SD, MN 95,119
1998 May IA, ND, SD 81,643
2000 May KS, MO, SD, WI, MN, ND 99,747
2001 May KS, IA, IL, WI, MN 54,978
2004 April IL, ND, NE, IA 30,058
2008 May SD, MO, IA, NE, WI, IL, MN 30,651
2009 April MN, ND 5,647
2010 July SD, IA, KS, WI, MO, IL 7,095
2011 May MO, ND, MN, SD, IL, IA 14,705
2013 July SD, IA, ND, MO, MN, WI 0
SOURCE: FEMA major disaster declarations.
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of	major	floods,	10,	was	declared	in	Iowa,	Missouri,	North	Dakota,	and	
South Dakota. On average, the nine states experienced a major river-
flooding	 disaster	 at	 a	 rate	 of	 about	 once	 every	 four	 years.	Table	 5.1	
also displays the number of weeks compensated by the DUA program 
for	each	of	these	flood	events.	The	Great	Flood	of	1993	sustained	the	
highest number of weeks compensated by the DUA program: 461,589 
weeks.	 Six	 other	 flood-related	 events,	 however,	 generated	 between	
50,000 and 133,000 weeks of compensation. Note also that the six years 
with more than 50,000 DUA weeks compensated were concentrated 
between 1993 and 2001, with smaller totals occurring in earlier and 
later years.
Flood-related major disasters cause unemployment among the 
self-employed and other labor market participants not eligible for UI 
benefits.	Since	1989,	however,	labor	market	participants	who	become	
jobless because of natural disasters and who are eligible to collect UI 
benefits	are	expected	 to	file	 for	UI	 rather	 than	DUA.	 In	effect,	DUA	
is reserved for the unemployed not covered by UI, such as the self-
employed, and persons with UI coverage but who are ineligible. Indi-
viduals who are ineligible to receive UI payments may have exhausted 
their	benefits	because	of	previous	spells	of	unemployment	or	because	
they	lack	sufficient	prior	earnings	in	UI	covered	employment.
The following section examines the effects of riverine disasters 
on	the	receipt	of	UI	benefits	and	unemployment.	Table	5.1	shows	that	
flood-related	disasters	in	the	Midwest	region	have	a	direct	effect	on	the	
receipt	of	DUA	benefits.	While	these	floods	have	a	direct	effect	on	DUA	
receipt,	their	possible	effect	on	UI	benefits	is	not	routinely	measured.	A	
test	for	estimating	the	effects	on	the	receipt	of	UI	benefits	and	associ-
ated UI program costs is presented below. The basic idea is relatively 
simple:	we	compare	the	seasonal	pattern	of	UI	recipiency	during	a	flood	
year with the pattern in adjacent years.
MIDWEST FLOODS AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
The	previous	section	highlighted	the	numerous	flood-related	major	
disaster declarations in the Midwest region. Between 1984 and 2013 
there	were	16	separate	years	with	major	floods	in	two	or	more	of	the	
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nine states that border the Missouri and Mississippi rivers. By far the 
most	extensive	and	severe	flooding	was	 the	Great	Flood	of	1993.	As	
mentioned in Chapter 1, the NCDC estimated the total damage from 
the	1993	flood	at	$33.8	billion	(in	2013	dollars),	the	sixth	highest	total	
among the 170 billion-dollar disasters between 1980 and 2013. The 
analysis	 in	 this	 section	 examines	 two	 other	 floods	 in	 the	 Missouri- 
Mississippi	 river	 systems,	 the	 floods	 of	 1997	 and	 2008.4 While less 
extensive	and	severe	than	the	Great	Flood	of	1993,	these	floods	ranked	
second	and	third	among	Midwest	region	floods	with	the	damage	esti-
mated by NOAA (in 2013 dollars) at $5.4 billion in 1997 and $16.2 
billion in 2008.
The	receipt	of	UI	benefits,	termed	recipiency,	displays	a	strong	sea-
sonal pattern in nearly all states. Recipiency is highest during January– 
March and lowest during summer and early fall. Our analysis uses the 
seasonal	pattern	in	the	immediate	preflood	and	postflood	years	to	pre-
dict	recipiency	in	the	year	of	the	flood.	A	categorical	(dummy)	variable	
is	added	to	the	specification,	which	equals	1.0	in	the	immediate	post-
flood	months;	 for	example,	August	and	September	 for	a	flood	occur-
ring in late June. The maintained hypothesis is that after controlling 
for	 seasonality,	 the	 coefficient	 on	 the	postflood	dummy	variable	will	
yield	a	point	estimate	of	the	increase	in	UI	recipiency	due	to	the	flood.	
Since	floods	can	also	disrupt	state	and	regional	labor	markets,	separate	
regression	equations	test	for	an	effect	on	total	unemployment	in	flood-
affected states. The regression analysis further tests for the duration of 
flood	 effects	 by	 extending	 the	 “on”	 period	 for	 the	 postflood	 dummy	
variable.
Table 5.2 displays the results of six regression equations that test for 
the	effects	of	three	flood-related	disasters	on	recipiency	(the	number	of	
UI	weekly	beneficiaries)	and	on	total	unemployment.	For	each	flooding	
incident, data are combined for several affected states in the year of the 
flood:	for	the	Great	Flood	of	1993,	the	data	of	nine	states	are	combined;	
for	 the	1997	major	flood,	 three	states;	and	 for	 the	2008	flood-related	
disaster, four states.
All six regression equations explain at least half the variation in the 
monthly	patterns	during	flood	years.	Perhaps	because	the	Great	Flood	
of	1993	was	the	largest	of	the	three,	the	best	average	goodness-of-fits	
(adjusted R2) were obtained in 1993. As expected, the effects of the pre- 
and postyear monthly averages are uniformly positive, and all six coef-
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Table	5.2		Regression	Analysis	of	Flood	Effects	on	Unemployment	Insurance	Beneficiaries	and	Unemployment
Constant
Pre-post 
seasonal 
pattern
Postflood	
dummy Adjusted R2 Standard error
Durbin- 
Watson
Mean 
dependent 
variable
UI	weekly	beneficiaries
1993 Flooda 2.492
(0.2)
0.993
(23.0)
7.965
(1.3)
0.984 7.316 3.29 254.7
1997 Flood −0.347
(0.3)
1.019
(32.2)
4.664
(3.8)
0.990 1.596 1.88 36.3
2008 Flood b −5.554
(0.2)
0.756
(3.3)
−0.889
(0.7)
0.512 11.151 1.08 80.9
Total unemployment
1993 Flood a −56.580
(0.4)
1.135
(7.1)
25.936
(2.3)
0.845 13.839 1.49 923.7
1997 Flood 135.583
(15.6)
0.124
(2.4)
4.872
(3.8)
0.553 1.568 2.66 156.6
2008 Flood b −343.966
(3.2)
1.766
(5.9)
0.818 
(0.1)
0.823 8.593 1.13 288.1
a Ten months with January and February omitted.
b Ten months with November and December omitted.
SOURCE:	UI	measured	as	average	weekly	beneficiaries.	Total	unemployment	measured	as	the	weekly	average.	Absolute	values	of	t-ratios 
appear	beneath	the	coefficients;	a	result	is	statistically	significant	if	the	t-ratio is 2.0 or larger. Data are in thousands.
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ficients	are	statistically	significant.	The	monthly	pattern	in	the	year	of	
the	flood	closely	tracks	the	average	monthly	pattern	of	the	two	adjacent	
years for both recipiency and total unemployment. The results indicate 
that	the	effects	of	floods	on	recipiency	and	unemployment	are	statisti-
cally	significant.	For	each	major	flood,	the	postflood	dummy	variable	
equals	1.0	in	the	two	months	immediately	following	the	flood:	August–
September in 1993, April–May in 1997, and July–August in 2008. Five 
of	the	six	postflood	dummy	coefficients	are	positive	and	three	are	sta-
tistically	significant.5 
For	 each	 of	 the	 three	 floods,	 FEMA	 supplies	 information	 on	 the	
total	weeks	compensated	and	 the	benefit	payments	for	 the	DUA	pro-
gram. For the Great Flood of 1993, total weeks were 461,589; for the 
1997	flood,	95,119;	and	for	the	2008	flood,	30,651	(see	Table	5.1).	The	
total	weekly	benefits	paid	by	the	DUA	program	in	2013	dollars	were	
$119.4	million,	 $15.1	million,	 and	 $7.8	million	 for	 the	 three	 floods,	
respectively.
Our calculations for 1993 and 1997 suggest that, as a result of river 
flooding,	the	UI	benefits	paid	represented	a	significant	increment	to	the	
benefits	paid	directly	by	the	DUA	program.6 Note in the top panel of 
Table 5.2 that the dummy variables for added UI weeks are positive 
for both 1993 and 1997. These dummy variables suggest that 68,773 
additional	weeks	of	UI	benefits	were	paid	in	1993	and	41,423	additional	
weeks in 1997. When these estimates are multiplied by UI average 
weekly	benefits,	the	estimated	addition	to	total	UI	benefits	was	$12.47	
million in 1993 and $7.88 million in 1997. Compared to their DUA 
counterparts, the estimated proportional increments to UI weeks com-
pensated (change in UI weeks/DUA weeks) were 0.149 and 0.425 for 
1993	and	1997,	respectively.	And	the	proportional	increases	in	benefit	
payments were 0.168 and 0.760, respectively. While the proportional 
addition	to	benefit	payments	is	almost	always	larger	than	the	addition	
to	weeks	 compensated	 (because	 of	 higher	weekly	 benefits	 in	 the	UI	
program	compared	to	the	DUA	program),	the	contrast	in	1997	reflects	
an	unusually	large	difference	in	the	two	weekly	benefit	amounts.	Our	
analysis suggests that the UI program paid about $3.00 for every $4.00 
in	DUA	benefits	in	the	states	of	the	Midwest	region	affected	by	river	
floods	in	1997.
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FLOODS AND FLOOD INSURANCE COVERAGE
Table	2.2	 in	Chapter	2	shows	that	flood-related	declarations	have	
been increasing in frequency. The annual average number major disas-
ter	declarations	as	a	result	of	floods	was	7.1	between	1953	and	1959,	but	
more than four times higher at 30.5 between 2000 and 2009. Despite the 
growth	in	the	frequency	of	major	floods,	comparatively	few	households	
have	property	insurance	policies	that	include	flood	insurance.
As noted in Chapter 3, the most common private insurance policy 
for homeowners in the United States is Homeowner-3 (HO-3). A stan-
dard HO-3 policy provides broad coverage for losses from a number of 
perils and insurance for widespread damage from certain other perils 
can be purchased for an additional premium. Flood damage, however, 
is not available as additional coverage. Private insurance companies did 
provide	flood	insurance	until	the	late	1920s.	Following	the	heavy	losses	
incurred	by	the	insurance	industry	following	the	Mississippi	floods	in	
1927,	 private	 flood	 insurance	 coverage	was	 discontinued.	 The	NFIP	
was	created	in	1968	in	the	wake	of	the	widespread	flooding	in	the	mid-
1960s	and	calls	for	a	reduction	in	the	financial	burden	on	taxpayers	for	
providing	assistance	to	flood	survivors.	The	NFIP	had	about	5.6	million	
active policies at the end of 2012 but covered less than 5 percent of all 
households.
A private-public partnership between the federal government and 
local communities, the NFIP provides insurance if a community will 
implement and enforce mitigation measures to reduce future risks in 
flood-prone	 areas.	 The	 program	 follows	 a	 comprehensive	 flood	 risk	
management	 strategy:	 flood	 hazard	 mapping,	 flood	 insurance,	 and	
floodplain	 management.	 Flood	 hazard	 mapping	 is	 designed	 to	 iden-
tify	 and	 map	 flood-prone	 communities	 across	 the	 nation.	 Updating	
and	making	maps	of	flood	plains	 easily	 accessible	would	help	make	
developers and property owners more aware of the risks and more moti-
vated to build appropriately.7	The	purchase	of	flood	insurance	encour-
ages property owners in NFIP-participating communities to protect 
their	property	against	flood	losses.	Systematic	mechanisms	for	tracking	
information related to the changing nature of risk, and translating it into 
risk-related property valuations, would increase the incentives for pre-
vention.	Flood	plain	management	requires	communities	in	flood-prone	
Floods and Their Consequences   105
zones to adopt and enforce approved ordinances to mitigate the risk of 
future	flood	damage.
As noted in Chapter 3, the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Admin-
istration administers the NFIP in close coordination with private com-
panies that provide property insurance to households and businesses. 
While	 the	payment	of	NFIP	benefits	 is	 federally	administered,	 insur-
ance carriers mainly collect the NFIP premiums, which are usually part 
of the property insurance premiums paid by homeowners and busi-
nesses to private carriers that are then forwarded to the Federal Insur-
ance and Mitigation Administration. To secure NFIP coverage, local 
governments	 are	 required	 to	 establish	 a	 minimum	 set	 of	 floodplain	
management policies. This set includes mandating NFIP coverage for 
local	areas	identified	as	being	at	risk	of	flooding;	for	example,	areas	in	
100-year	and	500-year	flood	zones.
While NFIP coverage has gradually increased since the program 
was established in 1968, coverage has remained limited. The largest 
increases	in	coverage	occur	after	major	flood-related	disasters,	such	as	
the	 catastrophic	flooding	 caused	by	Hurricane	Katrina.	For	 example,	
between the end of 2004 (eight months before Katrina) and the end of 
2006 (16 months after Katrina), NFIP coverage increased by 988,000—
the largest two-year increase in NFIP history.
Figure 5.1 displays NFIP coverage of households in national data 
from 1978 to 2014. There is a clear upward trend through 2007, increas-
ing from less than 2.0 percent of households in 1978 to nearly 5.9 per-
cent in 2007. Since 2007, however, the coverage percentage has pla-
teaued and actually decreased in recent years. Hurricane Sandy in late 
2012 did not have an obvious effect to increase the coverage percent-
age. In fact by 2014 the coverage of households was more than half a 
percentage point lower than during 2007–2010. The experience of the 
most recent years does not follow the historic pattern of increased cov-
erage immediately following a major hurricane.
Some	areas	that	have	experienced	frequent	floods,	however,	have	
had consistently low NFIP coverage. The low take-up rate was a major 
reason for enacting the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 after Hur-
ricane	Agnes	 in	 1972.	The	 legislation	 established	 a	mandatory	flood	
insurance	purchase	requirement	for	structures	located	in	special	flood	
hazard areas. Federally regulated lenders were obligated to require 
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flood	insurance	on	mortgages	for	property	 located	in	 these	areas	 in	a	
participating community.
The nine states in the Midwest region experienced an average of 
21.4	flood-related	major	disaster	declarations	between	1991	and	2013.	
This average was 57 percent higher than the national average of 13.6 
major	flood	disasters	per	state	for	the	same	23-year	period.	Of	the	nine	
states,	Wisconsin	had	the	lowest	total	with	18	major	flood-related	disas-
ters. For this group of states, however, NFIP coverage is low. At the 
end of 2011, eight of the nine states had NFIP coverage rates below 2.5 
percent of households, while only North Dakota had a higher cover-
age rate at 7.1 percent. After the Great Flood of 1993, Congress passed 
the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994, which strengthened 
lender compliance through the mandatory purchase provisions in the 
legislation.
Unlike hurricanes, which have a strong effect on the NFIP cover-
age,	major	floods	do	not	show	an	obvious	linkage	to	NFIP	coverage.	
Coverage rates (active NFIP policies as a fraction of households) by 
state at the end of 2011 are examined across 51 states in a cross section 
Figure 5.1  Percent of Households with NFIP Coverage, 1978–2014 
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SOURCE: National Flood Insurance Program, U.S. Census Bureau, and www.statista 
.com.
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regression analysis. Two explanatory variables are used: the number 
of hurricane-related major disasters (1953–2013) and the number of 
flood-related	major	disasters	(1953–2013).	The	number	of	hurricanes	is	
positively	and	significantly	linked	to	the	NFIP	coverage	rate,	while	the	
number	of	floods	does	not	have	a	statistically	significant	effect.8 Half of 
the interstate variation in the 2011 NFIP coverage rate is explained by 
knowing the history of hurricane-related disasters in each state. In con-
trast,	knowing	the	past	history	of	river	flooding	does	not	help	to	explain	
the state-level NFIP coverage rate.
Recall from Chapter 3 that the costs associated with the destruction 
from	hurricanes	are	much	larger	on	average	than	riverine	floods.	Their	
respective average costs are $14.9 billion and $5.0 billion; that is, the 
average cost of a hurricane-related disaster is three times the average 
of	a	flood-related	disaster.	Moreover,	NFIP	coverage	is	highly	concen-
trated	with	nearly	70	percent	of	policies	in	five	states:	California,	Flor-
ida, Louisiana, New Jersey, and Texas (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 
2011). Furthermore, NFIP coverage tends to be concentrated in coastal 
states, with nearly 40 percent of the entire program (number of policies, 
premiums, and coverage) concentrated in Florida and Texas. Hence, 
these	 differences	may	 partially	 explain	 the	 lack	 of	 statistical	 signifi-
cance	of	flood-related	disasters	as	a	determinant	in	interstate	variation	
in state-level NFIP coverage rates.
The	results	of	the	regression	equation	used	to	explain	flood	insur-
ance coverage rates had a standard error of 0.040. For 8 of the 51 
states, the standard error exceeded 0.060. Large underprediction errors 
are observed for Florida, Louisiana, Hawaii, and North Dakota. Even 
knowing the number of hurricane-related disasters, there was more 
NFIP coverage in those states than projected. Substantial overpredic-
tion	errors	are	observed	 in	Alabama,	North	Carolina,	New	York,	and	
Pennsylvania.
Since Florida and Louisiana have experienced large and repeated 
catastrophic	 losses	 from	 hurricanes,	 this	 cross-section	 finding	 might	
suggest a nonlinear response of household NFIP coverage to disasters. 
To test this hypothesis, the squares of the number of hurricane-related 
disasters	and	the	number	of	flood-related	disasters	are	used	as	explana-
tory variables. The results of the analysis show an improvement in the 
explained variation (the adjusted R2 increases from 0.498 to 0.641), and 
the projection errors decrease for six of the eight states with the largest 
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projection errors.9 The biggest improvement is in Florida, where the 
projection error decreased from 0.100 to 0.015. All of the improvement 
in	the	goodness-of-fit	reflects	a	larger	contribution	from	the	hurricane	
variable	but	continued	insignificance	of	the	river	flood	variable.	Hence,	
in using statewide NFIP coverage data, a greater frequency of major 
floods	is	not	associated	with	an	increase	in	the	coverage	rate.
Two continuing challenges remain for NFIP: to secure coverage 
among at-risk households, and to maintain coverage among existing 
policyholders. At the end of 2006 there were 5.514 million NFIP poli-
cies in force. The number of households in the United States grows by 
about 1 percent per year. Had the coverage rate remained at its 2006 
level, there would be 5.972 policies in force in 2014. The actual number 
at the end of 2014 was 5.478 million, or about 0.5 million less than the 
projected number.
A recurrent pattern is for coverage to increase immediately after a 
flood-related	major	disaster	but	then	decline	as	households	fail	to	renew	
their NFIP policies. Kousky and Kunreuther (2009) conducted an anal-
ysis	of	floods	and	flood	insurance	coverage	with	specific	reference	to	
St. Louis, Missouri. They created a database for NFIP policies effective 
in St. Louis County during 2000–2005, a database for claims related to 
the	Great	Flood	in	1993,	and	a	summary	file	of	claims	for	the	30	years	
from	1978	to	2007.	Despite	a	history	of	flooding,	the	researchers	found	
a low rate of NFIP coverage in St. Louis County, only 1 percent of 
single-family	homes	countywide	despite	a	history	of	flooding.
Mortgage lenders require any residence within a FEMA-designated 
Special	Flood	Hazard	Area	(SFHA)	to	purchase	flood	insurance. The 
SFHAs	are	zones	where	the	annual	flood	risk	is	1	in	100	or	higher.	The	
enforcement and participation, however, is not uniform. Dixon et al. 
(2006)	find	that	only	about	15	percent	of	residences	located	in	the	100-
year	floodplain	of	St.	Louis	County	have	NFIP	coverage.	The	authors	
suggest	that	low	take-up	in	St.	Louis	County	partially	reflects	low	take-
up	in	the	Midwest.	There	is	also	spatial	bias	in	flood	insurance	policy	
coverage depending on the number of single-family houses that exist in 
the	SFHAs,	where	the	mandatory	purchase	of	flood	insurance	applies.	
The	authors	find	that	NFIP	participation	is	16	percent	in	communities	
with 500 or fewer homes in the SFHA, 56 percent in communities with 
501–5,000 homes in the SFHA, and 66 percent in communities with 
more than 5,000 homes in the SFHA zone. In addition, the chances of 
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purchasing	flood	insurance	are	higher	for	SFHA	communities	subject	
to	coastal	flooding/storm	surge	(63	percent)	compared	to	communities	
more	at	risk	to	riverine	flooding	(35	percent).	Furthermore,	flood	insur-
ance coverage outside a high-risk	flood	area	is	very	low	(less	than	10	
percent).	Yet,	NFIP	 data	 show	 that	 25	 percent	 of	 all	 flood	 insurance	
claims come from the low to moderate risk areas beyond the 100-year 
floodplain,	which	are	largely	uninsured	losses	(FEMA	2014).
Maintaining required policies is also a major challenge for the NFIP 
program, as documented in a number of studies.10 For a sample of poli-
cies active in 2000 in St. Louis County, Kousky and Kunreuther (2009) 
find	that	only	about	one-third	were	still	active	in	2006.	Michel-Kerjan	
and Kunreuther (2011) followed longitudinally all new NFIP policies 
initiated between 2001 and 2009. One-year policy continuation rates 
varied between 67 percent and 80 percent across eight separate years 
with	similar	rates	for	properties	in	100-year	flood	zones	compared	to	
other areas. By 2009 only 20 percent of policies newly initiated in 2001 
were still active.11 In short, there is a strong and well-documented ten-
dency among property owners to discontinue their NFIP policies when 
they do not experience any losses over a succession of years. 
Payments from the NFIP program to survivors of Hurricane Sandy 
rank second only to payments to survivors of Hurricane Katrina, 
$130,000 compared to $168,000 (a total of $8.03 billion versus $18.9 
billion	in	2013	dollars).	Yet,	as	illustrated	by	Figure	5.1,	the	disastrous	
effects	of	Sandy	did	not	have	a	significant	effect	on	NFIP	coverage.	At	
the end of December 2012, just two months after Sandy, NFIP cover-
age stood at 5.620 million policyholders. Two years later, at the end of 
2014, coverage had declined by about 269,000 to 5.370 million policy-
holders. This pattern of lower postdisaster coverage contrasts sharply 
with the post-Katrina pattern of increases in coverage. If the post-Sandy 
coverage pattern becomes the new norm, it suggests the NFIP program 
will decline in importance as a source of compensation to future survi-
vors	of	major	flood	events.	Understanding	the	reason(s)	for	the	changed	
coverage dynamics since 2012 is important if the NFIP program is to 
sustain	its	important	role	in	compensating	flood	survivors.
Local governments play a key role in the NFIP program. Kousky 
and	Kunreuther	 (2009)	 identify	six	specific	challenges	 for	 local	gov-
ernments	in	managing	the	risk	of	river	flooding.	First,	many	property	
owners	do	not	purchase	flood	insurance,	and	among	those	who	initially	
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purchase insurance, many fail to maintain their policies. Second, many 
individuals	underestimate	the	risk	associated	with	flooding.	Third,	the	
FEMA	flood	maps	are	frequently	outdated	and	do	not	accurately	reflect	
current	flood	risks.	Fourth,	strong	reliance	is	placed	on	levees	to	protect	
property in low-lying areas. This reliance causes overdevelopment in 
areas protected by levees and leads to increased losses when levees 
fail.	Fifth,	the	risk	of	flooding	is	increasing	over	time.	A	number	of	fac-
tors contribute to increased risk, such as economic development (which 
increases runoff), channel straightening, and climate change. Finally, 
property	owners	may	be	willing	to	rebuild	in	areas	previously	flooded.
The rebuilding phenomenon seems to occur frequently in repetitive 
loss	properties.	Jenkins	(2005),	for	example,	finds	that	repetitive	loss	
properties represented only about 1.0 percent of properties insured by 
NFIP but 25–30 percent of claims. Recognition of the negative impact 
of	properties	prone	to	repetitive	flooding	on	the	financial	solvency	of	
the program led to the passage of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 
2004, which established a pilot program for the mitigation and funding 
of severe repetitive loss properties.
From	 the	 diversity	 of	 issues	 identified	 in	 the	 preceding	 list,	 it	 is	
obvious that NFIP faces several challenges in providing effective com-
pensation	against	the	risk	of	flooding.	The	most	important	one	is	that	
few	households	purchase	coverage	for	flood	risk.	Despite	 the	growth	
in	the	frequency	of	major	floods,	comparatively	few	households	have	
property	insurance	policies	that	include	flood	insurance.
FINANCING FLOOD INSURANCE
Although NFIP began in 1968, detailed program statistics are 
readily available only since 1978. The NFIP provides information on 
aggregate	 financial	 flows	 (premium	 income	 and	 losses	 from	 floods),	
as	well	 as	 data	 on	more	 than	 100	 large,	 flood-related	 disasters	 since	
January 1978. Cumulative NFIP payments to insured property own-
ers from January 1978 through March 2014 were $50.5 billion. Each 
of	 the	major	 flood	 events	 had	 at	 least	 1,500	 paid	 losses.	Hurricanes	
Katrina and Sandy dominate the NFIP time series data. As of March 
2015, the paid losses from Katrina were 168,000 and totaled $16.3 bil-
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lion ($18.9 billion in 2013 dollars), while the paid losses from Sandy 
were 129,000 and totaled $7.9 billion ($8.0 billion in 2013 dollars). The 
third-largest	major	flood-related	disaster	was	caused	by	Hurricane	Ike,	
with payments of $2.7 billion ($2.9 billion in 2013 dollars) for 46,568 
paid losses. 
At present, NFIP policies can insure homeowners for up to $250,000 
for single-family residences and up to $100,000 for contents. Commer-
cial properties can be insured for up to $500,000 each for buildings and 
contents. In February 2014, 3.578 million policies insured both build-
ings and contents, 1.803 million policies insured buildings, and 0.097 
million policies insured only contents.
The	NFIP	flood	insurance	rates	are	set	using	Flood	Insurance	Rate	
Maps.	The	maps	identify	each	SFHA	where	the	annual	flood	risk	is	1	
in 100 or higher. Premium rates also distinguish between A zones and 
V zones, the latter of which are located in coastal areas that have a sig-
nificant	risk	of	storm	surge	flooding	in	addition	to	damage	from	high	
waters. Other determinants of NFIP premium rates depend on the char-
acteristics	of	the	building,	such	as	the	number	of	floors,	the	presence	of	
a	basement,	and	the	height	of	the	lowest	floor	relative	to	the	height	of	
floodwaters	of	a	100-year	flood.	As	previously	noted,	properties	located	
in	SFHAs	are	required	to	purchase	flood	insurance	if	they	have	a	feder-
ally backed mortgage. 
Prior	to	Hurricane	Katrina,	NFIP	had	a	history	of	financial	solvency	
with cumulative receipts from insurance premiums exceeding cumula-
tive loss payouts. The payouts from Katrina, however, exhausted NFIP 
reserves	and	required	a	financial	transfer	from	the	U.S.	Treasury	to	meet	
its	obligations.	The	program	has	continued	to	have	a	cumulative	defi-
cit since 2005. The large increase in NFIP payouts (about $8.0 billion) 
caused	by	Sandy	increased	the	size	of	 the	deficit.	In	the	aftermath	of	
the	major	flood-related	disasters	of	the	past	decade,	the	NFIP	borrowed	
approximately $27 billion from the U.S. Treasury to meet its claims 
obligations.
Table	 5.3	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 NFIP	 financing	 from	 1978	
through	2012,	with	data	arranged	in	five-year	intervals.	Note	that	cumu-
lative policy premiums exceeded program losses through 2002. How-
ever, losses from Katrina (2005–2007) exceeded premiums, exhausted 
NFIP reserves, and necessitated borrowing from the Treasury. The pro-
gram’s year-end debt to the Treasury averaged $17–$19 billion between 
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2006 and 2012. Sandy had a similar effect in generating losses that 
exceeded	premiums	and	necessitated	a	second	financial	infusion	from	
the Treasury. At the end of 2013 the program’s debt to the Treasury 
totaled $24 billion.
Partly in response to these increased payouts and increased debt, 
Congress passed the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act (BW-
12) of 2012. The legislation applied the tools of risk management to the 
peril	of	flooding.	Among	its	provisions,	BW-12	required	that	floodplain	
maps be updated, local building code enforcement be strengthened, 
insurance subsidies for certain properties be removed, and risk-related 
premiums be charged. Certain policyholders had been paying premium 
rates that were below actuarially fair rates. Approximately 20 percent 
of policyholders with subsidized rates were to have their rates increased 
gradually	during	the	succeeding	five	years	to	bring	their	premium	rates	
into alignment with actuarial risks.
The	changes	to	improve	program	financing	affected	three	groups:	
those with subsidized policies on nonprimary and secondary residences, 
those	with	properties	that	experienced	severe	or	repeated	flooding,	and	
those with subsidized policies on businesses or nonresidential proper-
ties in SFHAs. Starting in 2013 these groups were to experience annual 
increases	in	premium	rates	until	their	rates	reflected	the	actuarial	risks	
Table 5.3  National Flood Insurance Financial Flows, 1978–2012  
($ millions)
Policies 
in force
(1)
Policy 
premiums
(2)
Total paid 
losses
(3)
Losses from 
significant	
floods
(4)
1978–82 1,842 1,023 1,187 625
1983–87 2,032 2,342 1,294 564
1988–92 2,415 3,433 1,944 1,385
1993–97 3,428 5,820 3,713 2,689
1998–02 4,382 8,654 3,604 2,790
2003–07 5,073 10,316 22,037 20,255
2008–12 5,661 15,486 16,531 14,328
SOURCE:	NFIP	website	and	unpublished	NFIP	data.	Column	(1)	shows	five-year	aver-
ages	while	columns	(2)	through	(4)	show	five-year	totals.	Significant	floods	compen-
sate at least 1,500 policyholders. 
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of	floods.	Certain	transactions	involving	primary	residences	in	SFHAs	
were also to undergo rate increases. For example, NFIP policies lapsed 
when properties were sold, new policies commenced, and large or 
repeated losses were incurred. Finally, grandfathered rates were to end 
when	a	community	adopted	a	new	flood	 insurance	 rate	map.	Collec-
tively, these changes would have reduced the subsidies realized by a 
substantial	minority	(about	20	percent)	of	flood	insurance	policyhold-
ers, increased NFIP premium income, and substantially improved the 
long run balance in the program between revenue and outlays.
As a result of BW-12, some residents, particularly those who 
received insurance premium subsidies, were confronted with large price 
increases.12 When the new increased rates were implemented in 2013, 
a	large	backlash	commenced.	Facing	significant	challenges	to	BW-12,	
Congress passed the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act in 
March 2014, which overturned the rate increases of BW-12. The 2014 
legislation also instructed FEMA to minimize the number of NFIP poli-
cies with annual premium rates above 1.0 percent of the insured value 
of	the	property.	To	keep	the	fiscal	effect	of	the	changes	revenue	neu-
tral, the 2014 legislation also imposed surcharges on all existing NFIP 
policies ($25 on policies for primary residences and $250 for all other 
policies). The net effect of the surcharges increased the degree of cross 
subsidization in NFIP, the opposite of the effect intended by BW-12. 
Furthermore, the 2014 legislation goes against the principle of having 
NFIP	premium	rates	accurately	reflect	the	actuarial	risks	from	flooding.	
Kousky	and	Kunreuther	 (2014)	explore	several	financing	alterna-
tives to the 2014 legislation. Similar to most insurance practitioners, 
they	argue	that	NFIP	premium	rates	should	reflect	the	risks	and	expected	
losses	from	flooding	to	the	greatest	extent	possible.	This	approach	to	
insurance pricing is most appropriate for achieving appropriate con-
sumer decisions in situations involving the risk of loss from natural 
phenomena	such	as	floods.	If	households	who	currently	reside	in	flood	
zones cannot afford the implied premiums, there needs to be an explicit 
subsidization of their insurance rates rather than the inappropriate pric-
ing of their premium rates. The subsidies could address the problem of 
affordability without distorting the price signals important in conveying 
an	accurate	picture	of	the	risks	of	flood-related	losses.
The	approach	described	for	flood	insurance	rate	setting	would	not	
only yield appropriate price signals but also address the issue of afford-
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ability	for	those	residing	in	flood	zones	with	limited	incomes.	Kousky	
and Kunreuther’s (2014) proposal would set NFIP premium rates to 
reflect	flood	risks	and	address	the	affordability	issue	by	instituting	flood	
insurance	vouchers.	The	vouchers	would	be	financed	by	general	 rev-
enue and administered by a public program that serves the low-income 
population. The authors identify four candidate programs, including the 
Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program administered through local 
offices	of	HUD	and	the	Food	Stamp/SNAP	program	administered	by	
the Department of Agriculture.13 The HCV-HUD program would seem 
to be the most likely candidate, since the subsidies are directed toward 
family residential situations. Regardless of administrative entity cho-
sen, the arrangement would combine appropriate insurance price sig-
nals	with	financial	relief	for	low-income	residents	in	at-risk	areas.	This	
arrangement would be superior to the one instituted under the 2014 
legislation.
The	BW-12	 legislation	 extended	NFIP	 for	five	years;	 the	 current	
authorization of the program expires in 2017. A congressionally man-
dated study of NFIP coordinated by the National Academy of Sciences 
(NAS)	is	currently	under	way.	The	NAS	study	reviews	NFIP	financing,	
the	setting	of	premium	rates,	and	flood	mitigation	activities.	The	study	
will produce three reports and legislative recommendations. The full 
results of the NAS analysis and the associated policy recommendations 
will be available by the time of the NFIP reauthorization. Recommen-
dations related to setting premium rates will be of major interest and 
influential	in	the	reauthorization	deliberations.	Chapter	9	notes	the	NAS	
study as part of a discussion of possible changes in the NFIP program.
CONCLUSIONS
The	number	of	flood-related	major	disasters	experienced	by	states	
located along major rivers is high, and they are concentrated during 
spring and early summer when rain and snow melt combine to increase 
river	flow.	Therefore,	it	seems	anomalous	that	the	extent	of	flood	insur-
ance coverage is relatively low.
Significant	changes	to	the	NFIP	may	be	required	if	the	program	is	to	
continue	providing	flood	protection	to	homeowners	and	businesses.	As	
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the program currently stands, there is widespread consensus that it faces 
financial	and	structural	challenges.	For	instance,	an	analysis	of	the	entire	
portfolio of the NFIP in the United States showed that the median ten-
ure	of	flood	insurance	was	between	two	and	four	years,	while	the	aver-
age length of time in a residence was seven years (see Michel-Kerjan, 
Lemoyne de Forges, and Kunreuther [2012]). If a multiyear insurance 
policy were tied to the property, it would deter policyholders from can-
celling their policies if they did not incur losses for several years.
Second, greater program participation is needed to reduce unin-
sured property losses. Many homeowners do not completely recognize 
or	internalize	their	flood	risk	and	tend	to	be	overly	optimistic	about	the	
extent	of	the	flood	risk	to	which	they	are	exposed.	Consequently,	 the	
NFIP has not achieved the level of participation originally envisioned 
by	Congress.	 In	 the	absence	of	flood	 insurance,	 the	cost	of	 repairing	
flood-damaged	property	is	usually	borne	either	by	the	property	owner	
from	 personal	 financial	 resources	 or	 by	 federal	 disaster	 relief	 assis-
tance. The result is billions of dollars of uninsured property losses that 
translate	into	higher	social	costs.	It	may	be	that	flood	survivors	think	the	
purchase	of	flood	insurance	is	not	necessary	in	order	to	receive	some	
compensation	for	flood-related	losses	from	the	federal	government.	
Third,	NFIP	premiums	do	not	adequately	reflect	the	magnitude	of	
the	risk	 involved.	The	availability	of	 federal	subsidies	 in	flood-prone	
areas encourages people to locate these areas and deters them from tak-
ing appropriate measures to mitigate loss. As a consequence, uncom-
pensated	flood-related	losses	are	transferred	to	taxpayers	through	fed-
eral disaster assistance. The assurance of federal assistance in the event 
of a repeated disaster creates a moral hazard as it lowers the incentives 
to avoid the risk. Insurance premiums need to be based on risk in order 
to provide individuals with accurate signals about the perils they face 
and to encourage them to engage in cost-effective mitigation measures. 
In addition, risk-based premiums would help address the long-term 
financial	 solvency	 of	 the	 program.	Timely	 dissemination	 of	 accurate	
information	and	updated	flood	maps	could	encourage	appropriate	miti-
gation measures.
Finally, the NFIP needs to address the issues of equity and afford-
ability. It is important that only low-income households currently resid-
ing	in	hazard-prone	areas	should	receive	financial	assistance	with	their	
insurance premiums. Rather than insurance premium subsidies, how-
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ever, the funds could come from general public funding. One option 
is to give property owners who cannot afford insurance vouchers that 
are	 tied	 to	 low-interest	 loans	so	 they	can	 implement	flood	mitigation	
strategies.
A private-public insurance program needs to be linked with other 
initiatives. Given the reluctance of individuals to voluntarily purchase 
insurance against losses, regulations could be passed that required cata-
strophic insurance coverage for all individuals who face risk. Insurance 
premiums would be risk-based to provide appropriate signals about the 
hazards individuals face and enable insurance providers to lower premi-
ums for properties where mitigation is undertaken.14 
If state and the federal governments were to provide insurance 
against catastrophic losses, then they could mandate risk-reducing mit-
igation as a required part of the policy. For instance, building codes 
would require property owners to meet standards not only on new 
structures	but	also	require	owners	to	retrofit	existing	structures.	Gov-
ernments could also offer tax incentives to encourage property owners 
to adopt mitigation measures.
Notes
		1.	 The	 nine	Midwest	 states	 affected	 by	 the	 flooding	were	 Illinois,	 Iowa,	Kansas,	
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
   2. Recall that the records of billion-dollar disasters maintained by NCDC for the 
United States commence in 1980, and NCDC is now known as the NCEI.
   3. These are the nine states affected by the Great Flood of 1993. Montana is not 
included	in	this	analysis,	even	though	the	Missouri	River	flows	through	the	state.	
The U.S. Census Bureau places Montana in the Mountain Division of the West 
Region.
			4.	 The	 1997	 flood	 resulted	 in	 major	 disaster	 declarations	 in	 Minnesota,	 North	
Dakota, and South Dakota. The major disaster declarations in 2008 were in Iowa, 
Missouri, Nebraska, and South Dakota.
			5.	 Specification	tests	using	a	longer	postflood	dummy	(three	months	rather	than	two	
months)	do	not	improve	the	goodness-of-fit.
			6.	 Because	 the	postflood	dummy	variables	were	not	 statistically	 significant	 in	 the	
regression	equations	for	2008,	the	results	suggest	that	UI	benefits	did	not	increase	
following	the	flood	of	2008.
   7. The World Bank and the United Nations (2010) report that even though FEMA 
has	updated	coastal	flood	maps,	it	is	finding	it	difficult	to	get	U.S.	Gulf	coast	com-
munities to accept them because such information would reduce property values.
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   8. The regression equation is: 
   NFIP Coverage = 0.0126 + 0.00717 × NumHur - 0.00015 × NumFlood 
     (1.0)        (7.1)                           (0.4)
  where NFIP coverage is the share of households in the state with active NFIP poli-
cies; NumHur is the number of hurricane-related major disasters between 1953 
and	2013;	and	NumFlood	is	the	number	of	flood-related	major	disasters	between	
1953 and 2013. The absolute value of the t-ratios	appear	beneath	each	coefficient;	
a	result	is	statistically	significant	if	the	t-ratio is 2.0 or larger.
  Adjusted R2 = 0.498; Standard error = 0.0400; Mean coverage rate = 0.0376
  9. The projection errors increased only in Hawaii and North Carolina, but both 
increases were modest, from 0.093 to 0.103 in Hawaii and from −0.094	to	−0.108	
in North Carolina.  
 10. See Michel-Kerjan (2010); Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther (2011); King (2011); 
Michel-Kerjan et al. (2012); Kunreuther, Pauly, and McMorrow (2013); and 
Knowles and Kunreuther (2014).
 11. These continuation rates are displayed in Table 7.1 of Kunreuther, Pauly, and 
McMorrow (2013).
 12.  Originally, BW-12 was to gradually phase-out the subsidized rates for about 20 
percent of property owners, half were to pay 25 percent more per year, and the 
rest	were	to	move	to	the	full-cost	for	flood	insurance	upon	purchase	of	an	older	
property.
	13.	 Two	other	programs	are	also	identified:	the	Low	Income	Home	Energy	Assistance	
Program administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
and the Universal Service Fund administered by the Federal Communications 
Commission.
14.   An important part of a private-public partnership is well-enforced building codes 
and land-use regulations to control development in hazard-prone areas.

119
6
Tornadoes
A methodology for classifying disasters that arise from adverse 
weather was introduced in Chapter 2. Table 2.2 presents a taxonomy 
of extreme-weather events and shows their correlates in terms of three 
underlying weather conditions: precipitation, temperature, and wind. 
Tornadoes are one of the seven types of major disasters discussed in 
this book; they are the most violent of all atmospheric storms but are 
not always accompanied by heavy precipitation. Conversely, a severe 
storm will be more damaging if it is accompanied by high wind, which 
is typical of a tornado. As such, tornadoes pose a serious threat to life 
and property to those in its path. As noted in Chapter 1, evidence sug-
gests that weather-related disasters are becoming more frequent, and 
one explanation is the increase in human population. Chapter 2 exam-
ines the correlation between population density and the occurrence of 
major disasters. With a larger population, vulnerability to a tornado 
rises because more people will be affected. In addition, development 
and urbanization in regions susceptible to tornadoes can increase the 
likelihood that they will cause a natural disaster.
The	first	section	of	 this	chapter	 introduces	some	terminology	rel-
evant to the discussion of tornadoes. It introduces the Fujita Tornado 
Damage Scale, which is used to classify each tornado by intensity and 
area. It also presents an outline of the enhanced scale introduced in 2007 
to rate tornadoes in a more consistent way. The regression analysis in the 
second section is exploratory. It examines the frequency of tornadoes 
in the United States since 1953 using data that are publicly available 
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
and FEMA. Using annual, state-level data we utilize OLS estimation 
to draw inferences that can provide useful background information for 
increasing our understanding of tornadoes. The geographic pattern in 
the occurrences of tornadoes is also explored. The third section exam-
ines	the	financial	costs	associated	with	tornado-related	disasters.	Given	
the data, we concentrate on economic damages and do not examine 
mortality and morbidity from tornado-related events. Generally, while 
tornadoes are responsible for much smaller aggregate destruction com-
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pared	 to	 hurricanes,	 drought,	 and	 river	floods,	 there	 is	 some	 support	
for the idea that tornadoes are having larger damaging effects in more 
recent years. The last section provides concluding comments.
TERMINOLOGY
According to the National Severe Storm Laboratory of NOAA, a 
tornado	 is	defined	as	“a	narrow,	violently	 rotating	column	of	air	 that	
extends from the base of a thunderstorm to the ground” (National 
Severe Storms Laboratory, n.d.) Unless a tornado forms a condensa-
tion	funnel	comprised	of	water	droplets,	dust,	and	debris,	it	is	difficult	
to see. Researchers do not fully understand how tornadoes form, but 
they do know that the “most destructive and deadly tornadoes occur 
from	supercells,	which	are	rotating	thunderstorms	with	a	well-defined	
radar circulation called a mesocyclone” (National Severe Storms Labo-
ratory, n.d.).1	Results	from	the	Verification	of	the	Origins	of	Rotation	in	
Tornadoes Experiment (VORTEX) program suggest that once a meso-
cyclone is under way, tornado development is related to the tempera-
ture differences across the edge of downdraft air wrapping around the 
mesocyclone.2
Approximately 1,200 tornadoes occur each year in the United 
States, of which a relatively high frequency occur in the central part 
of the country.3 The occurrence of a tornado event is measured in a 
number of ways: by all tornadoes, tornado county-segments, and strong 
and violent tornadoes only. These various ways of measuring a tornado 
occurrence provide a wide range of information relevant to different 
areas of investigation.
While tornadoes can occur at any time of year, they tend to strike 
during particular months. The time of year when the United States 
experiences the most tornadoes is termed the tornado season. The peak 
season for the Gulf coast is spring, for the southern Plains it is in May 
and early June, and in the northern plains and upper Midwest the tor-
nado season is in June or July.
The strength of a tornado is determined by the damage it causes, 
and the extent of the damage is used to estimate the wind speeds. Dr. 
T. Theodore Fujita introduced the Fujita Scale (F-Scale) in 1971 to 
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classify each tornado by intensity and area: F0 (Gale), F1 (Weak), F2 
(Strong), F3 (Severe), F4 (Devastating), and F5 (Incredible). Table 6.1 
shows the tornado scale and the typical damage associated with the 
wind speed of the tornado.
In 2007, the National Weather Service of NOAA implemented an 
Enhanced Fujita Scale (EF-Scale) to rate tornadoes in a more consis-
tent and accurate manner. The EF-Scale includes more variables than 
the original F-Scale to assign a wind speed rating to a tornado. The 
enhanced scale includes 28 damage indicators that describe the typi-
cal construction for that category such as building type, structures, and 
trees. For each damage indicator, the degree of damage is determined 
using	an	eight-point	classification.	The	degree	of	damage	in	each	cat-
egory is given an expected estimate of wind speed, a lower bound of 
Table 6.1  Fujita Tornado Damage Scale 
Scale
Wind 
estimate 
(mph) Typical damage
F0 >73 Light damage. Some damage to chimneys; branches 
broken off trees; shallow-rooted trees pushed over; 
signboards damaged.
F1 74–112 Moderate damage. Peels surface off roofs; mobile homes 
pushed off foundations or overturned; moving autos blown 
off roads.
F2 113–157 Considerable damage. Roofs torn off frame houses; 
mobile homes demolished; boxcars overturned; large trees 
snapped or uprooted; light-object missiles generated; cars 
lifted off ground.
F3 158–206 Severe damage. Roofs and some walls torn off well-
constructed houses; trains overturned; most trees in forest 
uprooted; heavy cars lifted off the ground and thrown.
F4 207–260 Devastating damage. Well-constructed houses leveled; 
structures with weak foundations blown away some 
distance; cars thrown and large missiles generated.
F5 261–318 Incredible damage. Strong frame houses leveled off 
foundations	and	swept	away;	automobile-sized	missiles	fly	
through the air in excess of 100 meters (109 yards); trees 
debarked; incredible phenomena will occur.
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wind speed and an upper bound. While more detail is incorporated into 
the EF-Scale, the original F-scale historical database has not changed. 
For instance, an F5 tornado rated in years prior to 2007 remains an F5 
under the enhanced scale, but the wind speed associated with the tor-
nado may be less than previously estimated.
TORNADO PATTERNS
Tornadoes are present in a considerable number of major disas-
ter declarations designated by FEMA. For example, 441 of the 2,046 
FEMA-designated disaster declarations between 1953 and 2013 were 
attributable to tornadoes. In some major disasters straight-line winds 
compound the damage from tornadoes. Both types of destructive wind 
events were present in 55 major disaster declarations of the 1953–2013 
period.
Most single and multiple tornado outbreaks do not result in a major 
disaster declaration by FEMA, even though they cause extensive dam-
age in local areas. The NCDC has information on tornado activity since 
1916.4 Figure 6.1 uses historical data from 1953 to 2011 to plot annual 
tornado	outbreaks.	The	figure	shows	a	discernible	upward	trend	in	the	
annual occurrence of tornadoes. For instance, between 1953 and 1959 
the annual number of tornadoes averaged 585, while between 2000 and 
2009 the average was 1,268.
Besides large year-to-year variation in tornado frequency, a sig-
nificant	 upward	 trend	 is	 clearly	 noticeable	 in	 the	 figure.	 Projections	
from the linear trend regression in Figure 6.1 exceed 1,200 in all years 
between 2000 and 2011, whereas all projections from 1953 to 1959 fall 
below 600.
Table 6.2 displays the results of a regression analysis of the fre-
quency	 of	 tornadoes	 in	 the	 United	 States	 since	 1953.	 The	 first	 two	
regression equations focus on national trends. A linear trend from 1953 
explains about two-thirds of the time series variation for the 1953–2011 
period. The slope of the trend indicates that the annual number of tor-
nadoes increased by about 15 during these 59 years. The second regres-
sion equation tests for an acceleration in tornado frequency starting 
in 1985. The decision rule for selecting the year 1985 for the break 
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in the series is arbitrary: it is approximately the middle of the period 
from	1953	to	2011.	The	trend	acceleration	coefficient	 is	positive,	but	
its t-ratio	of	1.8	is	of	borderline	significance	at	the	0.05	level.5 The two 
trend	 coefficients	 in	 the	 second	 regression	 equation	 suggest	 that	 the	
annual number of tornadoes increased by 10.56 in years before 1985 
but nearly doubled to 20.24 after 1985.
Regression Equations (6.2.3) and (6.2.4) repeat Equations (6.2.1) 
and (6.2.2) but add two years of data, 2012 and 2013. Note how the 
proportion of explained variation drops when 2012 and 2013 are added. 
Also in Equation (6.2.4), note how the estimated post-1985 trend accel-
eration drops to less than three tornadoes per year. The contrast between 
Equations (6.2.1) and (6.2.2) and Equations (6.2.3) and (6.2.4) is yet 
another illustration of the extreme volatility of annual disaster occur-
rences; in this instance, the nationwide occurrences of tornadoes.6
The data from NOAA also have information about serious torna-
does; that is, tornadoes in classes 5–9 based on the scale of property 
Figure 6.1  Annual Number of Tornadoes, 1953–2011 
SOURCE: Annual data from the NCDC. The linear trend is regression Equation (6.2.1), 
which is shown in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2  Measures of Tornado Frequency since 1953
Constant Trend 1953
New trend 
1985
Adjusted
R2
Standard 
error
Durbin-
Watson Mean
Sample 
period
(6.2.1) U.S. total 492.6
(10.5)
14.91
(11.0)
0.673 177.8 1.72 939.9 1953–2011
(6.2.2) U.S. total 561.0
(9.4)
10.56
(3.8)
9.68
(1.8)
0.685 174.4 1.82 939.9 1953–2011
(6.2.3) U.S. total 522.9
(10.5)
13.44
(9.6)
0.602 192.8 1.65 939.4 1953– 2013
(6.2.4) U.S. total 543.9
(8.2)
12.12
(4.0)
2.77
(0.5)
0.597 194.1 1.65 939.4 1953–2013
(6.2.5) U.S. serious 
tornadoes
66.9
(3.8)
5.43
(10.8)
0.667 65.6 1.54 229.6 1953–2011
(6.2.6) U.S. serious 
tornadoes 
60.3
(2.7)
5.83
(5.6)
−0.90
(0.4)
0.662 66.1 1.54 229.6 1953–2011
(6.2.7) Serious tornado 
proportion
0.167
(12.7)
0.0023
(5.9)
0.367 0.050 1.05 0.234 1953–2011
(6.2.8) Serious tornado 
proportion 
0.126
(8.4)
0.0048
(7.0)
−0.0058
(4.3)
0.514 0.044 1.40 0.234 1953–2011
(6.2.9) Major disasters 
with tornadoes
−0.381
(0.3)
0.246
(7.3)
0.465 4.63 1.52 7.230 1953–2013
(6.2.10) Major disasters 
with tornadoes 
1.656
(1.1)
0.118
(1.7)
0.267
(2.0)
0.492 4.51 1.63 7.230 1953–2013
(6.2.11) Major disasters: 
tornadoes or straight-
line winds
−0.439
(0.4)
0.271
(7.9)
0.508 4.69 1.48 7.951 1953–2013
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(6.2.12) Major disasters: 
tornadoes or straight-
line winds
1.762
(1.1)
0.133
(1.9)
0.289
(2.2)
0.537 4.55 1.60 7.951 1953–2013
SOURCE: National tornado data in Equations (6.2.1)–(6.2.8) from NOAA. Tornadoes and straight-line winds in major disasters in Equa-
tions (6.2.9)–(6.2.12) from FEMA major disaster data. The absolute value of the t-ratios	appears	beneath	each	coefficient;	a	result	is	
statistically	significant	if	the	t-ratio is 2.0 or larger. Note that the sample periods depend on data availability.
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damage.7 Equations (2.6.5) and (2.6.6) explain the trend in serious tor-
nadoes. Equation (2.6.5) indicates that serious tornadoes increased by 
slightly more than 5 per year from 1953 to 2011. The test for an acceler-
ation in serious tornadoes starting in 1985, however, is not statistically 
significant.8 The absence of an acceleration in the frequency of serious 
tornadoes	starting	in	1985	is	confirmed	in	Equations	(6.2.7)	and	(6.2.8),	
which examine serious tornado occurrences as a proportion of all tor-
nadoes. There is an upward trend from 1953 in Equation (6.2.8), but 
the	 trend	 acceleration	 coefficient	 is	 negative,	 statistically	 significant,	
and nearly the same size as the post-1953 trend. In other words, Equa-
tion	(6.2.8)	suggests	there	has	been	no	significant	change	in	the	share	
of serious tornadoes since 1985. The inference from Equations (6.2.7) 
and (6.2.8) is that since 1985 the increase in tornado frequency has been 
concentrated among less serious tornadoes; that is, those with estimated 
financial	costs	below	$50,000.
As noted at the start of this chapter, 441 of the 2,046 FEMA- 
designated disaster declarations between 1953 and 2013 involved tor-
nadoes. Most descriptions of the 441 incidents in the FEMA declara-
tions, however, also included one or more other phrases such as “severe 
storm”	or	“flooding.”	While	tornadoes	were	responsible	for	wreaking	
destruction in these disasters, one or more other destructive factors may 
also have been present. High winds were also present in another 44 
major disasters between 1953 and 2013 as straight-line winds.
Equations (6.2.9)–(6.2.12) in Table 6.2 show descriptive trend 
results for these high-wind events associated with major disasters. 
Equations (6.2.9) and (6.2.10) focus just on tornadoes, while Equations 
(6.2.11) and (6.2.12) add incidents with straight-line winds. Equation 
(6.2.9) suggests that the trend-wise increase in major disasters involv-
ing tornadoes was about one every four years between 1953 and 2013, 
while	Equation	(6.2.10)	suggests	a	significant	acceleration	starting	in	
1985. Equations (6.2.11) and (6.2.12) show that the upward trends are 
slightly larger when straight-line winds are included. Perhaps most 
interesting is the strong suggestion in Equations (6.2.10) and (6.2.12) 
that major disasters involving these wind-related phenomena were 
noticeably more frequent starting in 1985. The post-1985 trend accel-
eration	coefficients	are	more	than	twice	the	size	of	those	for	the	longer	
post-1953 trend.
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Note	 the	contrasting	findings	 regarding	a	possible	acceleration	 in	
tornado frequency starting in 1985. The NOAA series on all tornadoes 
and those causing major damage suggest an increase in the frequency 
of all tornadoes starting in 1985 (Equation [6.2.2]), but the increase 
did not occur in tornadoes that cause major damage (Equation [6.2.6]). 
The FEMA major disaster data, on the other hand, suggest an accelera-
tion after 1985 in the frequency of major disasters involving tornadoes 
(Equation [6.2.10]) and major disasters involving either tornadoes or 
straight-line winds (Equation [6.2.12]). Because most FEMA major 
disaster declarations with tornadoes had other contributing factors, the 
separate contribution of tornadoes to the acceleration in wind-related 
major	disasters	cannot	be	identified	in	the	FEMA	data.
As noted earlier, tornado frequency is higher in the Midwest and 
the South than elsewhere in the nation. Table 6.3 displays the results 
of a descriptive regression analysis to illustrate the contrasts in the fre-
quency of tornadoes in individual states across the nine U.S. Census 
Bureau divisions. The measure of tornado frequency is the number of 
tornadoes per 10,000 square miles of state land area.
Three measures of tornado frequency are examined: the annual 
average frequency of all tornadoes by state from 1953 to 2011; the aver-
age frequency by state of major disasters involving tornadoes for the 
period 1953–2013; and counts by state of the most severe category of 
tornadoes, the 59 EF-5 tornadoes recorded between 1950 and 2013. 
The regression analysis in Table 6.3 uses regional categorical (dummy) 
variables as explanatory variables and includes average tempera-
ture and average precipitation as additional arguments. Table 6.3 dis-
plays	the	results	for	five	regression	equations,	two	for	the	1953–2011	
annual average of all tornadoes per 10,000 square miles, two for all 
major disasters involving tornadoes between 1953 and 2013 per 10,000 
square miles, and a single regression for the 59 EF-5 tornadoes of the 
1950–2013 period.
For all series, the divisional dummies explain over 45 percent of the 
state-to-state variation in tornado frequency. Large, positive, and statis-
tically	significant	divisional	dummies	are	observed	for	the	East	North	
Central, West North Central, East South Central, and West South Cen-
tral	divisions;	small	or	negative	coefficients	are	observed	for	the	other	
five	divisions.	Average	temperature	and	average	precipitation	also	add	
to	the	explained	variation	with	uniformly	positive	coefficients	that	are	
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Table 6.3  State Tornado Frequency by Census Bureau Division
Census division 
Annual average 
1953–2011 
(1)
Annual average 
1953–2011
(2)
Major disaster 
1953–2013
(3)
Major disaster 
1953–2013
(4)
EF5 Major 
tornadoes
1950–2013
(5)
New England 1.52 (2.5) −5.18	(2.6) 1.49 (3.5) −1.99	(1.3)
Mid-Atlantic 0.71 (0.7) 0.59 (0.6) 0.98 (1.6) −0.50	(0.7)
East North Central 2.72 (3.1) 3.09 (3.7) 2.91 (6.3) 1.76 (2.8) 0.044 (3.9)
West North Central 3.54 (4.3) 4.64 (5.1) 1.94 (5.0) 1.29 (1.9) 0.041 (4.2)
South Atlantic 2.70 (3.5) 1.54 (2.0) 1.23 (3.6) −0.73	(1.2)
East South Central 3.54 (3.7) 1.80 (1.9) 5.23 (10.1) 2.91 (4.0) 0.066 (5.4)
West South Central 4.51 (4.8) 3.31 (3.4) 3.07 (5.9) 1.23 (1.7) 0.035 (2.9)
Rocky Mountain −0.69	(0.9) 1.29 (1.1) 0.09 (0.0) 0.10 (0.1)
Pacific −1.23	(1.4) −0.62	(0.6) 0.00 (0.0) −0.84	(1.2)
Mean temperature 0.078 (2.8) 0.026 (1.3)
Mean precipitation 0.071 (2.2) 0.051 (2.1)
Adjusted R2 0.619 0.697 0.642 0.673 0.484
Standard error 1.466 1.307 1.034 0.987 0.023
Mean 3.194 3.194 1.665 1.665 0.0178
NOTE: EF-5 tornadoes are the most severe with only 59 between 1950 and 2013. Tornado frequency measured per 10,000 square mile of 
state	area	in	(1)	to	(4).	Beside	each	coefficient	in	parentheses	is	the	absolute	value	of	the	t-ratio;	the	result	is	statistically	significant	if	the	
t-ratio is 2.0 or larger.
SOURCE: Annual average tornadoes 1953–2011, mean temperature 1951–2000 and mean precipitation 1951–2000 from NOAA. Major 
disasters involving tornadoes, 1953–2013, from FEMA. 
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statistically	significant	in	three	of	four	instances.	Knowing	the	location	
of a state, average temperature, and average annual precipitation is suf-
ficient	information	to	explain	48–70	percent	of	the	interstate	variation	
in tornado frequency per 10,000 square miles of state area.
The results of the regression analysis in column (5) in Table 6.3 
are quite illuminating. All 59 of the EF-5 tornadoes affected residents 
in just the four central census divisions. Not one of the EF-5 torna-
does affected a single state in the three East Coast divisions, nor the 
two	Western	census	divisions.	This	finding	is	particularly	relevant	for	
regional policymakers, who need to consider appropriate public policy 
tools to reduce the mortality and morbidity associated with tornado-
related events.
FINANCIAL COSTS OF TORNADOES
Tornadoes are one of the eight categories of natural catastrophes 
recorded in the billion-dollar disaster series of NOAA. Between 1980 
and 2012 there were 19 tornado outbreaks that caused destruction 
estimated to be at least $1.0 billion (in 2013 dollars). Among these 
19, NOAA estimated that just two were responsible for destruction 
that exceeded $4.0 billion and both occurred in 2011: the Southeast- 
Midwest tornadoes of late April and the Midwest-Southeast tornadoes 
of late May. Both these outbreaks were devastating (the combined esti-
mated cost was $19.9 billion in 2013 dollars) and deadly (498 com-
bined deaths).9 The devastation in Joplin, Missouri, in late May received 
extensive media coverage.
The combined cost of the 19 billion-dollar tornados was estimated 
at	 $51.7	 billion	 (in	 2013	 dollars).	 Nine	 of	 the	 19	 incurred	 financial	
costs of $2.0 billion or more, but only 1 of the 9 occurred before 2008; 
the other 8 happened between 2008 and 2012. Based on this fact and 
the size of the two largest tornado-related disasters of 2011, tornado 
outbreaks	appear	 to	be	becoming	more	damaging,	as	 reflected	 in	 the	
NOAA data. On average, while tornadoes wreak much smaller aggre-
gate	destruction	compared	to	hurricanes,	drought,	and	river	floods,	the	
NOAA data provide some support for the impression that tornadoes are 
having much larger destructive effects in more recent years.
130   Brusentsev and Vroman
Tornadoes are frequently part of a suite of destructive events 
described	as	severe	storms	that	can	also	include	heavy	rain,	hail,	flood-
ing, and mudslides. The NOAA billion-dollar disaster data also include 
severe storms as a separate category of destructive events. In the data, 
33 severe storms resulted in billion-dollar disasters between 1980 and 
2012, and 7 included tornadoes in their description. It is not a simple 
matter to separately estimate the destructive effects of tornadoes; fre-
quently it is not possible to separate the individual components of a 
disaster-related event.
Unlike	hurricanes	that	are	individually	identified	and	tracked,	tor-
nadoes typically occur in groups, carry group descriptions, and extend 
over many states at the same time. In more recent years the NOAA 
tornado-related billion-dollar disasters have included estimates of the 
number of tornadoes involved in the event. This description is true 
of 15 of the 19 tornado-related billion-dollar disasters. Counts of the 
number of tornadoes are also included in about half of the 33 billion-
dollar disaster events described by NOAA as “severe storms.” These 
descriptions appear as either a separate count or as a generic descriptor, 
“numerous.” For 17 events that include the number of counts of torna-
does, the range is between 22 and 400, with a mean of 120. This large 
number per event may help to explain why the destructive effects of 
tornadoes can extend over a wide geographic area.
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of tornadoes suggests at least four conclusions. First, 
all data series examined in this chapter show a strong upward trend in 
the annual number of tornadoes. It implies that the risk of a tornado 
occurring	that	causes	physical	harm	or	financial	loss	is	also	increasing.	
In part, the risk is increasing because of changing climatic conditions. 
Disaster risk reduction can be enhanced through complementary action 
from individuals, the private sector, and all levels of government. The 
federal government can coordinate the efforts of local and state gov-
ernments by providing information, policy and legal frameworks, and 
financial	support.
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One disaster risk-reduction strategy is an early warning system. 
This system would disseminate timely and meaningful warning infor-
mation that would enable individuals and communities threatened by 
a	tornado	to	prepare	and	to	act	appropriately	and	in	sufficient	time	to	
reduce the possibility of harm or loss. Simmons and Sutter (2005) found 
that the use of Doppler radar to identify tornadoes while still in the 
clouds has led to a longer lead time for tornado warnings (from 5.3 to 
10.0 minutes). The UNISDR (2009, p. 12) suggests a people-centered 
early warning system comprised of four key elements: “knowledge of 
the risks; monitoring, analysis and forecasting of the hazards; commu-
nication or dissemination of alerts and warnings; and local capabili-
ties to respond to the warnings received.” An appropriate and effective 
response to warnings is essential in reducing disaster risk.
Second,	there	is	a	definite	geographic	pattern	in	the	occurrences	of	
tornadoes. North Central and South Central states have much higher 
rates of occurrence per square mile compared to states along the Atlan-
tic	and	Pacific	coasts.	The	results	of	the	regression	analysis	show	that	
census division dummy variables alone explain 45–70 percent of the 
interstate variation in the frequency of tornadoes. Disaster risks are 
amplified	for	those	living	in	exposed	areas.	Improved	housing	and	more	
resilient	 infrastructure	 systems	 could	 significantly	 reduce	 vulnerabil-
ity and exposure in tornado-prone areas. Effective risk governance and 
the alignment of policies and incentives could strengthen community 
resilience. Local decision makers could encourage mitigation mea-
sures through building regulations. Adherence to model building codes 
can mean the difference between life and death or whether structures 
remain standing or are completely destroyed. Building codes can offer 
enhanced protection against the threat of a natural disaster and make 
communities more resilient and sustainable. An important issue that 
needs to be addressed, but is not discussed is this chapter, is the lack 
of affordable tornado shelters in some states within the central census 
division—an absence that leads to unnecessary mortality. Funding is 
available for the building of safe rooms.10 Information on tornado pre-
paredness is available from FEMA.11
Third, the average cost of the destruction caused by tornadoes is 
much smaller in scale than the destruction wrought by hurricanes, 
drought	and	even	river	floods.	Yet	mitigating	the	risks	from	tornadoes	
is important and requires a combination of active measures. A key ele-
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ment in reducing the potential destruction of tornadoes is community 
education and involvement. Active measures include those that reduce 
the risk itself (such as reducing the chances of damage through tornado-
proofing	measures	 in	homes	and	communities),	 limit	 the	exposure	 to	
risk (such as encouraging the purchase of insurance protection), and 
provide	financial	resources	to	help	people	recover	from	tornadoes	(such	
as disaster assistance or insurance payouts). Policy instruments include 
public-private	finance	partnerships,	loans,	regulations,	and	risk-sharing	
and	 transfer	mechanisms.	Risk-financing	mechanisms,	 such	 as	 insur-
ance, can contribute to increasing resilience.
Homeowners share responsibility for protecting themselves and 
their property from potential tornado damage. For tornadoes, this 
responsibility is voluntary and not enforced by statewide law or insur-
ance company practices. As such, these practices can decrease equity. 
Given the reluctance of individuals to voluntarily purchase insurance 
against property damage, regulations could be passed that require 
catastrophic insurance coverage for all individuals who face tornado-
related risks. Government could play a key role either as a regulator or 
an insurer of last resort.
Finally, the evidence on the increase in severe tornadoes and the 
associated scale of destruction is mixed. The FEMA data on major 
disasters suggest that there has been a more rapid growth in tornado-
related major disaster declarations since 1985. On the other hand, the 
national tornado data from NOAA suggest that there has been no signif-
icant growth in severe tornadoes since 1985. The NOAA billion-dollar 
disaster data also suggest that the average destruction caused by torna-
does has been increasing. The number of events (19), however, is too 
small to draw strong inferences.
Notes
	 1.	 Supercells	 can	 also	 produce	 damaging	 hail,	 flash	 floods,	 severe	 non-tornadic	
winds, and unusually frequent lightning.
		2.	 The	VORTEX	program	is	a	set	of	field	projects	that	study	tornadoes.	Scientists	
involved with VORTEX1 researched the evolution of a tornado with an array of 
instrumentation to gain a greater understanding of the processes involved with 
tornado genesis. VORTEX2 seeks to explain how tornadoes form, how long they 
last, and what causes them to dissipate.
Tornadoes   133
  3.  “Tornado Alley” is a label used by the media for a broad area of relatively high 
tornado occurrence in the central part of the United States.
  4. See NCDC (2012). 
  5. The required t-ratio	at	the	0.05	level	of	significance	under	a	two-sided	t-test is 1.97 
and under a one-sided t-test	it	is	1.672.	Thus	the	trend	acceleration	coefficient	is	
statistically	significant	under	a	one-sided	text	but	not	under	a	two-sided	test.
 6. The number of annual tornadoes decreased from 1640 in 2011 to 938 in 2012, or 
by 43 percent. NOAA records indicate that there was no change in tornado report-
ing between 2011 and 2012.
 7. Category 5 has damage from $50,000 to $500,000, while category 9 has damage 
of $500 million and over.
   8. The t-ratio	of	the	acceleration	coefficient	is	0.4,	far	below	the	level	required	for	
statistical	significance.
		9.	 The	year	2011	was	unusual	in	the	number	of	billion-dollar	tornado	disasters,	five	
including	the	two	identified	earlier	in	the	chapter.	All	five	incurred	at	least	$2.0	
billion	in	estimated	financial	costs.	The	498	deaths	from	the	April	and	May	2011	
tornado outbreaks accounted for 58 percent of all deaths caused by the 19 billion-
dollar tornado disasters.
 10. See https://www.fema.gov/safe-room-funding (accessed July 15, 2016).
 11. See https://www.ready.gov/tornadoes (accessed July 15, 2016).
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7
Drought and Other 
Risks to Agriculture
Agricultural producers face numerous, often simultaneous, sources 
of risk: volatility in product and input prices, macroeconomic distur-
bances affecting agricultural markets, outbreaks and spread of highly 
contagious diseases damaging to livestock, and adverse weather events. 
With diverse risks in agriculture, the responses required to manage them 
need to be different. Agricultural producers can directly manage varia-
tion in production, prices, and predictable weather with standard busi-
ness strategy. Marketable risk can be handled through market instru-
ments, such as insurance and futures markets, or through cooperative 
arrangements among agricultural producers.
Infrequent but catastrophic events that affect many agricultural 
producers over a wide area and for a sustained period of time require 
a different approach. Catastrophic risk strains the coping capacities of 
agricultural producers. One example of a catastrophic risk is severe and 
widespread drought. Losses associated with catastrophic risk affect the 
willingness of private insurers to provide coverage against certain haz-
ards. If the private insurance market fails to provide coverage for cata-
strophic risk, then government intervention is required. Programs that 
address both marketable and catastrophic risk are discussed in Chapter 3.
Unlike	the	risks	associated	with	hurricanes	and	floods,	those	associ-
ated with drought are less well understood. The World Meteorological 
Organization	defines	drought	as	a	natural	hazard	that	occurs	due	to	nat-
ural climatic variability.1	Chapter	1	introduces	the	declaration	classifi-
cation used by FEMA: major disaster declarations, emergency declara-
tions,	and	fire	management	assistance	declarations.	The	FEMA	incident	
descriptions do not directly identify drought as a descriptor in these 
declarations. While drought often contributes to the severity of wild-
land	fires,	these	fires	are	described	as	having	lightning	and	nonlightning	
causes.	The	agency	uses	the	descriptors	floods,	hail,	severe	storms,	and	
winter freezes when declaring incidents that affect agricultural pro-
duction. Drought is not an explicit category of either major disaster 
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or	emergency	declarations.	This	classification	may	reflect	an	important	
contrast between the onset and duration of drought compared to other 
adverse weather-related events whose onset and duration span just one 
or a few days. Drought, in contrast, extends over several months or 
even years, and drought-related agricultural and other economic losses 
also accumulate over longer periods.
The	first	section	of	this	chapter	introduces	terminology	that	is	rel-
evant to the discussion of drought. Four types of drought are intro-
duced: meteorological, hydrological, agricultural, and socioeconomic. 
Meteorological drought is a climatic phenomenon rather than a hazard; 
it only becomes hazardous when it is translated into hydrological or 
agricultural drought (UNISDR 2011). The regression analysis in this 
section examines the severity of drought in the United States from 1950 
to 2012 using state-level data from NOAA.2 We utilize OLS estima-
tion to draw inferences that can provide useful background information 
for increasing our understanding of droughts. Note that this estimation 
technique does not imply a causal relationship; it only shows an asso-
ciation between the variables of interest. More sophisticated statistical 
methods are appropriate to use with a larger and richer data set, par-
ticularly if the focus of the investigation is at the substate level. Our 
regression	analysis	finds	that	while	drought	is	closely	related	to	annual	
temperature and precipitation, annual precipitation has a more impor-
tant effect in explaining year-to-year variation in drought severity. The 
geographic scope of droughts is also explored, with drought being more 
frequent in states in the interior of the nation and less frequent in states 
along the coasts.
 The second section of this chapter examines the agricultural 
drought experience of the Dust Bowl of the 1930s and places it into 
a wider historical context by comparing data from the 1930s with two 
recent multiyear periods. The third section examines the role of insur-
ance in covering marketable risk, which can be handled through market 
instruments, such as federal crop insurance. The experience of federal 
crop insurance over time is examined with a regression analysis. The 
final	section	provides	concluding	comments.
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DROUGHT, MEASUREMENT, DETERMINANTS, AND COSTS
Past	research	and	practice	have	proposed	more	than	100	definitions	
of drought. The National Drought Mitigation Center at the University 
of	Nebraska	classifies	drought	 into	four	categories	using	a	 taxonomy	
originally developed by Wilhite and Grantz (1985). These four cat-
egories of drought are meteorological, hydrological, agricultural, and 
socioeconomic.	The	first	 three	 categories	deal	with	ways	 to	measure	
drought as a physical phenomenon; the last deals with drought in terms 
of supply and demand, tracking the effects of a shortfall in water as it is 
transmitted through socioeconomic arrangements.
Each category of drought merits a brief discussion. Meteorologi-
cal drought assesses the degree of dryness and the duration of the dry 
period.	It	is	usually	defined	as	deficiencies	in	rainfall,	with	periods	rang-
ing from a few months to several years or even decades. Since average 
precipitation varies widely across local geographic areas, the measure-
ment of meteorological drought involves a comparison of current dry-
ness conditions with the long-run average for the area. Long droughts 
often change in intensity over time and may affect different areas.
Hydrological drought assesses the effects of precipitation short-
falls over a period on surface and subsurface water supply. Agricul-
tural drought links meteorological and/or hydrological drought to its 
impact on agriculture. During a period of agricultural drought, demand 
for water for agricultural uses exceeds the supply. Here, supply encom-
passes groundwater and reservoir water stocks as well as precipitation. 
Agricultural drought considers the demand-supply water balance at 
all stages of crop development from planting to maturity. Socioeco-
nomic drought considers not only agriculture but also the broader bal-
ance between water demand and supply in society; for example, power 
generation, household use, industrial use, and social and environmental 
impacts.
The measurement of meteorological drought is well characterized, 
but the measurement of hydrological and agricultural drought remains 
a challenge. The World Meteorological Organization (2010) advo-
cates that agricultural drought be measured using composite indices 
that consider rainfall, soil moisture, temperature, soil and crop type, 
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stream	flow,	groundwater,	and	snow	pack,	as	well	as	historical	records	
of drought impacts.
Meteorological drought severity is often measured with the Palmer 
Drought Severity Index (PDSI), which considers the duration and inten-
sity of drought-inducing weather patterns. Long-term drought is cumu-
lative, and the PDSI uses weather information from the current month 
and several recent months. The PDSI is measured as an index with val-
ues	that	can	range	from	6.0	(wettest	conditions)	to	−6.0	(driest	condi-
tions). In actual use, PDSI values of 4.0 and above signal extremely 
wet	conditions,	while	values	of	−4.0	and	below	signal	extreme	drought.	
A second drought severity index is the Palmer Hydrological Drought 
Index (PHDI), which measures the hydrological effect of drought; for 
example, water-related indicators such as reservoir levels and ground-
water levels. It is also measured as an index that can range between 6.0 
and	−6.0.	The	PHDI	responds	more	slowly	to	changing	weather	condi-
tions than the PDSI since the hydrological effects of drought take lon-
ger to develop and longer to recover when compared to meteorological 
drought indices such as the PDSI.
At the statewide level, both the PDSI and PHDI are closely related 
to annual temperature and precipitation. Drought severity in the United 
States is examined with regression analysis using state-level annual 
data for the period 1951–2012.
The determinants of drought severity in the analysis are current 
and lagged annual values of average temperature and annual precipita-
tion. The regression results for 48 states showed that both weather vari-
ables	are	statistically	significant,	but	annual	precipitation	had	a	more	
important effect, particularly in explaining year-to-year variation in the 
PHDI.3 
Table 7.1 summarizes the results of a regression analysis using both 
drought indices. Each entry is a simple average of statistics across 48 
state-level regressions.4 Five observations from these results seem most 
pertinent to the analysis. First, the regression results explain most of the 
variation in both drought indices. The average adjusted R2 is 0.810 in 
the PDSI regression analysis and 0.823 in the PHDI regressions. Sec-
ond,	the	vast	majority	of	slope	coefficients	for	current	and	lagged	tem-
perature and precipitation have expected signs; that is, negative for tem-
perature and positive for precipitation. Third, precipitation has a more 
statistically	significant	effect	on	drought	severity	than	temperature;	the	
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t-ratios	for	the	precipitation	coefficients	are	four	to	five	times	the	size	
of the t-ratios	for	the	temperature	coefficients	for	both	indices.	Fourth,	
current-year effects on drought severity are clearly larger than the one-
year	lagged	effects.	The	coefficients	on	the	current-year	variables	for	
both average temperature and annual precipitation display noticeably 
higher averages than their one-year lagged counterparts. While lagged 
effects are important in the analysis, particularly for precipitation, cur-
rent-year	effects	are	generally	more	significant.	Fifth,	lagged	effects	are	
relatively	 larger	 and	have	greater	 statistical	 significance	 in	 the	PHDI	
regression analysis than in the PDSI regressions. The lagged-to-current 
ratios	are	0.471	(=	−0.157	÷	−0.333)	and	0.568	(=	−0.176	÷	−0.310)	for	
the	average	temperature	coefficients;	for	the	annual	precipitation	coef-
ficients,	they	are	0.590	(=	0.180	÷	0.305)	and	0.860	(=	0.258	÷	0.300).	
These results imply that not only does the start of adverse hydrological 
conditions take longer to develop when compared to meteorological 
conditions, but they also take longer to end.
Table 7.1  Regression Analysis of Drought Severity, 1951–2012
PDSI PHDI
Avg.	coefficient	
and t-ratio
Significant
t-ratiosa
Avg.	coefficient	
and t-ratios
Significant	
t-ratiosa
Regression	coefficients
Constant 11.79 (1.81) 23 10.05 (1.59) 18
Current temperature −0.333	(3.41) 43 −0.310	(3.02) 40
Lagged temperature −0.157	(1.70) 18 −0.176	(1.96) 23
Current precipitation 0.305 (13.08) 48 0.300 (12.12) 48
Lagged precipitation 0.180 (6.59) 48 0.258 (9.54) 48
Summary statistics
Adjusted R2 0.810 0.823
Standard error 0.827 0.886
Average index 0.125 0.332
aThe t-ratio	is	2.0	or	larger	and	the	coefficients	have	expected	signs,	that	is,	negative	for	
temperature and positive for precipitation.
SOURCE: The regression analysis uses data from 1950 to 2012 for 48 states available 
from the National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI) of NOAA. Beside 
each	coefficient	in	parentheses	is	the	absolute	value	of	the	t-ratio; the result is statisti-
cally	significant	if	the	t-ratio	is	2.0	or	larger.	Coefficients	and	summary	statistics	are	
simple averages across 48 states with no weighting for state size.
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To summarize these results, most of the annual variation in both 
drought indices at the state level is explained by yearly variation in 
average temperature and annual precipitation. In annual data the effects 
of both climate variables on drought in the current year are larger than 
their one-year lagged effects.
In contrast to the incident descriptions used by FEMA in its declara-
tion, the NOAA data of billion-dollar disasters that extend back to 1980 
do include drought as a disaster-related event. NOAA records show 21 
drought-related billion-dollar disasters between 1980 and 2013 incur-
ring cumulative costs of $278.2 billion (in 2013 dollars), or an average 
of $13.2 billion for each disaster. Of the seven types of disasters dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, droughts and hurricanes are the two most costly 
per-occurrence catastrophes. Also noted in Chapter 2 are three drought-
related	disasters	since	1980	that	resulted	in	financial	costs	in	excess	of	
$25 billion (the droughts of 1980, 1988, and 2012).
Drought is a widespread, multistate phenomenon. For 9 of the 21 
drought-related billion-dollar disasters, the NOAA data identify the 
affected states. The other 12 simply identify the region(s) and indicate 
that several states were affected.5 Of all the states, 40 experienced at 
least one period of drought during the nine years that NOAA provided 
details for individual states. The states with no recorded drought events 
were the six New England states plus New Jersey, Delaware, D.C., 
Alaska, and Hawaii. At the other extreme, the 14 states with four or 
more periods of drought during these nine years were states in the inte-
rior: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Arizona, and 
New Mexico.
From these nine episodes it is clear that drought was experienced 
more frequently by states in the interior of the United States and less 
frequently by states along the coasts. Of the 23 states that front one of 
the	three	coasts	(Atlantic,	Gulf,	and	Pacific),	drought	was	experienced	
33 times for an average of 1.4 per state. Among the 28 interior states 
drought was experienced 91 times for an average of 3.2 per state. Since 
1980 the economic losses from drought have not been randomly distrib-
uted across the individual states.
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PRECIPITATION IN THE WEST
The most widely recognized period of drought in the United States 
was the Dust Bowl of the 1930s, when residents of Oklahoma and 
adjacent states experienced severe hardship caused by several years of 
below-average precipitation. We recognize that the catastrophic experi-
ence of the Dust Bowl is more complicated than simply several years 
of below-average precipitation. The environmental catastrophe was due 
not only to government land policies at the time, but also to the intense 
cultivation of inappropriate crops (see, for example, Egan [2006] and 
Hornbeck [2012]). 
In the current terminology of the UNISDR (2009, p. 27), the ori-
gin	of	the	Dust	Bowl	would	be	classified	as	a	socionatural	hazard:	cir-
cumstances where human activity increases the occurrence of certain 
hazards beyond their natural probabilities. Socionatural hazards can 
be reduced, and even avoided, through effective management of land 
and environmental resources. To help the agricultural sector recover 
from the combined effects of the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl, 
Congress passed the Federal Crop Insurance Act, which established the 
federal crop insurance program, as discussed in Chapter 3.
Table 7.2 places the precipitation experience of the 1930s into a 
wider historical context by comparing long-run state-level precipitation 
data with data from the 1930s and from two recent multiyear periods.6 
It displays precipitation averages for 15 western states and the average 
annual precipitation for the 48 states of the United States. Precipitation 
for each year is expressed as a ratio to the 1901–2000 average, and the 
ratios were then averaged for the indicated periods. The table shows 
the averages for three multiyear periods (1930–1939, 2000–2006, and 
2007–2013) and for the 100 years from 1901 to 2000. 
For the 15 western states and the United States, column (1) shows 
the 100-year average precipitation, while columns (2)–(4) show ratios 
to the long-run average precipitation for the three multiyear periods. 
Based on 48 states, national data precipitation in the 1930s averaged 6 
percent below the 100-year average. In contrast, the national ratios for 
2000–2006 and 2007–2013 match the long-run national average. From 
an aggregate national perspective the 1930s were dry years while the 
years since 2000 have experienced average precipitation.
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The state-level ratios and the multi-state averages at the bottom of 
Table 7.2 show a clear pattern of below-average precipitation in all three 
periods. Of the 15 individual states, the average precipitation ratio for 
14 falls below 1.00 during 1930–1939, for 14 again during 2000–2006, 
and for 12 during 2007–2013. Average precipitation ratios across the 
15 western states are generally below 1.0, and the average precipitation 
ratios for both 2000–2006 and 2007–2013 are actually lower than dur-
Table 7.2  Average Precipitation by State, the 1930s and 2000s
Geographic areas
100-year
average,
1901–2000
(1)
Ratio to 
100-year
average,
1930–1939
(2)
Ratio to
100-year
average,
2000–2006
(3)
Ratio to
100-year
average
2007–2013
(4)
Oklahoma 33.8 0.89 0.99 1.02
Kansas 27.1 0.83 1.00 1.07
Nebraska 22.6 0.85 0.95 1.09
Texas 27.1 0.96 1.06 0.98
Arizona 12.6 1.00 0.92 0.92
Colorado 18.1 0.90 0.82 0.85
Idaho 23.9 0.88 0.73 0.76
Montana 18.7 0.87 0.75 0.88
Nevada 10.3 0.96 0.85 0.79
New Mexico 14.0 0.99 0.96 0.88
Utah 13.6 0.92 0.86 0.84
Wyoming 15.9 0.92 0.70 0.82
California 22.4 0.93 0.98 0.79
Oregon 32.2 0.89 0.79 0.81
Washington 42.0 0.97 0.86 0.92
United States 29.9 0.94 0.99 1.00
Average 15 states 22.3 0.92 0.88 0.89
Average 4 Plains 27.7 0.88 1.00 1.04
Average 8 Mountain 15.9 0.93 0.82 0.84
Average	3	Pacific 32.2 0.93 0.87 0.84
SOURCE: Annual precipitation data from NOAA. Column (1) shows 100-year aver-
ages. Columns (2)–(4) show average ratios of annual precipitation to the 100-year 
average for the indicated multiyear periods.
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ing the 1930s (the 15-state average ratios are 0.88 and 0.89 compared 
to 0.92 in the 1930s, respectively).
While the Dust Bowl in Oklahoma has received major attention, 
note that the average precipitation ratios for Kansas and Nebraska dur-
ing the 1930s were both lower than that in Oklahoma (0.83 and 0.85, 
respectively, compared to 0.89). Note also for the two post-2000 peri-
ods that the four plains states experienced precipitation averages that 
matched and even exceeded their long-run 1901–2000 averages.
For the eight states in the Mountain division and the three in the 
Pacific	division,	 both	 recent	multiyear	 periods	 have	 been	 even	dryer	
than during the 1930s.7 For these 11 states, all but 1 (Arizona in the 
1930s) of the 33 state-level precipitation ratios in Table 7.2 fall below 
1.0. Note also that 20 of 22 ratios during the 2000–2006 and 2007–2013 
periods were lower than during the 1930s. For these states in the Moun-
tain	and	Pacific	census	divisions,	 the	shortfall	of	annual	precipitation	
below the 100-year average has been larger since 2000 than during the 
1930s. The average ratios at the bottom of Table 7.2 reinforce this point. 
The precipitation shortfall during 2007–2013 averaged 16 percent for 
both	the	Mountain	and	the	Pacific	states.
ECONOMIC LOSSES AND INSURANCE
Adverse weather-related risks for agricultural producers include 
drought,	flooding,	hail,	high	winds,	and	winter	freezes.	Drought	is	par-
amount because of its geographic scope, the timing of its onset and 
duration, and the scale of the potential losses. Drought typically affects 
multistate areas and, unlike other weather-related disasters, is measured 
in terms of months and seasons of the year rather than days.
As noted in Chapter 1, agricultural producers face multiple, often 
simultaneous, sources of weather-related and other risks that result in 
frequent losses. These marketable risks can be handled through insur-
ance programs to help mitigate the losses associated with them. The 
federal crop insurance program is discussed in Chapter 3. Recall that 
participation in the federal crop insurance program is voluntary, and 
insurance policies only cover losses associated with the unavoidable 
risks of adverse weather and weather-related plant diseases and insect 
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infestations. The USDA determines which commodity to insure on 
a crop-by-crop and county-by-county basis. The Risk Management 
Agency of the USDA has overall responsibility for supervising the fed-
eral crop insurance program, which it administers in partnership with 
the private sector.
A number of factors make the federal crop insurance program the 
foundation	of	financial	and	risk	management	plans	for	many	agricul-
tural producers (see Rain and Hail Insurance Sociey [2015]). First, the 
program	is	flexible.	The	diversity	of	coverage	and	product	levels	pro-
vide agricultural producers with the opportunity to obtain the coverage 
that	best	fits	 their	own	risk-management	needs.	The	agricultural	pro-
ducer selects both the percentage of yield to be covered (that is, 50–75 
percent; 85 percent coverage is available for limited crops and in limited 
counties) and the percentage of the commodity price (55–100 percent). 
Second, the program is affordable. Because the government shares in 
the risk and administrative premium costs, agricultural producers can 
purchase crop insurance at more affordable premium prices. The result 
is affordable protection for agricultural producers and manageable costs 
for taxpayers. The third important factor is availability. Private sector 
delivery provides localized service for agricultural producers who pur-
chase crop insurance from the local agent of their choice. Fourth, crop 
insurance is predictable. Agricultural producers and their lenders know 
what their protection is before they plant their crop because the produc-
ers	pay	a	significant	portion	of	the	cost	themselves.	In	this	section,	the	
performance of the federal crop insurance program is examined with 
regression analysis.
A	 number	 of	 legislative	 changes	 have	modified	 the	 federal	 crop	
insurance program since its establishment. Legislative changes were 
introduced in 1980, 1994, 2000, 2008, and 2014. The Federal Crop Insur-
ance Act of 1980 encouraged participation in the program by authoriz-
ing a subsidy for premiums. It also added coverage for additional crops 
and regions of the country. The Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 
1994 further expanded program participation by increasing subsidies 
and	made	coverage	mandatory	for	certain	benefits	that	were	previously	
offered for free. The Risk Management Agency was created in 1996 to 
operate and manage the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation and the 
requirement for mandatory enrollment was lifted. The Agriculture Risk 
Protection Act of 2000 added $8.2 billion in new federal spending over 
Drought and Other Risks to Agriculture   145
a	five-year	period,	primarily	through	more	generous	premium	subsidies	
to help make the program more affordable to agricultural producers. 
The objective was to enhance participation levels and reduce the need 
for ad hoc emergency disaster payments. The Food, Conservation, and 
Energy	Act	of	2008	modified	the	legislation	to	reduce	the	overall	cost	
and create a permanent disaster assistance program. The most recent 
modification	was	with	 the	Agricultural	Act	 of	 2014,	which	 covers	 a	
greater	share	of	agricultural	losses	and	makes	other	modifications	that	
broaden policy coverage.
Agricultural crop insurance currently covers more than 80 percent 
of insurable farmland, and most producers select 70 percent of crop 
yield to be covered. Note that the federal crop insurance policy is a 
contract between the insured agricultural producer and the insurance 
company, not the federal government. For the agricultural producer to 
receive the federal subsidy attached to the program, the private insur-
ance policy is required to follow federal standards and rates. Because 
the policy is private, all premiums are owed to and guaranteed by the 
insurance providers. Table 7.3 summarizes agricultural insurance cov-
erage with emphasis on regional and time series aspects of develop-
ments since the mid-1990s.
Columns (1) and (2), respectively, show total farmland acreage and 
prime acreage in the nine census divisions of the so-called lower 48 
states, that is, excluding Alaska and Hawaii. Total farmland acreage is 
920.1, just below a billion acres, while prime farm acreage was 271 mil-
lion in 2002, or 0.295 of total acreage. Column (5) shows prime farmland 
acreage as a share of total acreage by Census Bureau division. The low-
est share is observed in the Mountain division (0.036); below-average 
shares	are	also	present	in	the	New	England	and	Pacific	divisions	(both	
slightly below 0.200). The highest prime farmland share is observed in 
the states of the East North Central division (0.668), with proportions 
ranging between 0.332 and 0.405 across four other divisions.
The growth in agricultural insurance coverage is vividly illustrated 
in columns (3) and (4), which show absolute coverage estimates for 
1994 and 2013, and in columns (6) and (7), which show shares of insur-
able farmland acreage for the same two years. Between 1994 and 2013, 
insured acreage increased by 2.6 times, from 88.8 to 231.2 million 
acres, or from 0.327 to 0.855 of prime farmland acreage. Insured acre-
age grew substantially in all regions, increasing by more than 0.450 in 
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Table 7.3  Federal Crop Insurance Acreage, 1994 and 2013
Region
Acreage 
in farms, 
2007
(1)
Prime 
farmland 
acreage, 2002
(2)
Insured 
acres,
1994
(3)
Insured 
acres,
2013
(4)
Prime 
farmland
share, 
=	(2)	÷	(1)	
(5)
Insured 
farmland share, 
1994
=	(3)	÷	(2)
(6)
Insured
farmland share, 
2012
=	(4)	÷	(2)
(7)
New England 4.0 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.191 0.077 0.788
Middle Atlantic 15.7 5.6 0.3 3.1 0.354 0.048 0.547
South Atlantic 47.1 13.1 3.6 10.9 0.278 0.273 0.829
E. South Central 45.5 18.4 3.7 16.4 0.405 0.200 0.888
W. South Central 187.5 62.3 21.9 50.8 0.332 0.352 0.815
E. North Central 80.7 53.9 11.8 43.5 0.668 0.219 0.807
W. North Central 261.9 99.4 44.3 92.7 0.380 0.445 0.933
Mountain 221.0 7.9 1.4 5.5 0.036 0.181 0.695
Pacifica 56.7 10.1 1.8 8.7 0.177 0.182 0.866
United Statesa 920.1 271.5 88.8 232.1 0.295 0.327 0.855
aExcludes Alaska and Hawaii.
SOURCE: Data in columns (1)–(4) from USDA. Acreage in millions. Columns (5)–(7) derived from columns (1)–(4).
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all nine Census Bureau divisions and by more than 0.680 in the New 
England,	East	South	Central,	and	Pacific	divisions.	By	2013	more	than	
65 percent of prime farmland acreage was insured in eight of nine Cen-
sus Bureau divisions (all but the Middle Atlantic division). Nationwide 
more than 80 percent of prime farmland acreage was insured.
The loss protection provided by federal crop insurance has also 
increased substantially. Three factors have contributed to the increase 
in	insurance	indemnity	payments	to	agricultural	producers.	The	first	is	
increased insurance coverage, as illustrated in Table 7.3. The second 
factor is the increase in the crop loss replacement rate. Glauber (2012) 
notes that in 1998 only 9 percent of insured acres were enrolled at cov-
erage levels above 70 percent of loss replacement, whereas 70 percent 
of insured acres were enrolled at loss replacement levels above 70 per-
cent in 2011. Recall that the Agriculture Risk Protection Act of 2000 
added	$8.2	billion	in	new	federal	spending	over	a	five-year	period	to	the	
program primarily through more generous premium subsidies. Thus, 
the legislation encouraged the increase in loss replacement and raised 
the subsidy levels for buy-up policies, which provided insurance pro-
tection against decreases in crop prices.
The third factor that has contributed to the increase in crop insurance 
protection is a substantial increase in the market prices of most major 
crops. During 2010–2013, for example, the average price received by 
farmers for crops was 94 percent higher than the average price during 
1990–1993.	For	 the	 same	period	 the	 total	GDP	deflator	 increased	by	
49 percent, or about half the increase in crop prices.8 Illustrative of the 
growth in crop insurance protection, total program liabilities grew from 
$13.6 billion in 1994 to $123.6 billion in 2013 (Rain and Hail Insurance 
Society 2015, p. 4). This ninefold increase in potential liabilities pro-
vides a vivid indication of recent growth in crop insurance protection.
While the scope of federal crop insurance has expanded in the past 
20 years, agricultural producers have continued to receive substantial 
disaster assistance payments to compensate for crop losses. Glauber 
(2012, p. 484) estimates that disaster-related costs were nearly $10.0 
billion	during	the	nine	fiscal	years	from	2001	to	2009.	Table	7.4	pro-
vides a summary of the experience with federal crop insurance between 
1990 and 2013. The data were mainly derived from the survey article by 
Glauber (2012, Table 2), but updated with data from the Rain and Hail 
Insurance Society (2015).
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Table 7.4  Federal Crop Insurance Financial Flows, 1990–2013 ($ billions)
Indemnity 
payments
(1)
Crop loss insurance premiums Farmer net 
indemnity
=	(1)	−	(3)
(5)
Administrative 
costs
(6)
Total insurance 
outlays
= (5) + (6)
(7)
Total
= (3) + (4)
(2)
Farmer-paid
(3)
Government 
subsidy
(4)
1990–1993 4,563 3,088 2,285 803 2,278 1,020 3,299
1994–1997 4,656 6,106 3,076 3,030 1,578 2,402 3,980
1998–2001 9,668 9,688 4,623 5,065 5,044 3,719 8,763
2002–2005 12,905 14,482 5,878 8,604 7,026 5,071 12,097
2006–2009 20,960 29,944 12,321 17,623 8,639 11,703 20,342
2010–2013 44,202 42,435 16,019 26,416 28,183 13,834 42,017
1990–2013 96,954 105,745 44,202 61,541 52,748 37,749 90,498
SOURCE: Glauber (2012, Table 2) and Rain and Hail Insurance Society (2015). The authors estimate administrative costs in 2012 and 
2013.
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The data are arranged into six four-year periods between 1990 and 
2013. One striking feature of Table 7.4 is the growth of indemnity pay-
ments to agricultural producers, increasing from $4.563 billion during 
1990–1993 to $44.202 billion during 2010–2013. Indemnity payments 
across the 24 years totaled $96.95 billion. As a percent of agricultural 
GDP, indemnity payments increased from 1.5 percent in 1990–1993 to 
6.8 percent in 2010–2013.
Columns (2)–(4) provide details of the insurance premiums that 
support the federal crop insurance program. Of the total $105.7 bil-
lion, agricultural producers paid $44.2 billion, while $61.5 billion (58 
percent) was covered by government subsidies. The table also shows 
that government subsidies have grown relative to premiums paid by 
agricultural producers. Government subsidies represented only 26 per-
cent of premiums during 1990–1993 but 62 percent during 2010–2013. 
The	final	three	columns	of	Table	7.4	provide	other	financial	details	of	
federal crop insurance. The net farmer indemnity (indemnity payments 
less farmer premium payments) totaled $52.7 billion during these 24 
years. Total administrative costs incurred by the insurance carriers were 
$37.3 billion, or 39 percent of indemnity payments. Total insurance 
costs (farmer net indemnity payments plus administrative costs, shown 
in column [7]), totaled $90.5 billion). Note also that total insurance 
costs increased sharply during 2010–2013, driven mainly by the large 
increase in indemnity payments. The presence of serious drought con-
ditions	 affecting	many	 farming	 areas	during	2010–2013	 significantly	
contributed to the increase in payments.
Further regression analysis examined the association between 
drought	and	crop	insurance	indemnification	from	1990	to	2013.	Recall	
that the NOAA data record 22 droughts that resulted in billion-dollar 
losses between 1980 and 2013. Five droughts occurred between 1980 
and	1989,	and	17	after	1990.	The	results	show	that	crop	indemnifica-
tion payments are closely linked to agricultural output.9 Between 1990 
and 2013, each $1.00 of agricultural output was associated with about 
$0.10	of	indemnification.	Also,	crop	loss	indemnification	has	increased	
substantially relative to crop losses in recent years. Aggregate crop 
insurance	payments	have	definitely	added	 to	 the	financial	 security	of	
U.S. crop farmers. Between 1990 and 2013, crop insurance payments 
became much more important in stabilizing farm income.
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CONCLUSIONS
The severity of drought is closely related to both annual temperature 
and precipitation. Annual precipitation, however, has a more important 
effect in explaining year-to-year variation. The increase in global tem-
peratures	can	significantly	increase	the	probability	of	heavy	precipita-
tion and high heat extremes throughout the world. The results of our 
analysis	in	Chapter	2	show	that	there	is	a	statistically	significant	associ-
ation between major disaster declarations and increasing temperatures 
and precipitation in the United States. The increase in the occurrence of 
adverse weather-related events requires ever-increasing taxpayer dol-
lars	to	finance	the	agencies	responsible	for	improving	our	capability	to	
mitigate them.
From the nine billion-dollar drought-related episodes with state-
level detail explored in this chapter, it is clear that drought was experi-
enced more frequently by states in the interior of the United States and 
less frequently by states along the coasts. Hence, economic losses from 
drought have not been randomly distributed across the individual states.
The federal crop insurance program is an example of a proac-
tive measure undertaken by private and public stakeholders working 
together for effective prevention. As Chapter 3 illustrates, private deliv-
ery of federal assistance is not unprecedented, as other federal programs 
are structured in similar ways. The federal crop insurance program is 
unique in that private companies use a federally designed insurance 
policy to enter into a private contract with agricultural producers. Both 
the federal government and the insurance providers share in the under-
writing performance of the contract. The USDA provides easily acces-
sible information about the likely risks of adverse-weather hazards on 
a crop-by-crop and county-by-county basis. Agricultural producers 
translate the information into risk-related commodity valuations. The 
crop insurance market guides agricultural producers and their decisions 
about which prevention measures to take, and the institutional frame-
work of the federal crop insurance program ensures public involvement 
and oversight that facilitates collective action.
Our regression analysis of the federal crop insurance program does 
not	cover	 the	most	recent	modification,	 the	Agricultural	Act	of	2014.	
The legislation expands the scope of the program by covering a greater 
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share	of	agricultural	losses,	and	makes	other	modifications	that	broaden	
policy coverage. It makes major changes to commodity programs, adds 
new crop insurance options, and expands programs for specialty crops, 
organic farmers, bioenergy, and rural development. Based on our results 
of the program between 1990 and 2013, which showed that federal crop 
insurance has become more important in stabilizing farm income, the 
most	recent	legislation	is	expected	to	be	even	more	significant.
Forecasting, early warning, and compensatory measures such as 
insurance are critical elements of drought risk management. To address 
the underlying factors of drought risk, however, private and public 
stakeholders need to consider other policies, particularly land planning 
and water management.
Notes
 1. In recent years, concern has grown worldwide that drought may be increasing in 
frequency due to climate change. See World Meteorological Organization (n.d.).
  2.  The data are from the NCDC.
   3. Data are not available for Alaska, D.C., and Hawaii for the full 1950–2012 period.
   4. The individual state-level regression results are available from the authors.
   5. The nine years are 1991, 1998, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2013.
   6. This analysis emphasizes annual precipitation for multiyear periods. Simi-
lar results are obtained when either of the drought indices (PDSI or PHDI) is 
examined.
   7. The two exceptions are Montana during 2007–2013 and California during 
2000–2006.
	 8.	 The	GDP	deflator	is	a	measure	of	the	aggregate	price	level.	Price	changes	in	the	
current year are compared to those in a base year for all goods and services pro-
duced	within	 the	economy.	The	 rate	of	change	 in	 the	GDP	deflator	 is	 the	most	
comprehensive	measure	of	inflation.
 9. The regression results are available from the authors. While it would be preferable 
to examine indemnity payments relative to crop output, removing such elements 
as livestock production in agricultural GDP, the available data in the National 
Income and Product Accounts do not provide such a breakdown.
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Wildfires
The	National	Interagency	Fire	Center	(NIFC)	defines	a	wildfire	as	
the	unplanned	ignition	of	a	wildland	fire	(caused	by	lightning,	volca-
noes,	or	unauthorized	or	accidental	human-caused	fires)	 and	escaped	
prescribed	fires.1	As	of	September	2015,	wildfires	had	burned	9.0	mil-
lion acres nationwide, far above the 2003–2012 annual average of 6.2 
million acres. At that time, above-normal temperatures and below-
normal precipitation in the Northwest, accompanied by the long-term 
drought	 in	 Southern	 California,	 led	 to	 above-normal	 fire	 potential	
throughout the region.
Wildfires	have	 always	been	an	 integral	 and	natural	 part	 of	 forest	
ecosystems. Two main factors, however, are changing these ecosys-
tems. First, climate change is contributing to an increased risk of wild-
fires	in	the	United	States.	The	most	recent	national	climate	assessment	
conducted by the U.S. Global Change Research Program (Joyce et al. 
2014)	concludes	that	large	and	intense	fires	will	occur	more	frequently	
due to climate change and increasingly affect western forests in the 
United States. As global temperatures rise, there is an increased likeli-
hood	that	wildfires	will	not	only	be	more	frequent	but	also	more	severe	
(see Joyce et al. [2014]). Moreover, climatic conditions are changing 
the	scale	of	wildfires	and	the	length	of	the	fire	season.	Second,	human	
development	 is	 intensifying	 in	wildfire-prone	 areas.	As	more	 people	
build	homes	in	and	near	wildfire-prone	areas,	individuals	and	families	
are	exposed	to	greater	risks	from	wildfires.	As	a	result,	fire	suppression	
and recovery costs increase.
The	first	section	of	this	chapter	presents	an	overview	of	wildfires	
using statistical information. Information on the incidence and fre-
quency	of	wildfires	can	help	stakeholders	assess	the	risk	from	wildfires	
and further a discussion of the mitigation practices landowners can use. 
The	second	section	examines	the	direct	costs	of	wildfires.	Fire	manage-
ment expenditures include the costs associated with preparedness ahead 
of	the	fire	season,	suppression	or	firefighting	during	the	fire	season,	mea-
sures to reduce vegetation fuel (either through removal or prescribed 
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burns),	and	postfire	rehabilitation.	The	frequency	of	large	wildfires	is	
examined in the third section, and geographic patterns are discussed. 
The	fourth	section	considers	wildfire	management	in	the	federal	bud-
get.	The	final	section	provides	concluding	comments.	Information	on	
the	costs	of	wildfires,	particularly	the	frequency	of	large	wildfires,	can	
help	shape	the	organization	of	fire	suppression	in	the	federal	govern-
ment,	as	well	as	state	and	federal	funding	for	wildland	fire	management.
STATISTICS ON WILDFIRES
According to statistics published by the NIFC, which began in 
1960,	more	than	60,000	wildfires	occur	in	the	United	States	each	year.	
More than 3.0 million acres have burned every year since 1999, and 
the acreage burned each year is increasing. Wildland acreage nation-
wide has been relatively constant since 1910: it decreases whenever 
population growth expands urban development and increases whenever 
former farmland reverts to wildland.2 Although the annual number of 
wildfires	has	not	been	increasing	in	recent	years,	the	acres	burned	per	
fire	have	been	trending	upward	strongly	since	about	1990.
Annual NIFC data show that the United States experienced 5.6 
million	wildfires	between	1960	and	2013.3 During these 54 years, the 
burned area totaled 235.8 million acres, or 362,849 square miles. The 
cumulative acreage burned between 1960 and 2013 is 9.6 percent of the 
total land area of the nation (3.8 million square miles).
Each	year	fires	are	deliberately	set	by	the	various	agencies	respon-
sible	 for	 forest	 and	wildfire	management.	 Federal	 and	 state	 agencies	
work together through the National Cohesive Wildland Fire Manage-
ment	Strategy.	The	main	federal	agencies	are	 the	USDA,	specifically	
the Forest Service, and the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI).4 On 
nonfederal	lands,	states	also	manage	forests	and	fight	wildfires	together	
with county and local jurisdictions.5 While state foresters are respon-
sible	for	managing	wildfires,	they	pay	for	only	a	modest	share	of	fire-
fighting	costs.
The	 primary	 cause	 of	 nonprescribed	wildfires	 is	 human	 activity:	
leaving	 campfires	 unattended,	 burning	 debris,	 negligently	 discarding	
cigarettes, and arson (see Theobald and Romme [2007]). The main 
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natural	cause	of	wildfires	is	lightning:	between	2002	and	2012,	it	was	
responsible	for	14	percent	of	the	823,032	wildfires.	Lightning-caused	
fires,	however,	are	much	larger	on	average	than	nonlightning	fires;	they	
are responsible for 62 percent of total acres burned during the same 11 
years.6	Prescribed	fires	(also	called	controlled	burns)	that	escape	their	
boundaries	constitute	18	percent	of	all	wildfires	in	the	United	States	and	
25 percent of acres burned from 2002 to 2012.7
Figure 8.1 displays data from 1960 to 2013 for three indices: the 
incidence	of	wildfires,	total	acres	burned,	and	the	average	acreage	per	
fire.8 Each series shows the ratio of annual data to its respective 1960–
2013 average. Three important trends are evident over these 54 years. 
First,	the	incidence	of	wildfires	has	not	increased	over	time.	In	fact,	it	
is lower from the mid-1980s through 2013 than from the 1960s through 
the	mid-1980s.	The	index	of	fire	incidence	has	been	below	1.00	since	
1983,	while	all	but	two	pre-1983	indices	exceed	1.00.	Wildfire	occur-
rences were especially numerous between 1976 and 1982. Second, both 
total	acres	burned	and	average	acres	per	fire	have	increased	since	the	
early to mid-1990s. Recently the indices for both measures have often 
Figure	8.1		Indices	of	Wildfires,	1960–2013
SOURCE: NIFC data. 
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exceeded 2.00; that is, twice the 54-year average. Third, the annual data 
for	all	three	series	vary	sharply	year	to	year.	The	coefficient	of	variation	
for each series is approximately 0.50 or larger, indicating a high degree 
of variability from one year to the next.9
The underlying trends become more obvious when multiyear aver-
ages are calculated.10 Using a regression analysis with an equation that 
introduces	 a	 linear	 trend	 starting	 in	 1990,	we	 find	 that	 the	 pre-1990	
average	acreage	per	wildland	fire	was	32.8	acres.	The	1990-trend	coef-
ficient	for	the	regression	is	3.162;	that	is,	an	increase	of	3.162	acres	per	
fire	a	year.	Based	on	this	linear	trend,	the	projected	acreage	per	wildfire	
increased from 32.2 acres in 1989 to 108.1 acres in 2013, or more than 
three times the 1989 level. This single explanatory variable (the 1990 
trend) explains more than half the variation in average acreage per wild-
fire	from	1960	 to	2013.	The	 implications	for	societal	costs	and	other	
consequences	of	fires	are	clear.
Wildfires	display	an	obvious	geographic	pattern.	Most	occur	west	
of the Mississippi River in states with low annual rainfall. On aver-
age, these states are larger than their eastern counterparts, accounting 
for approximately 75 percent of the nation’s land area. From 2002 to 
2013,	55	percent	of	wildfires	occurred	in	western	states,	but	those	fires	
accounted for 93 percent of the acres burned. Table 8.1 summarizes 
the	 distribution	 of	wildfires	 by	U.S.	Census	Bureau	 divisions	 during	
2002–2013. The six data columns show, respectively, for each division 
its	land	area,	the	number	of	fires,	acres	burned,	average	acreage	per	fire,	
and average annual precipitation (from 1951 to 2000).
Chapter	1	notes	 that	we	use	 the	classification	of	 the	U.S.	Census	
Bureau in our presentation of geographic patterns throughout the book. 
The United States is divided into four regions: Northeast, Midwest, 
West, and South. Each of the four census regions is divided into two 
or more census divisions. The former three regions have two census 
divisions while the South region has three. The two divisions in the 
Northeast region are the New England division and the Middle Atlantic 
division; the East North Central division and the West North Central 
division form the Midwest region; and the two divisions in the West 
region	are	 the	Mountain	division	and	 the	Pacific	division.	The	South	
Atlantic division, the East South Central division and the West South 
Central division comprise the South region.
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Table	8.1		Wildfires	by	Census	Bureau	Division,	2002–2013
Census Bureau 
division
Land area, 
square miles
(000s)
(1)
Number 
of	fires
(2)
Fires per 
1,000 square 
miles
(3)
Total area 
burned, square 
miles (000s)
(4)
Average acres 
per	fire
(5)
Annual 
precipitation 
(inches)
(6)
New England 72 36,548 0.512 42.1 1.15 42.88
Middle Atlantic 109 23,468 0.215 113.7 4.84 41.22
South Atlantic 293 209,259 0.714 4,154.0 19.85 49.07
East South Central 183 84,146 0.459 1,515.5 18.01 53.60
West South Central 444 130,043 0.293 9,740.4 74.90 34.87
East North Central 301 38,022 0.126 227.6 5.99 35.19
West North Central 520 67,356 0.129 3,172.9 47.11 26.67
Mountain 864 133,256 0.154 30,781.0 230.99 13.66
Pacific 1,009 143,044 0.142 34,370.9 240.28 25.95
United States 3,796 865,142 0.228 84,118.1 97.23 28.91
NOTE: Annual precipitation is from 1951 to 2000. Divisional precipitation averages are based on the statewide average weighted by the 
land area of the state
SOURCE:	Land	area	from	the	Census	Bureau;	number	of	wildfires	and	acres	burned	from	the	NIFC;	annual	precipitation	from	NOAA.
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In addition to expected relationships, Table 8.1 displays some unex-
pected patterns. For example, the four western Census Bureau divisions 
have the largest land areas: the West South Central, West North Central, 
Mountain,	and	Pacific	divisions	each	exceed	400,000	square	miles.	The	
largest	 number	 of	wildfires	 (209,259),	 however,	 occurs	 in	 the	 South	
Atlantic	 division,	which	 has	 a	fire	 incidence	 rate	 of	 0.714	 per	 1,000	
square miles, approximately three times the national average of 0.228 
per	1,000	square	miles.	Especially	high	fire	incidence	rates	occurred	in	
four	of	the	five	largest	states	of	this	division	(Florida,	Georgia,	North	
Carolina, and South Carolina), all 0.50 per 1,000 square miles.11 In con-
trast,	both	North	Central	divisions	and	the	Mountain	and	Pacific	divi-
sions have average occurrence rates between 0.126 and 0.154.12
Furthermore, precipitation among the South Atlantic states aver-
ages nearly 50 inches a year, the second highest divisional average and 
70 percent above the national average. This observation raises ques-
tions about why a geographic area with so much rainfall has such a high 
wildfire	incidence	rate.
Wildfire	severity,	as	gauged	by	the	average	acres	burned	per	fire,	
shows an expected association with precipitation. Mountain division 
states	have	the	second-highest	average	acres	burned	per	fire	(231)	and	
the lowest annual rainfall (14 inches, less than half the national aver-
age). In contrast, the four divisions where the average annual rainfall is 
above 40 inches all have an average acreage of 20 or fewer acres burned 
per	wildfire.	In	a	simple	cross-section	regression	analysis,	the	associa-
tion	between	average	acreage	burned	per	fire	 (during	2002–2013	 for	
the 48 contiguous states) and annual precipitation is negative and sta-
tistically	significant.13 At the state level, however, the results are more 
varied: only about half the interstate variation is associated with differ-
ences in annual rainfall.
Figure	8.2	vividly	illustrates	the	geographic	variability	of	wildfires.	
Between	2002	and	2013,	total	acreage	burned	by	wildfires	represented	
3.5 percent of the total acreage of the 50 states plus D.C. In 26 states, 
the acreage burned was less than 1 percent of total acreage; 20 of these 
26 states were east of the Mississippi River. Acreage burned in eastern 
states exceeded 1.5 percent of total acreage in just Kentucky, Georgia, 
and Florida. In contrast, all 4 states where burned acreage was above 
6.0 percent, and 11 of the 12 states where burned acreage was above 4.0 
percent were western states.
Wildfires			159
THE DIRECT COSTS OF WILDFIRES
The	many	 wildfires	 and	 the	 acreage	 they	 burn	 entail	 substantial	
costs.	 In	fire	management	expenditures,	Bracmort	 (2013)	 include	 the	
costs	associated	with	preparedness	ahead	of	the	fire	season,	suppression	
or	firefighting	during	the	fire	season,	measures	to	reduce	vegetation	fuel	
(either	through	removal	or	prescribed	burns),	and	postfire	rehabilitation.
The	NIFC	has	published	estimates	of	annual	fire	suppression	costs	
incurred	by	federal	agencies	since	1985.	Federal	fire	suppression	costs	
averaged $371 million a year during 1985–1989 but $1,548 million a 
year during 2009–2013. Of the total federal costs in 2013, the Forest 
Service was responsible for almost 77 percent; the DOI was responsible 
Figure	8.2		Share	of	State	Area	Burned	by	Wildfires,	2002–2013
SOURCE: NIFC data on acres burned by state, 2002–2013 measured as a proportion 
of total state acreage.
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for the remaining 23 percent. Most of the fourfold increase in cost was 
the	result	of	increased	acreage	burned	and	inflation.	The	real	cost	per	
acre in prices of 2009 purchasing power increased 17 percent, from 
$222	in	1985–1989	to	$260	in	2009–2013.	Though	federal	firefighting	
costs have increased, the increase in real terms is mainly the result of an 
increase in acreage burned since the late 1980s.
Figure	8.3	summarizes	the	annual	costs	of	fire	suppression	for	the	
two lead federal agencies in real terms. Fire suppression costs for the 
Forest Service are displayed from 1977, while the total costs for the For-
est Service and DOI are shown from 1985. Two patterns are obvious: the 
large	increase	in	fire	suppression	costs	since	2000	and	the	wide	year-to-
year variability. Note also that total federal costs exceeded $1.5 billion 
in 9 of the 14 years since 2000 but not once in the years before 2000.
A	 second	 component	 of	 total	 firefighting	 costs	 is	 expenditure	
incurred by state agencies. These costs are less easily estimated because 
of	the	large	number	of	state	and	local	agencies	with	wildfire	suppression	
responsibilities. A recent analysis by the Union of Concerned Scientists, 
Figure 8.3  Federal Fire Suppression Costs, 1977–2013 (billions of 2013 
dollars)
SOURCE: NIFC and Bracmort (2013, Figure 2).
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however,	shows	that	state	spending	on	fire	management	nearly	matched	
federal	 spending	on	fire	 suppression	 in	1998,	2002,	2004,	2006,	 and	
2008	 (the	 five	 years	 covered	 in	 our	 analysis).14 Because assembling 
state-level data is a major undertaking, it is not obvious how state 
spending compares to federal spending over the long run. Also, since 
the states receive substantial reimbursements from the federal partner 
for	firefighting	costs,	estimating	net	state-financed	firefighting	costs	are	
challenging.	The	federal	share	of	total	fire	suppression	costs	exceeds	50	
percent, but it may or may not reach 60 percent.
THE FREQUENCY OF LARGE WILDFIRES
While	 there	 is	 no	universal	 definition	of	what	 constitutes	 a	 large	
wildfire,	at	least	three	data	series	could	be	useful:	one	from	FEMA	and	
two	from	the	NIFC.	Chapter	1	notes	 that	FEMA	makes	fire	manage-
ment assistance declarations after a state submits a request because a 
single	fire	(or	a	group	of	fires)	is	large	enough	to	pose	a	“threat	of	major	
disaster.” The agency responds to these requests expeditiously; a deci-
sion is often rendered within hours of the appeal. The Fire Management 
Assistance Grant Program provides a federal cost-share of 75 percent 
of	the	allowable	costs	of	firefighting.	Allowable	costs	include	the	costs	
of	field	camps;	equipment	use,	repair	and	replacement;	tools,	materials,	
and supplies; and mobilization and demobilization activities.
The	FEMA	data	on	fire	management	assistance	declarations	com-
menced	in	1970.	Between	1970	and	2013,	FEMA	made	1,049	fire	man-
agement assistance declarations. These declarations fall into two broad 
periods. Between 1970 and 1993, FEMA consistently made fewer than 
10 declarations a year. Starting in 1994, the agency averaged 48 decla-
rations	a	year.	These	declarations	refer	to	major	fire	events	that	involve	
large costs of suppression and other factors, such as the value of lost 
timber and crops. The agency does not, however, estimate the total 
costs	of	its	fire-related	declarations.
On	occasion,	a	wildfire	grows	and	becomes	large	enough	for	FEMA	
to make a major disaster declaration. Between 1970 and 2013, FEMA 
declared	35	wildfires	as	major	disasters.	In	addition,	FEMA	classified	
15	wildfires	as	emergency	declarations,	which	are	smaller	than	major	
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disasters	 but	 of	 sufficient	 scale	 that	 states	 are	 reimbursed	 for	 certain	
fire	suppression	costs.	These	declarations	can	be	considered	large	fires.	
Note that the 1,099 FEMA declarations between 1970 and 2013 repre-
sent	0.025	percent	of	the	4,443,165	wildfires	reported	by	NIFC	over	the	
same period.
Two	 measures	 of	 large	 wildfires	 are	 available	 from	 NIFC	 data.	
Between	1950	and	2013,	there	were	52	“historically	significant	wild-
land	fires;”	only	4	occurred	before	1970.	Among	historically	significant	
fires,	9	resulted	in	major	disaster	declarations	and	15	as	fire	manage-
ment	assistance	declarations	by	FEMA.	The	NIFC	also	identified	154	
wildfires	since	1997	that	burned	100,000	or	more	acres.	Of	that	group,	
58 had burned more than 200,000 acres.
The	three	groupings	of	large	fires	show	similar	patterns	in	both	their	
timing and their geographic locus. Table 8.2 reinforces points made ear-
lier,	but	now	with	specific	reference	to	large	wildfires	as	recorded	by	
both FEMA and the NIFC for the years from 1970–2013. Two patterns, 
both	discussed	earlier,	are	obvious	 in	Table	8.2.	First,	 large	wildfires	
became more frequent after 1989. There were from three to six times 
as	many	large	wildfires	during	1990–1999	than	during	1980–1989.	In	
addition,	there	were	more	large	wildfires	from	2010	to	2013	than	during	
the 1970s and 1980s combined. More than likely, drought conditions 
will	only	add	to	the	frequency	of	wildfires	and	increase	the	associated	
costs	 of	 fire	 suppression	 and	 recovery.	 Second,	 wildfires	 are	mainly	
a	western	phenomenon;	 the	 incidence	of	 large	fires	 is	higher	 in	both	
the	Mountain	and	Pacific	divisions.	This	pattern	 is	 related	 to	 the	 low	
precipitation received by sizable areas of the states in these divisions, 
increasing	the	risk	of	large	acreage	burned	per	fire.
As noted in the introduction, more people have built or are build-
ing	homes	in	and	near	wildfire-prone	areas.	As	a	consequence,	they	are	
exposed	to	higher	risks	from	fires	and	greater	recovery	costs.	Radeloff	
et	 al.	 (2005)	 and	Theobald	 and	Romme	 (2007)	 find	 that,	 in	 the	 past	
50	years,	development	near	wildland	areas	has	expanded	significantly.	
Population growth, housing preferences, and the increasing number 
of vacation homes are contributing to these development trends. The 
intersection of wildlands and urban environments is known as the 
wildland-urban interface (WUI). According to Botts et al. (2013), in 
2008 approximately 40 percent of the 115 million single-family homes 
in the United States were in the WUI. Housing development in and 
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near	wildfire-prone	forested	areas	raises	the	exposure	to	both	the	risks	
of	wildfires	and	their	costs,	and	it	requires	spending	more	resources	on	
fire	suppression.
Theobald and Romme (2007) assert that nearly 90 percent of the 
developed areas located in or near forests are privately owned, and 
nearly	two-thirds	of	this	land	area	is	at	high	risk	for	wildfires.	Develop-
ment in and near the WUI has increased the costs for federal agencies 
that	help	provide	financial	and	 technical	assistance	 to	 state	and	 local	
agencies	for	wildfire	protection.
The	costs	associated	with	wildfires	are	substantial.	Two	main	fac-
tors	affect	these	costs:	the	size	of	a	wildfire	and	how	much	private	prop-
erty	 is	damaged.	Direct	fire	 suppression	costs,	however,	 significantly	
underestimate	the	total	costs	of	a	wildfire.	Other	fire-related	costs,	such	
as presuppression costs, disaster relief expenditures, timber losses, 
tourism-related losses, human health effects, and damage to ecosys-
tems	can	greatly	exceed	the	direct	costs	of	fire	suppression.	Butry	et	al.	
Table 8.2  Geographic Locus of Large Fires by Decade and Area, 
1970–2013
Fire management
assistance and 
other declarations
Historically 
significant	
wildland	fires
Wildland	fires	that	
burned 100,000 
or more acres
Large	fires	by	decade
1970–1979 41 4 n/a
1980–1989 38 5 n/a
1990–1999 231 16 n/a
2000–2009 571 11 103
2010–2013 218 12 40
Large	fires	by	Census	 
Bureau division
East 115 4 5
West North Central 38 2 1
West South Central 332 2 12
Mountain 310 25 59
Pacific 304 15 66
NOTE: n/a = not available.
SOURCE: Fire management assistance and other declarations data from FEMA; other 
data from the NIFC. 
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(2001)	find	that	in	some	cases	these	other	categories	of	costs	may	not	be	
fully	evident	until	years	after	the	suppression	of	a	fire.
Wildfire	 protection	 efforts	 are	 weighted	 toward	 fire	 suppression,	
which take up a major share of agency budgets. While the protection 
of natural resources and property is important, the overarching priority 
in	wildfire	management	 is	 human	 safety.	According	 to	 the	Office	 of	
the Inspector General (2006, p. ii), an audit of Forest Service expen-
ditures	 found	 that	 the	majority	 of	 the	 costs	 of	 putting	out	 large	fires	
are “directly linked to protecting private property in the WUI.” More-
over,	one	response	to	the	worsening	wildfire	situation	has	been	a	shift	
of	financial	resources	from	investment	in	long-term	forest	management	
and	forest	health	that	would	lower	the	risk	of	future	wildfires	to	fire	sup-
pression.	With	the	cost	of	fire	suppression	often	exceeding	actual	bud-
get	allocations	in	the	severe	wildfire	seasons	of	recent	years,	the	Forest	
Service	 has	 borrowed	 from	nonsuppression	 or	 even	nonfire	manage-
ment budget lines (see Tidwell [2013]). In addition, budget constraints 
have delayed the acquisition of lands for conservation purposes and 
reduced the expenditure on other maintenance programs. The realloca-
tion	of	resources	to	fire	suppression	activities	from	other	intended	uses	
is	commonly	termed	“fire	borrowing.”
Another	 response	 to	 the	worsening	wildfire	situation	has	been	an	
increased reliance on supplemental emergency appropriations from 
Congress. Cleetus and Mulik (2014) report that in 2012 and 2013 the 
Obama administration removed more than $1.0 billion from other pro-
gram	accounts	and	transferred	the	funds	to	fire	suppression.	Recent	leg-
islative proposals, as well as the administration’s 2014 budget, would 
change	the	way	federal	wildfire	costs	are	funded	and	create	a	separate	
emergency	fund	dedicated	to	fire	suppression.	In	2013,	Senators	Ron	
Wyden	and	Mike	Crapo	proposed	legislation	to	increase	funding	for	fire	
suppression	(S.	1875,	or	the	Wildfire	Disaster	Funding	Act	of	2013)	and	
Senators John McCain, John Barrasso, and Jeff Flake proposed similar 
legislation in 2014 (S. 2593, the FLAME Act Amendments of 2014). 
In	an	environment	of	tight	budgets,	however,	rising	wildfire	costs	will	
continue	to	pose	a	major	fiscal	challenge.
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WILDFIRE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET
Table	8.3	summarizes	federal	appropriations	for	wildfire	manage-
ment	spanning	fiscal	years	2008	 to	2013.	The	 table	divides	activities	
into	 five	 subaccounts.	 The	 data	 are	 derived	 from	 a	 relatively	 recent	
report by Bracmort (2013) that separates the details for both Forest 
Service	and	DOI	wildfire	activities.	The	subaccounts	for	preparedness	
and hazardous fuels encompass various activities designed to prevent 
and	limit	the	scope	of	wildfires,	such	as	firefighter	training,	equipment	
acquisition,	reducing	fuel	loads	in	fire-prone	areas,	and	rehabilitation	of	
fire-damaged	areas.	Their	combined	appropriations	exceeded	 that	 for	
the suppression subaccount ($9.436 billion versus $6.860 billion) over 
the six years examined. Emergency and other ad hoc budget increments 
for	fire	suppression	during	these	years,	however,	totaled	fully	half	of	the	
original amounts budgeted for suppression costs.
“Fire	borrowing”	 transfers	financial	 resources	 from	 the	prepared-
ness	and	hazardous	fuels	subaccounts	for	use	in	fire	suppression.	This	
practice effectively reduces activities related to forest management, 
forest restoration, and land acquisition. Both the 2013 Wyden-Crapo 
proposal (S. 1875) and the 2014 McCain-Barrasso-Flake proposal (S. 
2593)	would	provide	explicit	and	enhanced	funds	for	fire	suppression,	
Table	8.3		Federal	Wildfire	Management	Appropriations,	Fiscal	Years	
2008–2013
Total 
appropriation
($ billions)
Budget 
shares
Preparedness 6.394 0.308
Hazardous fuels 3.043 0.147
Suppression 6.860 0.033
Emergency and other suppression costsa 3.453 0.166
All other costs 1.009 0.049
Total 20.759 1.000
a Emergency appropriations and Federal Land Assistance, Management and Enhance-
ment	(FLAME)	Wildfire	Suppression	Reserve	Fund	appropriations	net	of	recessions	
and use of prior year funds.
SOURCE: Bracmort (2013, Table 5).
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protect	the	other	subaccounts,	and	end	fire	borrowing.	Neither	bill	has	
been enacted.
CONCLUSIONS
Private local development complicates decisions about how to man-
age our wildland in many ways. Urban development not only elimi-
nates some trees and forests, but it also increases population density, 
human activities, and urban infrastructure. State and local zoning poli-
cies continue to allow development in the WUI. The fact that most of 
the	firefighting	costs	are	borne	by	the	federal	government,	while	local	
authorities and developers decide where and how much to build in 
wildfire-prone	areas,	creates	a	misalignment	of	incentives.	Indeed,	local	
zoning policies may encourage development in high-risk areas, reduce 
the	incentive	for	homeowners	to	fireproof	their	homes	and	properties,	
increase	firefighting	costs,	and	exacerbate	the	physical	risk	to	firefight-
ers. As a result, federal taxpayer funds are not being used effectively 
to	manage	wildlands	and	build	resilience	to	wildfires	because	they	are	
heavily	directed	at	fire	suppression.
Risk	is	defined	as	 the	probability	of	an	adverse	event	(or	hazard)	
occurring	that	causes	physical	harm	or	financial	losses.	In	the	context	of	
wildfires,	risk	is	increasing	in	part	because	of	changing	climatic	condi-
tions. The risk is compounded by a moral hazard problem: local deci-
sion makers (governments and homeowners) may make choices that 
result in a greater exposure to risk because they do not pay the full 
costs of those choices. For example, decisions to permit development in 
wildfire-prone	areas	are	made	by	local	zoning	authorities.	This	develop-
ment,	however,	can	result	 in	greater	firefighting	costs,	most	of	which	
are paid by federal taxpayers.
A	key	element	in	reducing	threats	to	the	WUI	and	restoring	fire	to	
its natural role in the environment is community education and involve-
ment.	Mitigating	 the	 risks	 from	 wildfires	 requires	 a	 combination	 of	
active measures, which include actions that reduce the risk itself (such 
as	limiting	the	chances	of	wildfire	damage	through	fuels	management	
and	fireproofing	measures	in	homes	and	communities),	limit	exposure	
to	risk	(such	as	limiting	development	in	wildfire-prone	areas	and	buy-
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ing	insurance	protection),	and	provide	financial	resources	to	help	peo-
ple	recover	from	fires	(such	as	disaster	assistance	or	insurance	payouts).
Homeowners share responsibility for protecting themselves and 
their property. In many states, however, this responsibility is voluntary 
and not enforced by statewide law or insurance company practices. Cal-
ifornia is one of the few states with strict statewide building codes and 
fire	codes	that	apply	to	communities	in	wildfire-prone	areas.
Why encourage mitigation in building regulations? Adherence to 
model building codes can mean the difference between life and death 
or	whether	homes	remain	standing	or	are	completely	destroyed	by	fire.	
The evidence that mitigation can save lives and reduce costs is more 
than anecdotal. Model building codes can offer enhanced protection 
against the threats of disasters to make communities more resilient, sus-
tainable, and livable for generations to come (see Vaughan and Turner 
[2013]). Such codes lower the price of mitigation for building own-
ers. Other states, particularly western states, should follow California’s 
lead.
Notes
	 1.	 A	wildland	is	defined	as	land	that	is	not	cultivated	or	not	suitable	for	cultivation.	
Wildlands include forests, shrublands, grasslands, and other types of natural eco-
systems.	A	prescribed	fire	is	a	wildland	fire	originating	from	a	planned	ignition	to	
meet	the	objectives	specified	in	a	preapproved,	written	prescribed	fire	plan.
 2.  Forest area has been relatively stable since 1910, although the population has 
more than tripled since then. See Oswalt and Smith (2014).
	 3.	 “Total	 Wildland	 Fires	 and	 Acres”	 (1960–2015)	 https://www.nifc.gov/fireInfo/ 
fireInfo_stats_totalFires.html	(accessed	July	20,	2016).
	 4.	 To	 be	 specific,	 five	 federal	 agencies	 manage	 and	 have	 primary	 fire	 program	
responsibilities: 1) the Bureau of Land Management, 2) the National Park Service, 
3) the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 4) the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the U.S. 
Department of the Interior; and 5) the Forest Service in the USDA.
	 5.	 The	U.S.	Fire	Administration	works	with	county	and	local	fire	departments;	the	
National Association of State Foresters represents the states. The state, county, and 
local	jurisdictions	provide	primary	fire	protection	on	nonfederal	public	and	private	
lands across all 50 states.
 6. The NIFC recently changed its nomenclature; what was previously termed human-
caused fires is now nonlightning	fires.
	 7.	 Statistical	information	on	prescribed	fires	in	the	United	States	has	only	been	pub-
lished since 2002 by the NIFC.
 8. The National Interagency Coordination Center at the NIFC compiles annual wild-
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land	fire	statistics	for	federal	and	state	agencies.	As	the	statistics	before	1983	were	
not derived from the current reporting process, information before 1983 should 
not be compared to subsequent data.
	 9.	 The	coefficient	of	variation	is	the	ratio	of	the	standard	deviation	to	the	mean.
	10.	 For	 example,	 acres	 per	 fire	 averaged	 39.8	 during	 1980–1989	 but	 96.6	 during	
2002–2013.
 11. The states in the South Atlantic Division are Delaware, D.C., Florida, Georgia, 
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia.
 12. The states in the East North Central division are Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, 
and Wisconsin; in the West North Central division are Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota. The states in the Mountain 
division are Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and 
Wyoming;	and	the	Pacific	division	are	Alaska,	California,	Hawaii,	Oregon,	and	
Washington.
 13. Alaska, D.C., and Hawaii were not included in the analysis due to lack of long-
term average precipitation data. 
 14. Expressed in 2013 dollars, state spending totaled $7.7 billion while federal spend-
ing totaled $8.0 billion. See Cleetus and Mulik (2014, Figure 7).
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Geological and Man-Made Disasters
The two least common categories of disaster-related declarations 
used	 by	 FEMA	 are	 geological	 and	 man-made.	 This	 classification	 is	
somewhat different from the terminology used by the UNISDR, which 
aims to promote common usage of disaster risk reduction concepts in 
order to assist in the disaster risk reduction efforts of stakeholders. Both 
FEMA and the UNISDR classify geological processes or phenomena 
in the same way; they include internal earth processes, such as earth-
quakes, volcanic activity, and emissions, and related geophysical pro-
cesses, such as landslides, rockslides, and surface collapses. Instead of 
man-made, the UNISDR uses technological; that is, a disaster origi-
nating from technological or industrial conditions, including accidents, 
dangerous	procedures,	infrastructure	failures,	or	specific	human	activi-
ties. Examples of technological hazards include chemical spills, dam 
failures,	 fires,	 factory	 explosions,	 industrial	 pollution,	 nuclear	 radia-
tion, transport accidents, and toxic wastes.
Under man-made disasters, FEMA lists chemical/biological, dam/
levee breaks, explosions, radiation leaks, technological, terrorism, and 
virus threats. Nationwide, there were 38 geological and 22 man-made 
major disasters between 1953 and 2014. Combined, they averaged 
about one occurrence each year during these six decades. Humans can-
not usually predict geological disasters, but man-made disasters can be 
avoided and prevented.
While geological and man-made disasters have been infrequent, the 
associated DUA weeks compensated for three of them ranked in the top 
15 of the disasters that occurred between 1983 and 2014. As noted in 
Chapter 3, information on DUA only commences in 1983. One of these 
three top-ranked events was the civil unrest that erupted on April 29, 
1992,	in	Los	Angeles.	This	event	is	classified	by	FEMA	as	California 
Fire During a Period of Civil Unrest (DR-942), with an incident period 
from April 29, 1992, to May 28, 1992. The major disaster declaration 
was made on May 2, 1992. Fifty-two people lost their lives when vio-
lent mobs stormed through the city of Los Angeles. When the rioting 
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was over, approximately 2,500 people were injured and an estimated 
$1.0 billion in property was damaged.1
The second event was the California Northridge Earthquake (DR-
1008). The incident period was January 17, 1994, to November 30, 
1994, with the major disaster declaration made on January 17, 1994. 
The third event was the New York Terrorist Attack (DR-1391). The inci-
dent period was September 11, 2001, with a major disaster declared the 
same day.
This chapter begins by considering the 38 major disasters based on 
three geological hazards between 1953 and 2014: earthquakes, volcanic 
eruptions,	and	tsunamis.	The	focus	of	the	discussion	is	on	these	specific	
geological hazards and does not consider the related geophysical pro-
cesses, which would include disasters associated with landslides, mud-
slides, meteorology, and oceanography. The second section examines 
the 22 man-made major disasters between 1953 and 2014. The eco-
nomic losses associated with these disasters are outlined in this section 
together with the weeks compensated under the DUA program. Gener-
ally,	nearly	all	the	man-made	disasters	have	resulted	in	modest	finan-
cial losses compared to catastrophic natural disasters. The third section 
examines the role of private insurance in covering geological risk. In 
California, for example, about 20 private insurance carriers sell and 
service earthquake insurance policies. Similarly, the provision of insur-
ance against man-made risks has remained within the domain of private 
insurance, discussed in the fourth section of the chapter. In contrast, 
terrorism insurance arrangements since the September 11, 2001, attacks 
have seen the addition of a major element of government participa-
tion. The chapter then looks at the provision of terrorism insurance and 
the legislation associated with its delivery, and ends with concluding 
comments.
GEOLOGICAL DISASTERS
Three types of geological hazards—earthquakes, volcanic erup-
tions, and tsunamis—resulted in 38 major disaster declarations since 
1953, with earthquakes accounting for 27 of them. As stated above, the 
discussion in this section focuses on geological events.2 The vast major-
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ity	(32	of	38)	of	these	events	occurred	in	the	five	states	in	the	Pacific	
division, with California and Hawaii accounting for 14 and 10 events, 
respectively.
 1) Earthquakes. Three major disasters due to a geological hazard 
occurred east of the Mississippi River, and all three were earth-
quakes.3 One was the New York Earthquake (DR-1415), with 
the incident occurring on April 20, 2002, and the major disaster 
declaration made on May 16, 2002. The second and third dec-
larations were made for the same earthquake event. The inci-
dent period for the Virginia Earthquake (DR-4042) was from 
August 23, 2011, to October 25, 2011, with the major disaster 
declaration made on November 04, 2011. The third was the 
District of Columbia (DC) Earthquake (DR-4044), with an 
incident period of August 23, 2011, to August 28, 2011; the 
major disaster declaration was made on November 08, 2011.
	 2)	 Volcanic	 eruptions.	 Three	 of	 the	 five	 volcanic	 eruptions	
occurred in Hawaii, but the Mount St. Helens eruption of 1980 
resulted in major disaster declarations in two states, Idaho and 
Washington. The incident period of the Washington Volcanic 
Eruption, Mt. St. Helens (DR-623) was May 21, 1980, and its 
major disaster declaration was made on May 21; the Idaho 
Volcanic Eruption, Mt. St. Helens (DR-624) has an incident 
period of May 22, 1980, and a major disaster declaration on 
May 22.
 3) Tsunamis. A tsunami is a great sea wave that originates from 
a submarine earth movement or volcanic eruption. The six 
tsunami-related declarations were declared for Hawaii (three 
in the state), California (two), and Alaska (one).
Thus, all three types of geological hazards that led to disaster dec-
larations	 were	 concentrated	 in	 the	 five	 states	 that	 border	 the	 Pacific	
Ocean. To date, the post-1953 disasters originating from geological 
hazards have been of modest scale in terms of their effects on economic 
output. Not one of these events incurred more than $1.0 billion in esti-
mated costs as measured by the NOAA billion-dollar disasters between 
1980 and 2013. The two most serious events from available data on 
DUA weeks compensated were the California Loma Prieta Earthquake 
(DR-845) and the California Northridge Earthquake (DR-1008). The 
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Loma Prieta earthquake had an incident period of October 17, 1989, to 
December 18, 1989, with 16,262 weeks compensated in the DUA pro-
gram. The Northridge earthquake had an incident period of January 17, 
1994, to November 30, 1994, with DUA weeks compensated of 81,405. 
Since the DUA data on weeks compensated are available only since 
1983, it is possible that the Mount St. Helens volcanic eruption of 1980 
or some other pre-1983 disaster may have caused a larger number of 
DUA weeks compensated and/or had estimated costs of more than $1.0 
billion. From the available data, however, it is clear that the disasters 
originating from geological hazards of the past six decades have had 
relatively smaller consequences compared to other disasters, such as 
hurricanes and drought.
MAN-MADE DISASTERS
While geological disasters fall into obvious categories, man-made 
disasters take a wider variety of forms. As stated above, FEMA lists 
chemical/biological, dam/levee breaks, explosions, radiation leaks, 
technological, terrorism, and virus threats as possible man-made disas-
ters.	Our	 discussion	 of	 22	major	 disasters	 since	 1953	 identifies	 four	
categories:	 flooding	 from	 dam	 and	 levee	 failures	 (10	 events),	 large	
industrial	 accidents	 (3	 events),	 large	 urban	 fires	 (including	 domestic	
disturbances, 5 events) and terrorist acts (4 counts). The four terror-
ist acts were the New York World Trade Center Explosion (DR-984) 
on February 26, 1993, with the major disaster declaration on April 02, 
1993; the Oklahoma Explosion at Federal Courthouse in Oklahoma 
City (DR-1048) on April 19, 1995, with the major disaster declaration 
on April 26, 1995; and the simultaneous major disaster declarations on 
September 11, 2001, for the New York Terrorist Attack (DR-1391) and 
the Virginia Terrorist Attack (DR-1392).
The two September 11, 2001, major disasters incurred more than 
$200	billion	 in	financial	 costs.4 The estimated costs of the other two 
events fell below the $1.0 billion threshold used by NOAA in their clas-
sification	of	billion-dollar	disasters.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	FEMA	
classified	the	Boston	Marathon	bombing	of	April	2013	as	an	emergency	
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declaration and not as a major disaster: Massachusetts Explosions (EM-
3362), emergency declaration declared on April 17, 2013.
Nearly all the man-made disaster declarations in the FEMA histori-
cal	record	have	relatively	modest	estimated	financial	costs.	Eight	of	the	
22 events occurred after DUA compensation data for individual major 
disasters became available in 1983. The two major disaster events on 
September 11, 2001, caused 74,857 DUA weeks compensated (ranking 
11th in DUA weeks compensated) and $13.9 million in DUA payments.5 
The	Los	Angeles	civil	disturbances	and	fires	(DR-942)	of	1992	caused	
69,584 DUA weeks compensated and $6.0 million in DUA payments. 
The total estimated cost of this event may or may not have been less 
than $1.0 billion. Since the NOAA loss estimates are measured in terms 
of	2013	dollars,	the	inflation	factor	would	be	1.66	times	the	actual	costs	
measured in 1992 prices. Regardless of the estimate from this 1992 
event, it is obvious that the costs of the September 11, 2001, disaster 
events were very large, larger even than those arising from Hurricane 
Katrina, which NOAA estimated to be $149 billion (2013 dollars). The 
single disaster on September 11, 2001, resulted in estimated costs of 
between	one-fourth	and	one-fifth	of	all	the	billion-dollar	natural	disas-
ters between 1980 and 2013.
Terrorist acts in the United States between 1953 and 2014 have been 
limited to the four incidents previously noted. Two other potential types 
of	man-made	major	disasters,	however,	can	also	be	identified:	nuclear,	
biological, chemical, and radiological (NBCR); and cyber. Accidents or 
deliberate acts in any of these NBCR risk areas could potentially trig-
ger a major disaster. To date, the partial meltdown of the nuclear power 
plant at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, in 1979 has been the most 
serious nuclear power incident on record in the United States. While 
this	man-made	disaster	was	not	classified	by	FEMA	as	a	major	disaster,	
there was a major evacuation in the area around Three Mile Island and 
the plant was eventually closed. There have been other domestic inci-
dents involving nuclear power plants that could have had more disas-
trous outcomes.6
An analysis of the potential hazards associated with the storage 
of chemicals in six midwestern states was recently completed by the 
Center for Effective Government (2015). An explosion at a fertilizer 
plant	in	West,	Texas,	in	2013	that	killed	10	first	responders	prompted	
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increased awareness of chemical hazards. In its report, the Center for 
Effective	Government	identified	more	than	3,000	sites	in	the	six	mid-
western states with large volumes of stored chemicals and included sev-
eral recommendations to assure greater safety of stored chemicals.
An increase in measles cases linked to an amusement park in Cali-
fornia in 2015 is the most recent example of disease-related risks in the 
United States. Although the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) does not identify the source, the outbreak probably origi-
nated with a person who became infected with measles while overseas 
and then visited the amusement park while contagious. That year, 189 
people from 24 states and D.C. were reported to have measles. Since 
the CDC announced measles elimination in 2000, the largest number of 
cases was in 2014, with 667 cases in 27 states.7
In April 2016 the CDC reported 358 cases of travel-associated 
Zika virus in the 50 states and D.C., but the number of locally acquired 
vector-borne cases is zero.8 In American Samoa, Puerto Rico, and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands the CDC reported 475 Zika virus cases: 4 travel-
associated cases and 471 locally acquired vector-borne cases.
Earlier	 examples	 of	 disease-related	 risks	 include	 the	 Spanish	 flu	
pandemic of 1918, the polio epidemic of the early 1950s, and the HIV/
AIDS epidemic in the 1980s. In short, biological risks are always poten-
tially present as pathogens evolve, develop immunities to vaccines, and 
hinder public health interventions.
A technology company’s experience in 2014 offers a vivid example 
of cyber risks. A group calling itself the Guardians of Peace hacked its 
way into Sony Pictures, taking valuable insider information and leaving 
the Sony network inoperable for days. As the U.S. economy evolves 
toward increased reliance on information technology and the Internet, 
these risks seem slated to grow in the foreseeable future. More broadly, 
avoidance of NBCR risks will become increasingly important as the 
U.S. economy continues to evolve. Insuring against geological and 
man-made disasters will undoubtedly constitute an important element 
in our defense against these various risks.
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INSURANCE AGAINST GEOLOGICAL DISASTERS
Private markets exist for the purchase of insurance against geologi-
cal risks. In California, for example, about 20 private insurance carriers 
sell and service earthquake insurance policies, which are sold as add-
ons to basic homeowners insurance policies. Premium rates vary by 
geographic area within the state. 
Oversight of earthquake insurance is the responsibility of the Cali-
fornia	Earthquake	Authority	(CEA),	a	public,	not-for-profit	entity	estab-
lished with private funding in 1996 following the Northridge earthquake 
of	1994.	The	CEA	has	a	five-person	governing	board	with	three	voting	
members (the governor, the state treasurer, and the insurance commis-
sioner), and two nonvoting members (the speaker of the assembly, and 
the chair of the Senate Rules Committee). Policies can be purchased 
through CEA or with private carriers. About three-quarters of the 
approximately 800,000 insured Californian homeowners have cover-
age through CEA policies. The authority also educates and encourages 
homeowners to increase preparedness for future earthquakes. Thus, its 
mission encompasses education and other measures to promote resil-
iency as well as property-loss protection.
Insurance protection against most types of man-made disasters can 
also be secured through private insurance carriers. The federal gov-
ernment, however, oversees insurance against terrorist acts. Terrorism 
insurance is discussed in later in this chapter.
INSURANCE AGAINST MAN-MADE DISASTERS
As noted above, man-made disasters can result from deliberate acts 
such	as	a	terrorist	bombing	or	from	an	accident.	Only	five	notable	inci-
dents of successful terrorist acts have occurred in the United States since 
1993.9 It should also be observed that the distinction between geologi-
cal	and	man-made	disasters	is	somewhat	artificial.	Thirty-four	nuclear	
reactors in the United States are located downstream from a large dam 
(see Lochbaum, Lyman, and Strahan [2014]). For example, three reac-
tors of the Oconee Nuclear Power Plant in South Carolina are down-
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stream from the Jocassee Dam on the Keowee River. If an earthquake 
were	to	breach	the	dam	and	flood	the	power	facility,	then	the	cause	of	
the disaster would have both geological and man-made elements.
Catastrophic losses from geological disasters, such as earthquakes, 
and man-made disasters, such as nuclear radiation and terrorism, have 
affected the willingness of private insurers to provide coverage against 
these perils. Insurance arrangements currently exist for two types of 
man-made	 disasters	 identified	 previously:	 NBCR	 risks,	 including	
nuclear accidents and cyber attacks. All providers of nuclear power are 
required to purchase accident insurance from private carriers. Insurance 
coverage of the other components of NBCR risks can be purchased 
through private carriers who quote rates for the separate NBCR risks. 
Insurance against cyber attacks can be purchased as part of a com-
mercial property insurance policy. The extent of coverage is not fully 
known, but it is believed to exceed half of all companies with a higher 
coverage	rate	among	larger	firms.
Because the historical experience of losses from NBCR and cyber 
incidents has been limited, and losses have not been “large,” provision 
of insurance against these risks has remained within the domain of pri-
vate insurance. In contrast, since September 11, terrorism insurance 
arrangements have changed, with the addition of a major element of 
government participation. 
TERRORISM INSURANCE
Prior to the 2001 attacks, private insurance carriers provided insur-
ance against terrorist acts as part of standard commercial property 
insurance	policies.	The	cost	of	coverage	for	this	specific	risk	was	not	
explicitly shown in these policies. The attacks resulted in $44 billion of 
insured losses for insurance carriers and their reinsurers.10 Following 
these attacks, carriers started to exclude terrorist acts from coverage, 
which	exerted	a	negative	influence	on	new	commercial	and	real	estate	
investments.
Against this background, the U.S. Congress passed and the presi-
dent signed into law the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA). There 
were two main provisions in the legislation. First, carriers were man-
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dated to offer terrorism coverage in their commercial insurance policies 
and on the same terms as other insurance risks. Second, the legislation 
established a loss-sharing arrangement among three parties: companies, 
insurance carriers, and the federal government.
The	legislation	was	planned	as	a	short-run	“fix”	to	assure	coverage	
of businesses and to provide time for the insurance industry to develop 
private coverage vehicles. These expected developments did not occur, 
and the original law was succeeded by extensions enacted in 2005, 
2007, and 2015. The most recent legislation of January 2015 extended 
TRIA to the end of December 2020. Four important provisions of TRIA 
were amended. First, the primary administrative responsibility resides 
with the U.S. Treasury Department. Second, the composition of the 
three-person	committee	that	makes	the	determination	(certification)	of	
whether an incident is a terrorist act replaced the secretary of state with 
the secretary of homeland security. the composition of the committee 
in the 2002 legislation was the secretary of the treasury, the attorney 
general, and the secretary of state.  
Third,	provisions	in	the	legislation	define	a	set	of	financial	thresh-
olds: a minimum threshold for what constitutes a terrorist act, a mini-
mum threshold for federal participation in the compensation of survi-
vors of the terrorist act, a deductible level covered by insurance carriers, 
and a government-carrier sharing formula for losses that exceed the 
deductible. The 2015 extension placed all these thresholds on a sliding 
scale so that their levels in 2020 are considerably higher than in 2015. 
The federal share above the deductible threshold is to gradually decline 
from 85 percent in 2015 to 80 percent in 2020. Finally, TRIA is intended 
to be budget neutral. Federal government compensation to claimants is 
to be recouped through later assessments on insurance carriers.
The provision of terrorist insurance faces multiple challenges. The 
infrequency of terrorist acts means potential losses are highly indeter-
minate, making it uncertain how to appropriately price terrorist insur-
ance policies. In addition, coverage boundaries are not clear. Workers’ 
compensation	and	fire	insurance	are	probably	liable	for	certain	losses	
that arise from terrorist acts. A successful cyber attack might be covered 
by cyber insurance. Furthermore, basic information on terrorist insur-
ance coverage, costs, and pricing is incomplete. The 2015 TRIA legisla-
tion	mandates	the	Government	Accountability	Office	to	conduct	studies	
to close these various information gaps.
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It is currently estimated that TRIA covers about 60 percent of pri-
vate	 employers.	The	Government	Accountability	Office	 (2014)	 finds	
that the price of terrorist insurance policies has stabilized since 2010, 
and premiums are relatively constant at about 2.0 percent of overall 
property insurance premiums. It appears that TRIA has stabilized in 
recent years.
CONCLUSIONS
With guiding principles from the government, the insurance indus-
try could provide insurance against the full range of geological and 
man-made disasters. The information presented here indicates that geo-
logical and man-made disasters are low-probability events; therefore, 
providing insurance for them is a particular challenge. Because decision- 
makers have limited experience with low-probability events, there is 
considerable uncertainty about the likelihood of their occurrence. There 
is a tendency to either ignore a potential disaster or overreact to a recent 
one. As a consequence, people and insurance providers tend to focus on 
the	losses	from	a	worst-case	scenario	without	adequate	reflection	on	the	
likelihood of the event occurring in the future.
If a private-public insurance program were to be provided then it 
would need to be linked with other initiatives. Given the reluctance 
of individuals to voluntarily purchase insurance against losses, regu-
lations could require insurance coverage for all individuals who face 
similar risk. Insurance premiums would be risk based to provide appro-
priate price signals about the hazards individuals face and enable insur-
ance providers to lower premiums for properties where mitigation is 
undertaken. 
Chapter 10 discusses the provision of insurance for geological and 
man-made disasters. It outlines potential problems and offers sugges-
tions for national disaster policies, such as proposals for legislation 
and administrative practices for improved planning and responses to 
disasters.
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Notes
 1. See	 http://www.lapdonline.org/history_of_the_lapd/content_basic_view/1132	
(accessed July 21, 2016). 
   2. Given our focus in this chapter, geophysical processes such as the landslide in 
Oso, Washington, are not discussed. In the FEMA disaster-related declarations 
list this event is recorded as Washington Flooding and Mudslides (DR-4168), an 
incident period from March 22, 2014, to April 29, 2014, with a major disaster 
declaration on April 2, 2014.
   3. The time period under discussion refers only to events since 1953. The earth-
quakes in New Madrid, Missouri, of 1811, and San Francisco of 1906 fall outside 
the scope of the discussion in this book.  
   4. See, for example, http://www.iags.org/costof911.html, from the Institute for 
the	Analysis	of	Global	Security	 (accessed	July	21,	2016).	The	first	11	 items	of	
its 12-item list of loss categories total $242 billion. No attempt has been made 
to compare the Institute’s methodology for estimating losses with the NOAA 
methodology.
	 5.	 The	benefits	totaled	$13.7	million	for	New	York	and	$0.2	million	for	Virginia.
   6. See Lochbaum, Lyman, and Strahan (2014). Chapters 9 and 10 in that volume 
provide details of other nuclear power incidents in the United States that could 
have had more serious consequences under differing circumstances. Chapter 12 
describes the regulatory interface between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
and the nuclear power industry.
  7. The number of measles cases reported to CDC is updated weekly at http://www.
cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html (accessed July 21, 2016). 
  8. http://www.cdc.gov/zika/geo/united-states.html (accessed April 18, 2016).
		9.	 The	New	York	World	Trade	Center	Explosion	(DR-984)	in	1993;	the	Oklahoma	
Explosion at Federal Courthouse in Oklahoma City (DR-1048) in 1995; the two 
terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 (DR-1391 and DR-1392); and the Massa-
chusetts Explosions (EM-3362) in 2013.
 10. See Kunreuther et al. (2014, section 1). Reinsurers paid for about two-thirds of the 
losses from the September 11, 2001, disaster.
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Disasters and 
Compensation Systems
OVERVIEW OF DISASTERS
This volume explores the recent history of disasters in the United 
States using state-level data that extend back to the early 1950s. From 
1953 through the end of 2013 the cumulative number of declarations 
made by FEMA was 2,046 major disasters, 355 emergency declara-
tions,	and	1,050	fire	management	declarations.1 The results of analyz-
ing state-level data in Chapter 2 show a strong upward trend in both 
major	disaster	and	fire	management	assistance	declarations.	Between	
1953 and 2013 the annual increase in major disasters was about one per 
year	(shown	by	the	annual	trend	coefficient	of	0.885).	The	analysis	also	
finds	an	acceleration	 in	 the	occurrence	of	major	disasters	after	1995.	
Fire management assistance declarations in particular have become sig-
nificantly	more	numerous	since	1995.
Chapter 2 also documents the strong upward trend in the annual 
number	of	floods	and	tornadoes,	which	account	for	about	three-quarters	
of	all	major	disasters.	Drawing	on	the	findings	of	subsequent	chapters,	
however, the increase in disasters is a broad-based phenomenon and is 
not limited to just one or two categories. In addition, Chapter 2 shows 
that the occurrence of disasters has far outpaced the growth in popula-
tion	since	the	early	1950s.	A	disaster	incurs	significant	costs,	including	
loss of life, reduced economic production, and damage to property and 
infrastructure. Generally speaking, fewer people are dying in disasters, 
but	the	financial	costs	associated	with	disasters	are	increasing.
Improved science and technology is a principal reason that fewer 
lives are lost when a disaster occurs. The forecasting of potential natu-
ral hazards has improved, and superior structures are being built to bet-
ter withstand the effects of disasters due to these hazards. Even though 
property and infrastructure are more resistant to damage, the total dollar 
amount of destruction has been increasing, mainly because the number 
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of disaster-related events is rising. Stated simply, society now has a 
larger volume of valuable resources exposed to hazards. The increase 
in the occurrence of disasters also requires increasing taxpayer dollars 
to	finance	 the	various	agencies	 responsible	 for	managing	 the	adverse	
effects of hazards and related disasters.
LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF DISASTERS
Hurricanes stand out among the categories of major disasters for the 
scale of their destructive effects. The 33 hurricanes and tropical storms 
of the 1980–2013 period accounted for nearly half of the $1.1 trillion of 
total costs from the 170 billion-dollar disasters as estimated by NOAA. 
Hurricanes also accounted for approximately two-thirds of DUA weeks 
compensated since 1983 and two-thirds of NFIP cash payments since 
1978. Drought is the only other category of major disaster that is of 
comparable cost per event. 
Chapters	4	and	5,	which	examine	hurricanes	and	floods,	establish	
that disasters have measurable effects in the labor market. Hurricane 
Katrina	 caused	 significant	 increases	 in	 the	 statewide	 unemployment	
rates of Louisiana and Mississippi in the fall of 2005. Associated with 
higher	unemployment	were	significant	 increases	 in	 the	number	of	UI	
beneficiaries	in	these	two	states,	but	not	in	Alabama.	While	Hurricane	
Sandy	did	not	 raise	 statewide	unemployment	 rates	 in	New	York	 and	
New	Jersey,	it	did	cause	significant	increases	in	the	number	of	UI	ben-
eficiaries	in	both	states.	In	contrast,	our	analysis	of	Hurricanes	Andrew	
and Ike and the four destructive hurricanes that impacted Florida during 
August–September	2004	does	not	find	evidence	of	statewide	increases	
in	unemployment	or	UI	beneficiaries.2
Our	analysis	of	three	major	floods	in	the	Midwest	region	also	iden-
tifies	significant	labor	market	effects	that	followed	the	floods	of	1993	
and	1997,	but	not	the	flood	of	2008.	Unemployment	rates	in	the	affected	
states	were	higher	and	the	number	of	UI	beneficiaries	increased	signifi-
cantly.3 In our analysis of tornadoes and drought, we also test for labor 
market	effects	due	to	these	two	categories	of	disasters,	but	do	not	find	
significant	effects	in	statewide	data.
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These	results	lead	us	to	conclude	that	finding	state-level	effects	of	
major disasters is likely only if the disaster is of an extremely large 
scale and/or the state is comparatively small. The effects of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Sandy were discernible at the state level because of their 
large-scale destruction. We also infer that the effects of disasters on 
unemployment and UI recipiency were of comparatively short duration, 
lasting from four to six months or fewer. A larger and richer data set, 
particularly with county-level data, could provide more information on 
disaster-related labor market effects.
The	reporting	of	UI	benefit	payments	does	not	separately	identify	
payments	due	to	disasters.	We	encourage	a	modification	to	the	UI	data	
reporting system to explicitly recognize disaster-related UI payments. 
This	modification	would	allow	policymakers	and	other	stakeholders	to	
more accurately assess the importance of major disasters as a cause for 
UI	benefit	 payments.	The	need	 to	 know	 such	 information	may	grow	
in the future if the scale of the DUA program continues to decline, as 
documented	in	Chapter	3.	Both	UI	and	DUA	benefits	provide	a	cush-
ion to vulnerable individuals not only during but after a disaster. These 
programs are already being delivered and can reach a sizable number 
of	disaster-prone	households.	Our	proposed	modification	requires	rela-
tively minor adaptations to the existing UI program with comparably 
low additional costs.
The current practice in state UI programs is to treat disaster-related 
UI	 benefit	 payments	 as	 noncharged	 benefits;	 that	 is,	 these	 payments	
are a common charge whose cost is spread across all covered employ-
ers and not assigned only to the individual employers who make the 
payments.	In	effect,	current	financing	makes	these	benefit	payments	a	
shared	financial	responsibility	of	all	employers	in	the	state.
An	argument	can	be	advanced	that	disaster-related	UI	benefit	pay-
ments are a federal rather than a state responsibility. To the extent that 
social insurance (as opposed to private insurance) compensates survi-
vors,	national	funding	of	 these	benefits	seems	appropriate,	analogous	
to	the	national	funding	of	DUA	benefits.	A	starting	point	for	advanc-
ing this idea of national funding is to collect information on the cur-
rent volume of disaster-related payments made by the UI programs. To 
obtain this information, a survey of the states is needed. Securing state 
cooperation in such a survey should not be a problem since the states 
would	be	transferring	to	the	federal	partner	a	part	of	the	cost	of	benefits	
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currently	financed	by	state-level	UI	 taxes.	After	 implementation,	 this	
approach	to	financing	these	benefit	payments	would	be	a	national	rather	
than state responsibility.
THE ROLE OF INSURANCE
Hazards, exposure, and vulnerability are characteristic of the rela-
tionship between people and risk. The UNISDR (2009) divides risk 
into two broad categories: extensive and intensive. An extensive risk 
is “associated with the exposure of dispersed populations to repeated 
or persistent hazard conditions of low or moderate intensity, often of a 
highly localized nature, which can lead to debilitating cumulative disas-
ter impacts” (p. 15). An intensive risk, on the other hand, is “associ-
ated with the exposure of large concentrations of people and economic 
activities to intense hazard events, which can lead to potentially cata-
strophic disaster impacts involving high mortality and asset loss” (p. 
18). A drought is an example of an extensive risk. Extensive risks are 
largely shaped by the underlying risk factors and can be relatively eas-
ily reduced. Flooding in large river basins and hurricanes are examples 
of an intensive risk. Intensive risks are largely determined by the loca-
tion, severity, and frequency of the hazard, which means that there are 
limits as to how much risk can actually be reduced.
While the risks cannot be eliminated, the scale or severity of haz-
ards can be substantially lessened in a way that can minimize the hazard 
to individuals and communities. If hazard severity and exposure cannot 
be reduced, then the main opportunities for reducing risk lie in reduc-
ing vulnerability. Vulnerability refers to the way a disaster will affect 
human life and property. The UNISDR (2015) considers three kinds 
of risk management strategies to reduce vulnerability: prospective risk 
management, corrective risk management, and compensatory risk man-
agement. Prospective risk management requires strategies to ensure 
that development does not introduce new risks to the stock of risk-prone 
assets. For example, building standards can be improved and enforced 
to reduce vulnerability in new construction, land-use planning can deter 
development from hazard-prone areas, and better water management 
can reduce drought risk. Corrective risk management removes risks 
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already present before they become a loss. For example, highly exposed 
and vulnerable structures could be relocated, obsolete infrastructure 
could be renovated, and degraded ecosystems could be restored. 
Different risk management strategies are needed to reduce the two 
categories	of	risk	defined	above.	Since	extensive	risks	are	largely	shaped	
by the underlying risk factors, a greater understanding of these risk fac-
tors can reduce them. The more intensive risks need to be addressed 
through compensatory risk management, which can include risk trans-
fer	mechanisms,	such	as	insurance	and	reinsurance,	contingent	financ-
ing, and social insurance and social protection programs. Insurance is a 
valuable tool for managing risk and handling vulnerability. When insur-
ance	functions	as	intended,	it	not	only	provides	financial	protection	to	
individuals	and	communities,	but	also	a	profitable	business	model	for	
insurance providers.
Private insurance policies can be devised for many hazards that 
have catastrophic consequences. There are three general requirements 
for insurability. First, the hazard and the associated losses need to occur 
with	 sufficient	 frequency	 that	 the	 insurance	 provider	 can	 develop	 an	
accurate estimate of the distribution of potential losses. Second, the act 
of insuring does not alter the distribution of the loss; that is, there is no 
moral hazard. Third, the parameters of the loss distribution (frequency 
and size of losses) are stable over time such that actuarially fair policies 
(including	a	profit	for	the	insurer)	can	be	devised.
Several	hazards	identified	in	this	book	satisfy	these	three	conditions.	
Examples of anthropogenic hazards would include commercial airline 
crashes, construction collapses, maritime disasters, mine disasters, and 
train wrecks. Insurance policies can be devised and compensation pro-
vided to recipients who incur covered losses. For instance, commercial 
airlines can insure their equipment for the hazard of an air crash.
Chapter 3 presents the most common private insurance policy for 
homeowners in the United States: the Homeowner-3 (HO-3) policy. A 
standard HO-3 policy provides broad coverage for losses from hazards, 
such	as	explosions,	fire,	hail,	lightning,	smoke,	storms,	theft,	tornadoes,	
vandalism,	and	wind.	In	some	hailstorm-prone	areas,	there	is	a	specific	
hail damage deductible. A deductible is the part of the claim that is not 
covered by the insurance company and will be borne by the insured 
homeowner. There are some restrictions in coverage for windstorm 
damage if one lives near the Atlantic or Gulf coasts because of the high 
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risk of damage from hurricanes. Similarly, if one lives in certain parts 
of the Midwest where tornadoes are common, windstorm damage is not 
usually covered.
Individuals choose how much prevention to undertake, how much 
insurance to purchase, and how much residual risk to bear through cop-
ing. Economic theory posits that individuals undertake prevention to 
the	point	where	expected	benefits	 (avoiding	 losses)	exceed	 the	costs,	
subject	 to	 a	budget	 constraint.	Survey	findings	 show	 that	 individuals	
sometimes misperceive risks and may not always act in their own best 
interests. They tend to discount low-probability future losses and seem 
reluctant to invest in disaster risk management. A survey conducted by 
Viscusi	and	Zeckhauser	(2006)	finds	that	most	respondents	assess	their	
risks as “below average.” Those in riskier areas who experience disas-
ters estimate their risks to be higher, but not as high as they should sta-
tistically. These individuals appeared to underestimate risk even though 
the survey was conducted in 2006, shortly after Hurricane Katrina.
As Chapter 9 notes, earthquake insurance can be purchased for an 
additional premium under a standard HO-3 policy in all states except 
California. Earthquake coverage for residents in California can be pur-
chased through the California Earthquake Authority, which is a state-
run earthquake insurance program. Earthquake coverage for business 
firms	in	California	is	usually	included	in	a	commercial	policy	or	can	be	
purchased from private insurers as separate coverage.
Other hazards with catastrophic consequences do not satisfy the 
three requirements for insurability. Examples include terrorist attacks, 
cyber attacks, nuclear power plant disasters, and biological catastro-
phes, such a plagues and epidemics. The likelihood of these hazards 
occurring is extremely rare, but the associated losses are devastating, 
making	it	difficult	or	impossible	to	assess.	Hence,	a	catastrophic	hazard	
is a low-probability, high-consequence (LP-HC) event.
Providing insurance for LP-HC events is a particular challenge for 
individuals at risk, insurance providers, and regulators. Individuals at 
risk have a tendency to ignore extremely rare events until after a disas-
ter occurs. Many individuals do not voluntarily buy coverage against 
potential LP-HC events because they do not think a catastrophic loss 
will happen to them. Chapter 5 shows that people voluntarily buy insur-
ance only after incurring a serious loss, but many cancel their policies 
if they do not experience a compensated loss in succeeding years. This 
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pattern leads us to conclude that many individuals do not view insur-
ance as a protective measure. Rather, they consider insurance an invest-
ment and believe that the premium is wasted if they do not receive 
payment from an insurance claim.
Insurance providers do not behave optimally in the case of LP-HC 
events. After they suffer a severe loss, they may decide that the risk is 
completely uninsurable rather than increase the premium to cover the 
hazard. Chapters 3 and 5 note that private insurance companies pro-
vided	flood	insurance	until	the	late	1920s.	Following	the	heavy	losses	
incurred	by	the	insurance	industry	after	the	Mississippi	floods	in	1927,	
private	flood	 insurance	 coverage	was	 discontinued.	Prior	 to	 the	New 
York Terrorist Attack (DR-1391) on September 11, 2001, terrorist insur-
ance was included (but not explicitly priced) in standard property loss 
policies providing coverage against damage to commercial property. 
Nearly all property loss policies written after September 2001 excluded 
terrorist attacks because insurance providers feared catastrophic losses 
from future attacks.
State regulators often limit insurance premiums in the case of 
LP-HC events because they are concerned about the affordability of 
insurance, especially to those who are at higher risk. Kunreuther and 
Michel-Kerjan (2011) outline how the state of Florida set up its own 
insurance company, Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, and heav-
ily subsidized the policies of homeowners residing in hurricane-prone 
areas. These highly subsidized rates undercut the premiums of private 
insurers. Moreover, an inappropriate premium has adverse effects that 
are	difficult	to	rectify	later.	For	example,	low	premiums	encouraged	the	
construction of vacation homes in hazard-prone areas of Florida.
The behavior of at-risk individuals, insurance providers, and regu-
lators outlined above defeats the objective of insurance. The main pur-
pose of insurance is threefold: it needs to provide information about the 
severity of risk through setting appropriate premiums, it needs to moti-
vate those at risk to undertake protection against LP-HC events, and it 
needs to offer incentives in the form of premium reductions to reward 
individuals and communities who invest in risk-reducing measures.
At least two insurance approaches can be suggested for LP-HC 
situations. First, the government can act as the insurer. Second, private 
insurers can write the basic policies but operate with back-up provided 
by reinsurance. As currently structured, terrorist insurance has an ele-
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ment	of	the	first	approach	in	that	the	government	insures	against	large	
open-ended liabilities. The private insurance industry participates with 
a sharing arrangement for what is in effect the deductible element of the 
insurance. Currently, the United States does not have an explicit insur-
ance structure to insure against cyber attacks.
As Chapter 7 describes, the crop insurance program is a federal pro-
gram that is delivered by private sector insurance providers, who use a 
federally designed insurance policy to enter into a private contract with 
agricultural producers. Both the federal government and the insurance 
providers share in the underwriting performance of the contract.
Government insurance programs now provide coverage for the 
hazards	 of	 both	 floods	 and	 terrorist	 attacks.	 Recall	 that	 floods	 were	
perceived to be uninsurable for three main reasons: adverse selection 
meant	that	only	households	and	firms	in	flood-prone	areas	would	pur-
chase coverage; risk-based premiums were too costly for the average 
household;	private	insurers	could	not	generate	sufficient	premiums	to	
insure	against	a	catastrophic	flood	event.	Because	private	carriers	effec-
tively deemed potential losses too uncertain to price out and stopped 
providing coverage, the federal government has stepped in to provide it. 
Private carriers continue to participate in the administration of both the 
flood	insurance	and	crop	insurance,	but	the	ultimate	financial	liability	
for losses resides with the federal government.
SOCIAL INSURANCE
An alternative approach for providing insurance protection against 
disaster risk is through social insurance. As noted in Chapter 3, social 
insurance can be viewed as a scheme that requires individuals to con-
tribute in advance to a program that will help them in times of personal 
need, rather than rely on taxpayers when the need arises. All parties at 
risk pay actuarially fair premiums into a trust fund, which dispenses 
payments to those survivors who have coverage. Coverage can be man-
datory as with UI and workers’ compensation insurance. A potential 
advantage of social insurance is the mandatory feature of coverage so 
that the issues of adverse selection are avoided. Social insurance can 
also	 charge	 differential	 contribution	 rates	 that	 reflect	 risk;	 for	 exam-
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ple, higher premium rates for residences and business establishments 
located	adjacent	 to	 rivers,	 in	floodplains,	 and	 in	 coastal	 areas.	These	
same insurance-pricing features can also be provided through private 
insurance.
Social insurance does not reduce disaster risk in and of itself, but 
it can be part of strategic disaster risk management. Social insurance 
instruments can enhance the disaster resilience of individuals and 
households and protect household assets. Many of these instruments are 
already being delivered in the United States. They have the advantage 
of reaching large numbers of disaster-prone households and communi-
ties both during and after a disaster and can help compensate for income 
loss, medical expenses, and other expenses.
INCREASING PARTICIPATION IN THE NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM 
NFIP coverage has been stable and even declining since 2006. As 
mentioned	in	Chapter	5,	the	program	has	difficulty	maintaining	cover-
age among insured homeowners who do not receive payments for losses 
in the years immediately after electing coverage. Three approaches hold 
promise for increasing coverage: the use of community ratings, multi-
year policies, and increased enforcement of mandatory coverage.
Community ratings and multiyear policies differ from current NFIP 
policies that are sold annually to individual homeowners and business 
establishments. Community ratings would apply to an entire commu-
nity where all households and businesses would participate and pay a 
community premium rate. These would be of particular relevance to 
communities where a substantial share of property is located in a 100-
year	floodplain.
Multiyear policies would be sold for multiyear periods, perhaps for 
the	duration	of	a	mortgage	for	property	located	in	a	100-year	floodplain.	
Such policies would encourage investment in preventive and protective 
measures	with	premiums	reflecting	risk	over	a	longer	time	horizon	than	
current annual insurance policies. Experience could determine if the 
price of multiyear insurance would be higher than single year cover-
age, but one advantage for individuals would be price stability. Regula-
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tors would have to allow insurance providers to charge premiums that 
reflect	risk.
Enforcement of mandatory participation in either approach, how-
ever, presents major administrative challenges. Pilot projects should 
test both ideas to assess their effectiveness and to help identify imple-
mentation problems. The point of both approaches would be to more 
effectively	maintain	flood	insurance	coverage	compared	to	the	present	
situation where annual attrition rates can be as high as 30 percent of 
covered properties.
A third approach to increasing coverage would be to aggressively 
enforce	 insurance	 coverage	 on	 properties	 located	 in	 100-year	 flood-
plains. Estimates from the National Academy of Sciences (2015) sug-
gest that half of all properties with mortgages in these locations avoid 
NFIP mandatory coverage. Enforcement could consider penalizing 
both the property owner and the mortgagor when noncovered proper-
ties	are	identified.	
As noted in Chapter 5, NFIP coverage has not been increasing since 
about 2007 or even after the destruction caused by Sandy in late 2012. 
Unless coverage can be enhanced, the NFIP will decline and necessitate 
greater future reliance on emergency payments rather than insurance 
payments	to	the	survivors	of	major	floods.
CONCLUSIONS
As a nation, we can take measures to increase our resilience to disas-
ters. These measures are generally long-term projects to enhance our 
awareness of hazards, improve our physical structures and infrastruc-
ture, and ensure that effective recovery procedures are in place when 
a	disastrous	event	occurs.	The	Stafford	Act	 instituted	a	first	 response	
to a disaster, introduced long-term recovery strategies, and established 
disaster assistance programs.
Managing disaster risks involves adaptation and mitigation from 
individuals, the private sector, and all levels of government. The 
UNISDR	(2009,	p.	19)	defines	mitigation	as	the	“lessening	or	limita-
tion of the adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters.” Mitigation 
measures include public awareness of hazards, dissemination of infor-
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mation and timely warnings, hazard-resistant construction, and policies 
that incorporate disaster risk management. Individuals can respond to 
expected hazards and moderate their harmful effects. Local government 
and the private sector are critical players in reducing disaster risk, given 
their	roles	in	managing	risk	information	and	financing.	National	gov-
ernments can coordinate the efforts of local and state governments by 
providing information, establishing policy and legal frameworks, deliv-
ering	financial	support,	and	protecting	vulnerable	groups.
We need to continue investigating hazards so that we know how 
to prepare for and respond to them when they occur. Such observation 
usually involves monitoring natural hazards to identify any anomalous 
change that may lead to a more devastating event. As outlined in Chap-
ter 4, hurricanes are known to pass through several stages of develop-
ment: from tropical depression to tropical storm and then hurricane. 
Once	a	tropical	depression	is	identified,	meteorologists	can	monitor	it	
to predict how long the development will take and identify the eventual 
path of the storm.
We can design and install early warning systems to alert us to haz-
ards that may be about to occur. A people-centered early warning sys-
tem would disseminate timely and meaningful warning information 
that would enable individuals and communities threatened by a hazard 
to	prepare	for	and	act	appropriately	with	sufficient	time	to	reduce	the	
possibility of harm or loss. Together with early warning systems, we 
need to establish lines of communication and ensure that the public has 
an appropriate response to warnings. Warnings and evacuations need 
to be coordinated, and local capabilities must be able to respond to the 
warnings.
We can also develop and enforce building codes that require struc-
tures to withstand earthquakes or high winds. Building codes and regu-
lations, construction styles, and zoning statutes are important elements 
in enhancing resilience to hazards. Climate data show that average tem-
peratures and annual precipitation has increased in the United States. 
The	 increased	 temperature	 trend	 can	 lead	 to	wildfire-induced	 degra-
dation of ecosystems as well as property loss and mortality. Chapter 
8 notes that forest managers and municipal planners are increasingly 
incorporating	fire	protection	measures,	such	as	prescribed	burning,	to	
support ecosystem adaptation. The U.S. Global Climate Change Pro-
gram	(Joyce	et	al.	2014)	finds	that	adaptation	in	human	settlements	is	
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constrained by private property development in high-risk areas; adapta-
tion could be encouraged by appropriate land-use planning.4 Chapter 
5	 indicates	 that	 extreme	precipitation	 can	 result	 in	floods	 in	 riverine	
and coastal areas that lead to property and infrastructure damage as 
well as environmental degradation. Older rainfall design standards are 
employed	in	some	areas	and	need	to	be	updated	to	reflect	current	cli-
mate	conditions.	The	intensity	of	flood	events	could	be	reduced	by	con-
servation of wetlands and land-use planning.
While we do not discuss climate change in detail, we make refer-
ences to the phenomenon throughout the book. Here we acknowledge 
that	steps	to	increase	resilience	to	climate	change	would	significantly	
reduce exposure and vulnerability in densely populated areas and lead 
to successful prevention. The many disaster risks of climate change 
tend to be concentrated in urban areas. Improving housing and con-
structing resilient infrastructure systems are vital. The federal govern-
ment has taken the lead in providing guidance, information, and support 
in planning for and implementing measures to adapt to climate change. 
The new federal climate adaptation initiatives and strategies developed 
in recent years are outlined in the U.S. Global Climate Change Program 
(Joyce et al. 2014).5 While all federal agencies are required to plan for 
adaptation, state/tribal governments, and local and regional govern-
ments are currently engaged in various stages of planning.
Risk-financing	mechanisms	 in	 the	private	and	public	sector,	 such	
as insurance, can contribute to increasing resilience. As Chapter 10 
shows, the design of insurance instruments is a continuing challenge; 
unintended consequences can lead to disincentives, market failure can 
result, and equity could be decreased. We can structure insurance poli-
cies to assist in the recovery from the damages incurred as well as pro-
viding compensation. Insurance providers and regulators need to edu-
cate at-risk households and businesses that insurance is a proactive way 
to reduce risk. In addition, insurance policies need to be transparent, 
understandable, and equitable. It is also important for insurance pre-
miums	to	reflect	risk	so	that	policyholders	accurately	perceive	the	risk	
they face and become aware of the preventive or protective measures 
that reduce their vulnerability to potential losses. Insurance also needs 
to deal with the issues of affordability and equity. Any special treat-
ment given to individuals at risk (for example, low-income uninsured or 
inadequately insured individuals) should be in the form of means-tested 
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financial	support	rather	than	insurance	premium	subsidies.	Kunreuther	
and Michel-Kerjan (2011), Kunreuther, Pauly, and McMorrow (2013) 
and	 Kunreuther	 (2015)	 suggest	 that	 the	 financial	 support	 should	 be	
means-tested	insurance	vouchers,	financed	by	the	federal	government	
or at a state level through general taxes.
The United States uses a combination of private insurance, govern-
ment insurance, disaster assistance, and other income support to man-
age the risk and vulnerability of disasters. The book examines selected 
aspects of these systems, as they provide support to survivors of cata-
strophic events. As a nation, we can take many steps to reduce the risk 
and vulnerability to hazards and to respond effectively when a disaster 
occurs. While these steps can be divided into several categories, it is 
important to note that there is no clear distinction among them: preevent 
preparedness, emergency responses immediately after extreme events 
occur, postevent recovery and reconstruction, and developing resilience 
in nondisaster times.
Preventing a disaster requires strategies that reduce exposure and 
vulnerability to contain damage and loss. Not all disasters, however, 
can be prevented. The impact of a disaster depends on how individu-
als and governments react and cope. Effective prevention requires a 
myriad of measures working harmoniously together. With enough 
public awareness, individuals, the private sector, and governments can 
undertake preventive measures, and the federal government can take 
the lead. The ultimate goal is to increase our resilience to hazards and 
avoid disasters. Our choices make us either more susceptible to disas-
ters or more resilient.
Notes
 1. Information on major disaster declarations is available from 1953; for emergency 
declarations	from	1974;	and	fire	management	declarations	from	1970.
  2. The four hurricanes were Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne.
		3.	 The	 nine	Midwest	 states	 affected	 by	 the	 flooding	 in	 1993	were	 Illinois,	 Iowa,	
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wis-
consin.	The	1997	flood	resulted	in	major	disaster	declarations	in	Minnesota,	North	
Dakota, and South Dakota. The major disaster declarations in 2008 were in Iowa, 
Missouri, Nebraska, and South Dakota.
		4.	 Bierbaum	et	al.	(2014)	find	that	adaptation	by	human	settlements	is	also	by	limited	
household-level adaptive capacity.
  5. See Note 4.
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Disaster Supplemental Nutrition  
 Assistance Program (D-SNAP),  
 59, 74n25, 74n27
Disaster Unemployment Assistance  
 (DUA) program, 60–64, 74nn30– 
 34
	 federal-state	benefits	beyond	UI,	50,		
 60–61, 74n30, 74n32
	 financial	assistance	from,	60,	61–64,		
 62t, 63f, 74n31, 74n33
	 floods	and,	10,	61,	62t, 74n34, 99– 
 100, 99t
 geological disasters and, 171–172
 human-environment interaction and,  
 169–170, 173, 179n1, 179n5
 hurricanes and, 9, 61, 62, 62t, 74n34,  
 77, 78, 82–83, 86–87, 89, 90,  
 91–93, 182
 tornadoes and, 61, 62t, 63, 74n34
Disasters, 15–41
 declaration and frequency of, 1–3, 8,  
 12n3, 15, 19–21, 39, 41n5
   (see also DR [major disaster])
 distinction between, and hazards, 2,  
 13n6
 human exposure to, 2, 28–32, 30t, 184
 insurance role in, 184–189
 labor market effects of, 182–184,  
 193nn2–3
 mitigation of, 1, 11, 12, 54, 67, 70– 
 72, 73nn11–12, 131, 150, 153,  
 165f, 166–167, 190–191, 193
   (see also under Risks, disaster,  
 and their reduction)
 nature of, 15, 16, 39
   (see also under Weather-related  
 disasters, taxonomy of)
 overview of, 181–182, 193n1
 relief from, 3–4, 5, 8, 13n10, 39–40,  
 167
   (see also under Compensation for  
 disaster survivors)
 severity of, 2, 5, 13n8, 184
 trends in, 16–22, 17f, 25–26, 27t,  
 41nn2–3, 181
District of Columbia (DC), disaster  
 occurrences in, 28–29, 171
DR (major disaster)
 declaration of, followed by sequence  
 number, 1, 4, 11, 12n2, 14n13,  
 20t, 95–96n6, 95n3, 95n5, 171– 
 172, 193n1
   (see also specifics, e.g.,  
 Mississippi Severe Storms and  
 Tornadoes [DR–4205])
	 defined,	4,	13n11
 FEMA and, 16, 17f, 24, 95n3, 181
Drought, 135–151
 as billion-dollar events, 10, 46–47,  
 46t, 49t, 73n6, 140, 150, 182
 climate change and, 2, 7, 15, 135
 correlates of, 22–23, 23t
 duration of, 23t, 40, 136, 137, 184
 economic losses and insurance for,  
 143–149, 146t, 150–151, 151nn8–9
 severity as measurement of, 136,  
 137–140, 139t, 151n6, 151nn2–4
 states affected by, 140, 141–143,  
 142t, 150
 types of, 136, 137
DUA. See Disaster Unemployment  
 Assistance program
Dust Bowl
 average precipitation during, by state,  
 142t, 143
 historical context of, 136, 141–143
 recovery from, and legislation, 65–66,  
 141
Earthquakes, 3, 11
 DR declarations for, 170, 171–172
 as geological hazards, 7, 8, 11, 169,  
 179n3
 homeowners insurance coverage for,  
 64, 74nn35–36, 186
East Coast, U.S. See Atlantic Coast
206   Brusentsev and Vroman
ECLAC. See United Nations Economic  
 Commission for Latin America  
 and the Caribbean
Economic development, natural hazards  
 and, 2, 3, 10, 72
Economic Development Administration  
 (EDA), U.S., national disaster  
 recovery and, 70, 75n45
Economic Injury Disaster Loans  
 Program, small business recovery  
 under, 55
Economic losses. See under Losses,  
 economic, due to
Ecosystems
 forest, 3, 153, 167nn1–2, 191
 riverine, 114, 192
EDA. See Economic Development  
 Administration, U.S.
EF-Scale. See Enhanced Fujita Scale
ELAP. See Emergency Assistance for  
 Livestock, Honeybees, and Farm- 
 Raised Fish Program, 57–58
EM. See major emergency. See under  
 Emergency declarations, federal  
 record listings of
EM-DAT/CRED. See Emergency Events  
 Database of the Centre for  
 Research on the Epidemiology of  
 Disasters, 2, 12n4
Emergency Assistance for Livestock,  
 Honeybees, and Farm-raised  
 Fish Program (ELAP), coverage  
 for disease and adverse weather,  
 57–58
Emergency Conservation Program,  
 disaster assistance for land  
 rehabilitation under, 58
Emergency declarations, 12n1, 164
 federal record listings of, followed  
 by sequence number, 1, 4–5, 18,  
 20t, 161–162, 172–173, 193n1
 trends in, 22, 41n6
 USDA authorized to make, 58–59,  
 73n9
Emergency Events Database of  
 the Centre for Research on the  
 Epidemiology of Disasters (EM- 
 DAT/CRED), natural hazards  
	 defined	and	categorized	by,	2,		
 12n4
Employment and Training  
 Administration, disaster-related  
 assistance from, 50, 60, 74n30,  
 74n32
Enhanced Fujita Scale (EF-Scale)
 categories EF2–EF9, 121t, 123, 126,  
 127, 128t, 129, 133n7
 as NWS-NOAA enhancement of  
 F-Scale, 121–122
   (see also Fujita Tornado Damage  
 Scale [F-Scale])
Environmental degradation, 3, 7, 192
Environmental management
 disregard for prudent, and human  
 vulnerability, 12n5, 166
 ecosystems in, 3, 114, 153, 167nn1–2,  
 191, 192
 land-use planning in, 151, 163, 166
 water supply and demand in, 136,  
 137, 151
Exposure, human, to disasters, 2, 3,  
 166–167, 182, 184–185
Families and individuals, disaster effects  
 on, 44, 51–53, 81
 See also Social support
Farm Service Agency (FSA), disaster  
 assistance by, 50, 56–58, 73– 
 74n19, 73nn16–18, 74nn20–23
Federal Agricultural Improvement and  
 Reform Act (1996), NAP  
 authorized by, 56, 73nn17–18
Federal Communication Commission,  
 assistance to low-income  
 populations by, 114, 117n13
Federal Crop Insurance Act (1980), 66,  
 74n40, 141, 144
 predecessor of, 65
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation,  
 65–66, 74n38, 144, 150
Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act  
 (1994), 75n40, 144
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Federal Emergency Management Agency  
 (FEMA)
 administrative role of, 1, 12n1, 67,  
 68, 75n43
 agricultural producers and, 10, 39,  
 135
 EM declarations from
   (see under Emergency  
 declarations, federal record  
 listings of)
 FM declarations from, 17–18, 19f, 21,  
 161–162, 181
 mission of, 5, 14nn13–14, 40, 50, 51
 programs of, 13n10, 52–53, 54, 60,  
 74nn31, 161
 reporting system and database  
 developed by, 6, 16, 49, 97, 122,  
 169, 172–173, 179n2, 181
Federal Insurance and Mitigation  
 Administration, NFIP and, 67–68,  
 75n43, 105
Federal Land Assistance, Management  
 and Enhancement (FLAME)  
	 Wildfire	Suppression	Reserve		
 Fund Act Amendments (2014),  
 as Senate-proposed legislation,  
 164, 165–166
FEMA. See Federal Emergency  
 Management Agency
Financing, 154, 164
 accounting for disaster, 2, 13n8
 disaster assistance and, 5, 50–51,  
 73nn10–11, 182
	 flood	insurance	and,	110–114,	112t,  
 115, 190
 loan programs as, for disaster  
 recovery, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54–55,  
 58–59, 116
 risk-, and strengthening resilience,  
 192–193
 safe rooms in tornado preparedness,  
 131, 133nn10–11
Fire
 insurance coverage for, 44, 64, 74n35
 large urban, as man-made disaster,  
 169, 172
 prescribed, 153–154, 155, 159,  
 167n1, 167n7, 191
Fire management assistance
	 federal,	and	fire	suppression	costs,		
 159–160, 160f, 164
 FEMA and, 17–18, 19f
 grant provisions for, 4, 161
 multigovernmental cooperation in,  
 154, 167nn4–5
 U.S. declaration of, as FM followed  
 by sequence number, 1, 5, 19f, 20t,  
 21, 193n1
   (see also	Wildfires)
FLAME Act Amendments (2014), as  
 Senate-proposed legislation, 164,  
 165–166
Flood Disaster Protection Act (1973),  
 hazard-zone mandatory insurance  
 under, 75n42, 105
Flood hazard areas. See Special Flood  
 Hazard Area (SFHA)
Flood insurance
 coverage by, 10, 65, 68, 74n37, 104– 
 110, 188
	 financing	of,	110–114,	112t, 115, 190
 legislation for, 67, 68, 75nn42–43,  
 105, 106, 110, 112–113
 See also National Flood Insurance  
 Program (NFIP)
Flood Insurance Reform Act (2004),  
 75n42, 110
Floods	and	flooding,	3,	7,	97–117,	130,		
 132n1
 agricultural producers affected by, 40,  
 143
 as billion-dollar events, 46t, 49t,  
 73n6, 74n34, 97, 116n2
   (see also specifics, Great Flood  
 [1993])
 building codes to withstand and  
 mitigate, 11, 68
	 classification	of,	25–26
 climate change and, 2, 7
 correlates of, 22–23, 23t
 dam/levee failures and, 169, 172,  
 175–176
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Floods	and	flooding,	cont. 
DUA and, 10, 61, 62t, 74n34, 99–100, 
 99t
 FEMA and, 10, 24–26, 27t, 41n9,  
 75n42, 135
 frequency of, 9–10, 181
 hurricanes associated with, 77, 96n7,  
 105, 109
 insurance coverage of
   (see Flood insurance)
 as major Midwest disasters, 98–100,  
 99t, 193n3
 Midwest, and UI, 100–103, 102t, 182,  
 193n3
FM	(major	fire	management).	See under  
 Fire management assistance, U.S.  
 declaration of
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act  
 (2008), permanent disaster  
 assistance under, 75n40, 145
Food and Nutrition Act (2008),  
 emergency assistance under, 73n9
Food and Nutrition Service, disaster  
 assistance by, 50, 59, 74n25, 74n28
Food Stamp Act (1977), disaster  
 assistance authorized by, 74n27,  
 114
F-Scale. See Fujita Tornado Damage  
 Scale
Fujita Tornado Damage Scale (F-Scale)
 categories F0–F5, 120–121, 121t
 NWS-NOAA enhancement of, 121– 
 122
   (see also Enhanced Fujita Scale  
 [EF-Scale])
	 tornado	classification	by	wind	speed		
 in, 120, 121t, 122
GDP. See Gross domestic product,  
 48–49, 73n7, 95, 147, 151n8
Geological disasters, 169, 170–172, 175,  
 179
	 defined,	7,	169
 DUA and, 171–172
 from natural hazards to, 2, 3, 7, 8, 11,  
 25
 See also Earthquakes; Landslides;  
 Volcanoes
Global changes, 115
 disaster frequency, 12n3, 13n6, 15, 22
 precipitation, 3, 7, 13n7, 13n9, 15,  
 31–32, 39, 150
 temperature, 2–3, 7, 13n7, 13n9, 15,  
 31–32, 41n1, 150, 153
 See also Climate change
Grant programs, FEMA administration  
 of, 4, 52, 54, 161
Great Depression, recovery from, and  
 legislation, 65–66
Great Flood (1993), 108
 among billion-dollar events, 73n6, 97
 DUA and, 96n7, 98, 100, 103
 legislative reform after, 106–107
 states affected by, along major rivers,  
 97–98, 99t, 116n3, 193n3
	 UI	paid	benefits	after,	98,	101–103,		
 102t, 116nn5–6, 182, 193n3
Gross domestic product (GDP)
 billion-dollar disasters compared to,  
 48–49, 73n7, 95
	 crop	prices	and,	deflator,	147,	151n8
Groundwater, agricultural drought and,  
 137–138
Guardians of Peace, cyber attack by, 174
Gulf Coast, 81, 120
	 flood	maps	along,	and	property		
 values, 104–105, 116n7
 hurricanes and, 9, 47, 68, 78, 80
 restrictions in insurance coverage  
 near, 64, 185–186
Hail, 40
 FEMA and, 10, 135
 homeowners insurance for losses due  
 to, 44, 185
 insurance coverage for, 64, 74n35
 supercell production of, 130, 132n1
Hazards
 areas prone to, 55, 71–72
 distinction between, and disasters, 2,  
 13n6
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Health care costs, disaster survivors and,  
 44–45, 70
Heat waves, 2, 15, 73n6, 150
Home Disaster Loan Program, SBA  
 administration of, 52, 53
Homeowner Flood Insurance  
 Affordability Act (2014), as  
 corrective legislation, 68, 113
Homeowners insurance, 111
 disaster-related losses and, 44, 167,  
 175, 185–186
 perils coverage by, 64, 68, 74nn35– 
 36, 104, 113
 voluntary nature of, 132, 167
Human populations
	 activities	of,	and	nonprescribed	fire,		
 154, 167n6
 density of, as disaster correlate,  
 28–32, 30t, 41nn11–13
 disaster severity and, 2, 3, 8, 10
 exposure to disasters by, 2, 3, 166– 
 167, 182, 184–185
 failure of, to address environmental  
 interactions, 2, 3, 11–12, 15,  
 116n7, 166
 growth of, and disaster frequency, 16,  
 31, 39, 153, 162
 public policy safety measures for,  
 71–72, 131, 164, 166
Hurricane	Agnes,	mandatory	flood		
 insurance after, 75n42, 105
Hurricane Andrew
 labor market and, 89–90
 states affected by, 91, 95–96n6
 as third-most costly hurricane, 73n6,  
 82, 89, 92t, 93
 UI after, 91, 182
Hurricane Charley, 95n2
 costs of, 92t, 93
 UI after, 91, 182, 193n2
Hurricane Frances, 95n2
 costs of, 92t, 93
 UI after, 182, 193n2
Hurricane Ike, 96n6
 as fourth-most costly hurricane, 73n6,  
 82, 89, 92t
 labor market and, 89–90
 NFIP paid-outs after, 96n7, 111
 UI after, 91, 182
Hurricane Irene, NFIP paid-outs after,  
 96n7
Hurricane Ivan, 95n2
 costs of, 92t, 93
 UI after, 91, 182, 193n2
 wind speeds of, 90, 96n9
Hurricane Jeanne, 95n2
 costs of, 92t, 93
 UI after, 91, 182, 193n2
Hurricane Katrina, 18
 labor market and, 83–87, 84t, 182
 as most costly hurricane, 45, 47,  
 73n6, 78, 82, 94, 173
 NFIP coverage and payouts after, 92t,  
 96n7, 105, 109, 110–111
 out-migration due to, 41n4, 94
 states affected by, 81, 84t, 95nn3–4
Hurricane Rita, states affected by, 81
Hurricane Sandy
 labor market and, 87–89, 182
 NFIP coverage and payouts after, 92t,  
 93, 96n7, 105, 109, 111, 190
 as second-most costly hurricane, 46,  
 47, 73n6, 78, 82
 states affected by, 79, 87–89, 87t,  
 95n5
Hurricanes, 77–96
 as billion-dollar events, 10, 46–48,  
 46t, 49t, 74n34, 77, 91, 92t, 93,  
 182
	 classification	of,	7,	25
 climate change and, 2, 94
 correlates of, 23t, 80
 costs of, and compensation, 91–93
 DUA and, 9, 61, 62, 62t, 74n34, 91,  
 182
 FEMA and, 26, 27t, 41n10
	 flood	events	associated	with,	77,	91,		
 92t, 96n7, 109
 “Florida Four,” 78, 82, 89–90, 91,  
 92t, 93, 95n2
 frequency of, 3, 9, 93–94
 labor market and, 81–91
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Hurricanes, cont.
 terminology, 78–81
 See also specifics above, e.g,  
 Hurricane Katrina
Hydrological disasters
 natural hazards as, and negative  
 effects on human populations, 2,  
 136, 137
   (see also specifics, e.g., Floods  
	 and	flooding)
 World Meteorological Organization  
 and, 7, 14n18
Hydrological hazards
 mitigation of, 58, 137
 severity index for, 138–139
Hydrometeorological natural hazards,  
	 UNISDR	classification	of,	7,	136
Idaho Volcanic Eruption, Mt. St. Helens  
 (DR-624), 171, 172
IHP. See Individual and Household  
 Program
Illinois Severe Storms, Straight-line  
 Winds, and Tornadoes (DR–4157),  
 41n9
Income
 farm, stabilization, 149, 151
 loss of, as disaster-related, 2, 9, 13n8,  
 45, 70, 81
 low, populations and public  
 assistance, 113–114, 117n13,  
 192–193
Individual and Household Program  
 (IHP), grants by FEMA under its,  
 52
Infrastructure, 2, 3, 192
 disaster-related losses to, 53, 72n3,  
 73n11, 181–182
 failures of, as preventable, 7, 12–13n5
Insurance coverage
 affordability of, 68, 113, 187–188
 premium subsidies for, 75n40, 144– 
 145, 147, 192–193
 private providers of, 40, 64–65, 71,  
 104, 135, 150, 170, 175, 176,  
 179n10, 185
 role of, in disaster-related losses, 11,  
 44, 64–69, 70–71, 136, 184–189
 See also specifics, e.g., Crop  
 insurance; Flood insurance
Insurance Information Institute
 costs of extreme weather events  
 estimated by, 45, 49
 homeowners insurance coverage, 64,  
 74n35
 inaction by, 177, 178
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate  
 Change, data from, 2, 13n7, 32
Labor markets
 effects of disasters on, 182–184,  
 193nn2–3
   (see also Disaster Unemployment  
 Assistance [DUA] program;  
 Unemployment; Unemployment  
 insurance)
	 floods	and,	10,	101,	182
 hurricanes and, 9, 81–91, 182–183
Landslides
	 floods	and,	3,	24,	41n9
 as geological hazard, 7, 130, 179n2
 North Carolina Severe Storms,  
 Flooding, Landslides, and  
 Mudslides (DR–4153), 41n9
Land-use planning, 151
 human adaptation to, 184, 191–192,  
 193nn4–5
 WUI and need for, 163, 166
Lightning, 132n1
 insurance coverage for, 44, 64, 74n35
	 wildfires	due	to,	153,	154–155
Livestock, 56, 57–58, 74n21, 135
Local governments
 as disaster survivor category for  
 compensation, 44, 51, 53–54
 federal funding for disaster assistance  
 to, 5, 39, 43, 70
 reciprocity between state and, 51,  
 154, 167n5, 191
 role of, in code and zoning issues,  
 71–72, 116, 117n4, 131, 166
 role of, in NFIP, 109–110
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Losses
 animal and human, of life from  
 biological vectors, 7, 9
 catastrophic, and public-private  
 insurance partnerships, 44, 65, 116
 disaster-related, and agricultural  
 assets, 56–59, 72n3, 73–74n19,  
 73n18, 74nn20–23
 economic, due to crop failures, 143– 
 144, 147–149, 148t
 economic, due to hurricanes, 9, 77– 
 78, 81–83, 94
 economic, due to man-made disasters,  
 170, 172–173, 179n4, 179n10
 mitigation of disaster-related, 43,  
 75n42, 110, 170, 173
 severity measurements as, vs.  
 damages, 2, 11–12, 13n8
Louisiana Floods (DR–84), 25
Man-made disasters, 169, 172–174,  
 175–179
	 defined	as	human-environment		
 interactions, 7, 11, 13n7, 13n9, 15,  
 25, 169, 173–174, 179nn6–8, 185
 DUA and, 169, 173, 179n5
 FEMA and, 169, 172–173, 179n2
 insurance against, 175–178, 185
 riots as, 169–170
 UNISDR terminology for, 7, 169
Massachusetts Explosions (EM-3362),  
 172–173, 179n9
Measles cases, reported by CDC, 174,  
 179n7
Mesocyclone, 120
Meteorological hazard assessments
 natural, and negative effects on  
 human populations, 2, 3, 136, 137
 predictive technology and, 1, 13n7
 preparedness warnings from, 11, 181
 severity index for, 138–139
Midwest region, U.S.
 divisions in, 8, 133n3, 145, 146t
	 states	in,	and	major	flood	disasters,		
 97, 98–100, 99t, 116n1
 tornado destruction in, and dollar- 
 cost, 129, 132
 tornadoes in, 10, 23–24, 41n9, 120,  
 127, 128t, 129
	 UI	and	floods	in,	100–103,	102t
Mississippi River
 damages along, 101, 116n3
	 floods	along,	47,	97,	104,	116n4, 187
 states east of, and burned acreage,  
 158, 159f
 states west of, with low rainfall, 156,  
 157t
Mississippi Severe Storms and Tornadoes 
 (DR–4205), 1, 12n2
Missouri River
 damages along, 101, 116n3
	 floods	in	states	along,	47,	97,		
 116nn3–4
Moral hazard, as human failure to  
 address environmental  
 interactions, 2, 3, 11–12, 15,  
 116n7, 166, 178
Mortality
	 financial	costs	vs., of disasters, 181– 
 182
 human, as damages, 2, 6, 9, 13n8,  
 131, 133n9, 167, 173–174
Mount St. Helens, volcanic eruption of,  
 as DR-623 and DR-624, 171, 172
Mudslides. See Landslides
Munich Re, costs of extreme weather  
 events estimated by, 45, 49
NAP. See Noninsured Crop Disaster  
 Assistance Program
National Academy of Sciences, NFIP  
 review study by, 114, 190
National Association of State Foresters,  
	 fire	protection	on	nonfederal	lands,	 
 154, 167n5
National Centers for Environmental  
 Information (NCEI), 139t
 predecessor of, 14n17
National Climatic Data Center (NCDC),  
 NOAA
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National Climatic Data Center (NCDC),  
 NOAA, cont. 
cost estimates on weather and climate  
 disasters from, 45–47, 46t, 48, 49t,  
 72nn2–5, 73n6
 data used from, 6, 10, 23, 41nn7–8,  
 122, 151n2
 NCEI as successor to, 14n17, 116n2
 wide variability of precipitation data  
 from, 32, 33f
National Cohesive Wildland  
 Fire Management Strategy,  
 multigovernmental cooperation in,  
 154, 167nn4–5
National Disaster Recovery Framework,  
 U.S.
 EDA role in, 70, 75n45
 presidential policy directive-8, 5, 43,  
 73nn12–13
National Drought Mitigation Center,  
 University of Nebraska,  
	 classification	role	of,	137
National Flood Insurance Program  
 (NFIP), 104–114
 changes proposed for, 114–116,  
 117n14, 189–190
 compensation paid out by, 89, 91–93,  
 92t, 94, 96n7, 109, 110–111, 182
 households covered by, 105–109,  
 106f, 117nn8–9
 local governments role in, 109–110
 maintaining required policies in, 109,  
 117nn10–11, 190
 as public-private partnership, 104– 
 105, 117n14
 rate maps and premiums of, 111–113,  
 112t, 114, 115
 services provided by, 10, 40, 65,  
 67–68, 75n43
National Flood Insurance Reform Act  
 (1994), 75n42, 106
National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC)
 data from, 153, 154, 155, 155f, 159,  
 162, 167–168n8, 167n1, 167n3,  
 167nn6–7
 federal agencies in, 154, 167n4
National Oceanic and Atmospheric  
 Administration (NOAA)
 costs of extreme weather events  
 estimated by, 45, 140, 151n5
 databases compiled by, 6, 119
 programs and services of, 6, 120, 135,  
 139t, 151n2
National Park Service, as NIFC  
 component, 167n4
National Severe Storm Laboratory,  
	 NOAA,	tornadoes	defined	by,	120
National Weather Service (NWS),  
 NOAA, database of, 6, 79, 80, 122
Natural disasters, 1, 5
 mitigation measures for, 72, 181,  
 190–191
Natural hazards, 5, 44
	 definition	and	categories	of,	2,	12n4
 negative effects of, on human  
 populations, 2, 3
 as studied subset of all hazards, 7–8,  
 135
Natural Resources Conservation Service,  
 USDA, watershed protection and  
	 floodplain	easement	administered		
 by, 58
NBCR (nuclear, biological, chemical,  
 radiological) accidents or  
 deliberate acts, 173–174, 176, 186
NCDC. See National Climatic Data  
 Center
NCEI. See National Centers for  
 Environmental Information
New England, U.S. census division,  
 disaster occurrence rate in, 28, 29,  
 41n11
New	York,	disaster	occurrence	in
 earthquake (DR–1415) in 2002, 171
 terrorist attacks (DR–1391 and DR– 
 984) in Manhattan, 11, 25, 170,  
 172, 179nn4–5, 179nn–9–10, 187
NFIP. See National Flood Insurance  
 Program
NGOs. Nongovernmental organizations,  
 40, 44, 69, 75n44
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NIFC. See National Interagency Fire  
 Center
NOAA. See National Oceanic and  
 Atmospheric Administration
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),  
 assistance to disaster survivors by,  
 40, 44, 69, 75n44
Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance  
 Program (NAP), disaster  
 assistance under, 56, 73–74n19,  
 73n18
Nonprofit	organizations
 as disaster survivor category for  
 compensation, 44, 54–55
 as providers of disaster assistance, 44,  
 69
North Carolina Severe Storms, Flooding,  
 Landslides, and Mudslides (DR– 
 4153), 41n9
Nuclear, biological, chemical, and  
 radiological (NBCR) accidents
 deliberate acts or, as man-made  
 disasters, 173–174, 175–176,  
 179n6
 insurance for, 176, 186
Nuclear power incidents, 173, 175–176,  
 179n6
Obama, Pres. Barack, 5, 164
Oconee Nuclear Power Plant, 175–176
Oklahoma, disaster occurrence in
 explosion (DR–1048) at federal  
 courthouse, 11, 12, 172, 179n9
 severe storm (DR–4247) and tornado,  
 1, 12n2
Pacific	Ocean,	41n1, 171
 hurricane formation season in, 78, 79
Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI),  
 138–139, 151n4, 151n6
Palmer Hydrological Drought Index  
 (PHDI), 138–139, 151n3, 151n6
Political pressures, test for, 4, 13–14n12
PPDs. See Presidential policy directives,  
 5, 43, 73nn12–13
Precipitation
 annual, effect on disasters, 136, 138– 
 140, 149t, 150, 157t, 158, 168n13
 average, per western state, 141–143,  
 142t, 151nn6–7, 162
 changes in average U.S., 31–35, 33f,  
 34t, 38–39, 127, 129
 as correlate of extreme-weather  
 events, 22, 23t, 40
 global, and climate change, 3, 13n9,  
 15, 150, 713n7
 heavy, and catastrophic events, 16,  
 119, 192
 See also specifics, e.g., Hail; Rainfall;  
 Snow
Presidential policy directives (PPDs),  
 disaster risk reduction through, 5,  
 43, 73nn12–13
Public policy
 assistance to low-income populations,  
 113–114, 115–116, 117n13
 disaster risk reduction and, 5, 11, 71,  
 131–132, 185
 include land and water use in risk  
 management, 151, 163, 166, 184– 
 185
 means-testing vs. subsidies in, 192– 
 193
 national debt and disaster  
 compensation, 5, 39–40, 43
 public-private partnerships in, 71,  
 132, 150, 178, 187–188
Radiological hazards, NBCR accidents  
 or deliberate acts include, 173
Rainfall, 114, 137, 192
 changes in average U.S., 31–32
	 deficiencies	in,	137,	156
 heavy, 15, 25, 130, 158
Red Cross (organization), assistance to  
 disasters survivors by, 69, 75n44
Resilience
 activities to strengthen, 2, 11, 40, 72,  
 132, 190, 191, 192–193
 building codes and, 167, 190, 191
 disasters and, 2, 14n15, 193
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Risk Management Agency, USDA,  
 federal crop insurance and, 56, 66,  
 75nn39–40, 144
Risks, 166
 disaster, and their reduction, 5, 11, 43,  
 68–69, 70–71, 73nn12–13, 104– 
 105, 131–132, 153, 165, 165t
	 limited	official	recognition	of,	and		
 human vulnerability, 12–13n5
 management of, 135, 136, 147, 184– 
 185, 191, 193
 perceived, and human-environment  
 interaction, 3, 110, 115, 132,  
 162–163, 178, 186–187
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and  
 Emergency Assistance Act (1988)
 eligibility for disaster-related  
 programs in, 51, 74n26, 74n29,  
 190
 provisions of, 3–4, 13nn10–11, 49– 
 50, 73n9
Saffir-Simpson	Hurricane	Wind	Scale,		
 95n1
 in severity measurement, 77, 78–79
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